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ABSTRACT
VIOLENCE AT HOME OR ABROAD:
UNDERSTANDING HOW REBEL LEADERS RESPOND TO
DOMESTIC UNREST
Ruolin Su
Alex Weisiger
Existing studies suggest that leaders with previous rebellion participation have a
higher level of international conflict propensity than leaders with no such experience. This
dissertation examines whether prior rebel experience will induce leaders to initiate an
international conflict in response to domestic strife. I propose a preference modification
approach and argue that rebel leaders’ policy choice during domestic unrest is a product of
their pre-existing preferences and contextual factors: contextual factors not only constrain
leaders’ ability to pursue a certain policy, but more importantly reshape their policy
preference. Specifically, I claim that rebel leaders’ willingness to use force abroad during
domestic unrest is contingent on the severity level of domestic problems. When rebel
leaders face severe internal unrest, they are unwilling to engage in international conflicts
because severe domestic strife will reshape leaders’ perceptions and neutralize their policy
preference toward international conflict through two mechanisms.
First, high intensity level of domestic strife changes the deliberative cost-benefit
calculation about available policy options. Specifically, serious domestic problems call for
a direct, speedy, and “to-the-point” policy response, which enables domestic measures (i.e.
co-optation and repression) to be more efficacious because domestic measures aim to
directly and effectively address the problem that gives rise to the strife. Second, severe
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domestic unrest affects rebel leaders’ intuitive behaviors by activating some certain
predispositions of leaders endowed by rebellion experience, which induces them to use
other policy responses rather than initiating an international dispute.
Statistical analyses of the international militarized dispute initiation of leaders
under domestic strife from 1875 to 2000 reveal strong support for these arguments. Two
case studies of Mao Zedong and Suharto further confirm the causal mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

War is the product of the actions of two or more states or other political
organizations. It follows that to understand the outbreak of war we need to understand
why states make certain decisions rather than other decisions. That leads us to an
analysis of foreign policy decision-making, which focuses on the individuals and
governmental organizations that are empowered to make and implement policies on
behalf of the state.
—Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War, 2010, p.128

Sukarno (or Soekarno),1 the first President of Indonesia serving from 1945 to 1967,
was one of the most famous revolutionary leaders2 in the world. He led Indonesia’s struggle
for independence from the Netherlands as well as Indonesian resistance to Dutch
recolonization. Sukarno’s prior experience of revolutions tremendously influenced his
policies while in office. In his address on the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Founding of the
Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1960, Sukarno admitted that “I am crazed, I am
obsessed by the Romanticism of Revolution.”3 It was argued that one reflection of his
revolutionary trait was his bellicose foreign policy.
From the fall of 1963 to 1966, Sukarno had adopted an aggressive foreign policy
against Malaysia called “confrontation with Malaysia” or “Konfrontasi”. This ostensibly
aimed to express Indonesia’s opposition to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia
with the amalgamation of the eleven states of Malaya, Singapore, and the two former

1

As a rule, I have spelt Indonesian names according to the current spelling system introduced in 1972, except for those
in direct quotations.
2
In the discussion followed, I will use revolutionary leaders and rebel leaders interchangeably to describe leaders who
previously participated in activities that overthrow the existing regime.
3
Sukarno 1960.
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British protectorates of Sarawak and Sabah in Borneo. 4 As a result, an actual violent
conflict took place between the two countries. Since most fighting was in the border area
Borneo, the conflict is also known as the Borneo confrontation.
The motives of Indonesia behind this undeclared war were complex, including
“territorial aggrandizement, a belief that Malaysia is a grave threat, and a desire to assert
Indonesia’s ‘rightful place’ in Southeast Asia.”5 But it is also true that Indonesian leaders,
especially Sukarno, had a vested interest in the confrontation and that the conflict has a
domestic motivation. 6 Specifically, Sukarno provoked the international conflict first to
deflect the public attention from economic deterioration. 7 Then, the crisis provided
Sukarno an environment for anti-Western propaganda, so that he could maintain himself
and the Communist party as the most important political forces in Indonesia.8
Given the existing consensus that revolutionary leaders or leaders with prior
rebellion experience may have an aggressive feature in foreign policy, it would not be
counterintuitive that revolutionary leaders, like Sukarno, would like to utilize international
conflict to tackle domestic problems. As Rex Mortimer puts it, “Sukarno was a man of
intensely romantic temperament, who viewed life as an unfolding drama, or a series of
dramas, in which satisfaction for the revolutionary was to be found not so much in the
attainment of perceived objectives but in the expectation, excitement, and tension of the
struggle itself.”9 In other words, his revolutionary fanaticism would predispose him to

4

Sodhy 1988, 111.
Hindley 1964, 905.
6
Dake 2006, 3; Hindley 1964.
7
Dake 2006, 3.
8
Hindley 1964, 909–912.
9
Mortimer 2006, 80.
5
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foreign aggression in many circumstances, not to mention the situation where the use of
force could be justified by rational considerations as well.
This dissertation is about leaders with rebellion experiences and their willingness
to use force in response to domestic unrest. I ask similar questions as Amy Oakes does in
her book “Diversionary War: Domestic Unrest and International Conflict,” but with a
specific focus on rebel leaders or revolutionary leaders. 10 Do revolutionary leaders use
foreign adventure to improve their domestic political fortunes? If so, under what conditions
are unpopular rebel leaders most likely to deploy this strategy? When is initiating an
international dispute a more-effective response to internal unrest than making political
concessions to opposition groups or suppressing dissent?
Oakes (2012) provides a policy substitutability approach to explain the use of
diversionary tactics in general.11 Specifically, she proposes that “a government’s choices
result from the interaction between leader preferences and environmental factors…. Thus,
if diversionary war is a leader’s preferred response to internal instability and it is
practicable, then the state will pursue this policy path. If, however, environmental factors
rule out the use of diversionary force, the government is compelled to select an alternative,
less palatable, strategy from the menu.”12 In contrast to Oakes’s research, this dissertation
project focuses only on rebel leaders’ policy responses to domestic unrest. I propose a
preference modification approach, and argue that rebel leaders’ policy choice during
domestic unrest is a product of their pre-existing preferences and contextual factors:

10

Oakes 2012, 2.
Oakes 2012.
12
Ibid., 165.
11
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contextual factors not only constrain leaders’ ability to pursue a certain policy, but more
importantly reshape their policy preference.
In particular, I borrow the definition of leader preferences from Oakes (2012) and
define rebel leaders’ preferences as “how the decision maker assesses the desirability of
each option on the policy menu and then ranks these options from most to least
attractive.”13 The major difference from Oakes’s definition is that I emphasize the preexisting nature of these preferences. Specifically, these preferences are primarily created
by leaders’ previous experiences and already existed before they are faced with the
domestic unrest.
In terms of contextual factors, I expand Oakes’s definition of environmental factors.
According to Oakes, “Environmental factors are those conditions that enable or constrain
a leader’s ability to pursue these options.”14 The major problem of this definition is that it
neglects the impact of environmental or contextual factors on reshaping leaders’
preferences and only focuses on how those factors affect leaders’ ability to pursue policy
options. In fact, the context in which leaders are operating could influence both their ability
and their pre-existing preferences. Therefore, here I define contextual factors as those
conditions that could shape both leaders’ pre-existing policy preferences and their ability
to pursue their desirable response.
Specifically, I propose that rebel leaders’ willingness to use force abroad in
response to domestic unrest is contingent on the severity level of domestic problems. When
rebel leaders face a risk of severe internal unrest, they are unwilling to engage in

13
14

Ibid., 6.
Ibid.
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international conflicts, because severe domestic strife will reshape leaders’ perception and
neutralize their policy preference toward international conflict through two mechanisms.
First, high seriousness levels of domestic strife change the cost-benefit calculation
regarding available policy options. Specifically, serious domestic problems call for a direct,
speedy, and “to-the-point” policy response, which enables domestic measures (i.e. cooptation and repression) to be more efficacious because domestic measures aim to directly
and effectively address the problem that gives rise to the strife.
Second, severe domestic unrest affects rebel leaders’ intuitive behaviors by
activating certain predispositions of leaders endowed by rebellion experience, which
induces them to use other policy responses rather than initiating international dispute. To
begin with, the extremely unstable domestic environment compels leaders to choose the
policy they feel most confident in. Rebellion experience causes rebel leaders to be more
confident when utilizing repression to deal with oppositions, given that they came into
power after they survived a severe domestic crisis (i.e. rebellion). This confidence
translates into a preference of repression during severe domestic unrest. In addition, severe
domestic unrest is often accompanied with the risk of international intervention. Compared
to foreign aggression, domestic measures better conform to rebel leaders’ appreciation of
national authority and sovereignty (a predisposition they obtained from rebellion
experience). Furthermore, rebellion experience predisposes rebel leaders to be ruthless to
enemies, which translates into a policy preference of repression during severe domestic
unrest.

5

WHY STUDY LEADERS WITH PRIOR REBELLION PARTICIPATION
AND THEIR RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC UNREST?
The most recent decade has seen a new behavioral revolution sweep over social
science and unfold in international relations.15 According to Hafner-Burton et al. (2017),
“the defining characteristic of this revolution has been the use of empirical research on
preferences, beliefs, and decision making to modify choice- and game-theoretic models.”16
When incorporating the new revolution into international relations, one major theme is “the
heterogeneity of preferences, beliefs, and decision-making processes even across similarly
situated individuals.” 17 Under this general trend, a number of studies on international
conflict look at how state leaders’ formative experiences affect their preferences, beliefs,
and decision making.18 They find that the personal experiences of leaders in their early
years have “large and persistent effects on personality and risk propensity later in life.”19
After leaders enter office later on, their personality, risk propensity, and beliefs shaped by
prior experiences impact their behavior and policy-making.
Among the different life experiences that may shape leaders’ propensity for
international conflict, participation in rebel movements is the one that draws the most
scholarly attention. There are many reasons to think that participation in rebel movements
might have a particularly large and systematic impact on leaders’ tendency for international
conflict when they are facing domestic strife. First, rebellion participation has as much
impact on leaders’ decision-making once they assume power as military experience.
15

Hafner-Burton et al. 2017.
Ibid., 2.
17
Ibid., 5.
18
Colgan 2013; Colgan and Lucas 2017; Colgan and Weeks 2015; Dyson and Preston 2006; Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam
2015; Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015; Goldgeier 1994; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015;
Saunders 2011; Saunders 2017.
19
Horowitz and Stam 2014, 530.
16
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Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam argue that this powerful impact arises for the
following three reasons. To begin with, military background “offers a potentially direct
connection between a behavior someone engages in prior to entering office—fighting a
war—and something they might do while in office—initiating a militarized dispute or
war.”20 Additionally, military experience may modify an individual’s personality and risk
preference, which play a crucial role in one’s later decision-making. Lastly, empirical
evidence from the United States, since the Cold War, implies that leaders with military
experience might hold a different view regarding the use of force from those who do not
have a military background.21
In addition to the reasons listed above, the experience of rebellion participation has
an independent influence on leaders’ policy choices during an internal turmoil. Specifically,
rebellion participation is an essential experience that can shape participants’ future beliefs
about the game of political survival (e.g. how to retain power and who your primary enemy
is). For instance, when his political life was threatened by both the Chinese Communist
Party and Japan, Chiang Kai-shek (or Jiang Jieshi), the leader of the Republic of China
between 1928 and 1949, adopted the policy “first internal pacification, then external
resistance” (rangwai bi xian annei; 攘外必先安内), which gave precedence to suppressing
the communists over resisting Japan.22 This policy is based on Chiang’s belief, formed
during his rebellion period, that “the Japanese are a disease of the skin, but the communists
are a disease of the heart” (rikou wei xianzhen zhiji, gongdang nai xinfu zhihuan; 日寇为

癣疹之疾,共党乃心腹之患).23 Hence, in this dissertation project, I will focus on leaders

20

Ibid., 531.
Horowitz and Stam 2014.
22
Chiang 1992, 54; So 2002, 213.
23
Hopkins 2010, 161; So 2002, 231.
21
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with prior rebellion experience and investigate their policy preferences when they
encountered internal problems.

EXISTING LITERATURE AND ITS LIMITATIONS
As shown in Figure 3.1 in the quantitative chapter, there has been a gradual increase
in the numbers of rebel leaders over time between 1875 to 2000 in the world. Many people
may argue that the prevalence of rebel leaders is mainly the result of decolonization
between the 1940s and 1970s. That said, we should expect a decrease in the numbers of
rebel leaders in the near future, given the relative domestic stability of most countries.
However, this should not obscure the importance of studying the behaviors of rebel leaders.
The beginning of the 21st Century witnessed a spate of rebellion movements, such
as the Columbia Civil War (1970-2010), the series of uprisings in the Arab Spring of 2011,
and the Syrian Civil War from 2011. Some of them have been ended whereas others are
still ongoing. One of the important consequences of these recent anti-government uprisings
is that they could give rise to a group of leaders with prior rebellion experience in the future
and their rebellion experiences will shape their policy preferences. Therefore, it is of great
realistic significance to study the behaviors of rebel leaders.
Conventional wisdom agrees that revolutionary leaders or rebel leaders play an
independent and crucial role in foreign policy-making, and their unique features predispose

8

them to a certain set of policy preferences. Specifically, revolutionary leaders are more
likely to drag their country into interstate wars.24
There are primarily three approaches to explain the association. The first approach
focuses on the personality traits of leaders with rebellion experiences. As Stephen M. Walt
summarizes, “Its proponents begin by arguing that leaders of revolutions are usually selfconfident, stubborn, suspicious, and ruthless. These traits allegedly make revolutionary
leaders difficult to deter and prone to reckless foreign policies, either because they are
convinced of their own infallibility or because they repeatedly seek to perform new acts of
revolutionary heroism.” 25 In addition to these traits, recent studies indicate that
revolutionary leaders are more risk-tolerant and thus are more likely to engage in risky
activities, like war, than leaders with no rebellion experience. 26
The second approach is also about leaders’ predispositions and argues that
revolutions endowed participants with a revolutionary ideology, which could then lead to
a revolutionary foreign policy.27 As Robert C. Tucker notes, “Revolutionary consciousness
begins in estrangement, in a person's feeling of not being a part of the existing society, of
not sharing its sustaining myth…. A revolutionary mind of great creative power will be
one that forms or adumbrates a new concept of social living that may, if a revolution takes
place, become the sustaining myth of a new society.”28 Therefore, if revolutionaries tend
to sell their new concept of social living abroad, war is unavoidable. For instance, before
the late 1940s, “the leaders in Moscow made promoting the proletarian world revolution

24

Colgan 2013; Colgan and Weeks 2015; Colgan and Lucas 2017; Gurr 1988; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Horowitz,
Stam, and Ellis 2015; Tudoroiu 2014; Tudoroiu 2016; Walt 1992; Walt 1996.
25
Walt 1992, 328–329.
26
Colgan 2013; Colgan and Weeks 2015; Colgan and Lucas 2017; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis
2015.
27
Walt 1992, 325–327.
28
Tucker 1995, 106–107.
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and overthrowing capitalism’s global reign the Soviet Union’s sacred state mission.”29 This
mission of exporting revolution was translated into aggressive foreign policy against
capitalist countries.
Dual-process theories of neurosciences contend that “human thought processes are
subserved by two distinct mechanisms: one fast, automatic, and nonconscious, the other
slow, controlled, and conscious, which operate largely independently and compete for
behavioral control.”30 In other words, “the human brain uses at least two different processes
of decision-making based on different neural systems: the intuitive system and the
deliberative system.” 31 In this case, if the first two approaches imply that foreign
aggression is a result of revolutionary leaders’ decision-making based on the intuitive
system, the last approach demonstrates that it depends on the decision-making based on
the deliberative system. Specifically, the first two approaches propose that the international
hostility of revolutionary leaders is heavily emotionally charged, and it is the intuitive
behavior guided by predispositions, which are, in part, the result of experiences. Unlike
the first two approaches, the third approach claims that international conflicts serve
revolutionary leaders’ personal interest. That is, “revolutionary leaders seek conflicts with
other states in order to rally popular support, to justify internal repression, and to provide
a scapegoat should domestic problems persist.”32 In other words, rebel leaders in the face
of domestic unrest have a motivation for war.
When it comes to domestic unrest, it appears to be intuitively reasonable to claim
that the high propensity toward international conflict may accordingly increase the chance

29

Chen 2001, 4.
Evans and Frankish 2009, v.
31
Kaufman 2019, 3.
32
Walt 1992, 327.
30
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of revolutionary leaders’ use of force to deal with domestic unrest, either because of rebel
leaders’ preposition to international conflict in general, or because those leaders perceive
initiating an international dispute as an efficacious option. The Sukarno case discussed
above indicates that revolutionary leaders do use foreign adventure to improve their
domestic political fortunes. But the key questions remain unanswered: are rebel leaders
actually more likely to provoke international conflicts than their non-revolutionary
counterparts as a response to domestic unrest? Are rebel leaders more willing to use
international dispute rather than other policies in the face of domestic troubles? More
research is required to answer these questions.
In addition to the empirical call for more research, investigating revolutionary
leaders’ policy preferences to cope with domestic unrest is of critical theoretical
importance for several reasons. The most important reason is that domestic unrest actually
provides us with a context to further explore the relationship between leaders with rebellion
experience and their war preference in order to fill the theoretical gap of conventional
studies on the topic. Existing approaches regarding revolutionary leaders and war
mistakenly ignore the context in which leaders are operating, which often renders them
incompetent to provide a strong theoretical explanation for the connection between
revolutionary leaders and international conflict on both empirical and logical grounds.
Although cross-national quantitative results seem to suggest that rebel leaders are more
likely to behave aggressively abroad, the explanations of conventional wisdom are far from
satisfactory.
First, most relevant works fail to recognize that the impact of a revolutionary
leader’s personality and preference on foreign policy, is contingent upon the context. Put

11

differently, a state’s foreign policy is not always a manifestation of its leader’s personal
preference. “The context in which the actor is operating is very important: the impact of
leader personality increases to the degree that the environment admits of restructuring.”33
In this case, even if we agreed that the special personality and predisposition of rebel
leaders make them more inclined to participate in war, we cannot explain why so many
rebel leaders did not pursue an aggressive foreign policy. In other words, the failure of
existing approaches to incorporate the context makes them unable to explain when
revolutionary personality or predisposition counts. For instance, after the liberation of
Khorramshahr in 1982, Ruhollah Khomeini, the supreme leader of Iran from 1979 to 1989,
preferred terminating the Iran-Iraq war and not entering Iraqi territory. However, he was
faced with various constraints that prevented him from translating his personal preference
into foreign policy. Eventually, he approved to continue the war. This decision was not a
manifestation of Khomeini’s personal preference for the expansion of the Iranian
revolution as proponents of the aggressive feature of rebel leaders may suggest, but rather
the result of “the interplay and compromise among stakeholders laboring under domestic
and international constraints.”34
The second limit of existing explanations lies in their neglect of the fact that
predispositions and preferences per se are situational. Take the revolutionary ideology
approach as an example. “Although one might hope that ideology would provide a clear
guide to the intentions and actions of revolutionary leaders, in practice revolutionaries
frequently shifted their policies in response to changing circumstances.” 35 In this case,

33

Tudoroiu 2014, 390.
Rouhi and Snow 2019, 7.
35
Goldstone 2016, 417.
34
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predispositions of revolutionary leaders could be translated into diverse policy preferences
under different conditions, but not necessarily translated into the preference for
international conflict. Even if we assumed that a revolutionary leader possessed a unique
personality and a revolutionary ideology, we still could not know for sure whether these
traits would translate into a policy preference toward war in a specific circumstance since
those explanations overlook inconsistencies within the individual’s preferences and
behaviors. For example, as a typical revolutionary leader with both revolutionary
personalities and revolutionary ideologies, Stalin led the Soviet Union’s retreat from
pursing world proletarian revolution from the late 1940s.
If the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 symbolized Moscow’s retreat from
pursuing world proletarian revolution as a state-policy goal, the SovietAmerican agreement at Yalta in February 1945 represented the completion of
a crucial step in the Soviet Union’s ‘‘socialization’’ process. Although Moscow
continued to profess its belief in the Marxist-Leninist theory of international
class struggle, the Soviet Union was no longer the same kind of revolutionary
country it used to be—isolated and excluded from the existing international
system; rather, as a main patron of the postwar world order created at Yalta,
Stalin’s Soviet Union was changing into an insider of the big-power club,
assuming the identity of a quasi-revolutionary country and a status quo power
at the same time.36

Stalin’s inconsistences in foreign policy preferences were not unusual among revolutionary
leaders. Quite often in history that leaders’ foreign policy preferences changed over time
or changed from case to case. Suharto (or Soeharto), the President of Indonesia from 1967
to 1998, pursued an aggressive policy against China but abandoned the Confrontation with
Malaysia after he assumed power. In addition, Walt finds that “[r]evolutionary elites
frequently disagree about foreign policy.”37 This finding indicates that in a general sense,
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there is neither a consistency among one’s choices over time nor an inter-leader consistency
in their foreign policy preferences.
Similarly, one’s risk perception is situational and individuals show different risk
preferences across different situations and domains as well. 38 According to Sitkin and
Pablo (1992), people’s risk propensity is determined by their inherent risk preference in
combination with situational factors.39 Building on that, Weber and William claim that “the
situational differences in risky choice may be due to differences in the perception of risk.”40
Hence, the domestic context matters tremendously as it not only provides decision-makers
with space and time to situate information within but also reshapes their basic risk
perception and beliefs about policy options. For instance, studies on decision-making under
pressure find that differing levels of stress may cause a difference in both decision-making
processes and policy outcomes.41 Therefore, variation in the intensity levels of domestic
problems could drive leaders to behave differently.
Thus, predispositions and personalities of revolutionary leaders are insufficient for
them to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. This statement does not mean there are not
predictable patterns of rebel leaders. Rather, we should “identify predictable patterns of
variability across situations.” 42 In other words, it is necessary to bring context and
conditions back when studying how rebel leaders’ behavior or foreign policy preference
“varies reliably as a function of the particulars of the situation” they encounter.43
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Third, unlike what recent studies on rebel leaders and war suggest, the influence of
rebel experiences has multidimensional implications for leaders’ foreign policy
preferences which may affect their inclination toward foreign aggression. Even though it
is agreed that revolutionary leaders are risk-taking and favor exporting revolution, it does
not indicate that those traits alone were obtained from rebellion experiences. Rebellion
participation may endow participants with traits that would neutralize their preference
toward war in a specific context. For instance, as psychologists suggest, revolutionary
struggle requires leaders to have a categorical, single-minded approach to problems.
Specifically, a successful revolutionist “is characterized by a conceptually simple level of
functioning: He depicts the enemy as all evil and the revolution as the ultimate good; he
evaluates all individuals, classes, and nations as either enemies or friends, depending on
their attitude toward the revolution; his ultimate court of appeal is the authority of the
revolution; and he directs all energies, faith, and struggle toward the success of the
movement. Prominent pre-takeover individuals who show less than this complete singlemindedness are probably perceived by other revolutionists as weak, if not disloyal, which
would tend to endanger their later careers.”44 This trait appears to be irrelevant with a leader’
foreign policy preference. However, if we consider a specific context, such as when leaders
are faced with domestic unrest, it would be directly associated with leaders’ foreign policy
choices. In particular, when dealing with domestic unrest, leaders may have three policy
options: repression, co-option, and foreign aggression. In this case, if revolution experience
predisposes leaders to have no empathy for oppositions or enemies, then it would reduce
the likelihood of leaders to use force abroad since repression at least equally, if not more
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than foreign aggression, conforms to their predispositions. Again, it demonstrates that the
influence of predispositions is premised on certain scope conditions.
Therefore, as many social behavior theorists have long suggested, “efforts should
be directed toward the identification of those changing conditions that lead to changes in
behavior rather than toward the demonstration of cross-situational consistency.” 45
Domestic unrest just provides us with an important scope condition to explore the link
between revolutionary leaders and their foreign policy preferences. Not only because the
third approach directly addresses that domestic unrest plays a significant role in explaining
the aggressive inclination of rebel leaders, but also because domestic unrest enables us to
draw a comparison among possible policy options—repression, co-option, and
international dispute initiation, ultimately, we can further confirm whether international
conflict is always preferred by revolutionary leaders - no matter what alternatives they may
have.
Another reason for investigating rebel leaders’ use of force during domestic unrest
lies in the limits of diversionary war theory. As Taylor Fravel demonstrates, “Domestic
unrest and the diversionary motive that it creates are, however, insufficient for a state to
pursue an aggressive foreign policy.” 46 The debate over diversionary war theory, the
inconsistency among empirical results, and the infrequency of diversionary war in history
all confirm that further research is required. Basically, similar with the studies on
revolutionary leaders and war, studies on diversionary war need to further specify the scope
conditions of the diversionary use of force. To specify the scope conditions, research could
either focus on a unique group of leaders or address a specific situation. My research
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proceeds along the first direction and studies whether leaders with prior rebellion
experiences are more likely to use foreign aggression to deal with domestic unrest, given
their high level of international conflict propensity.
Furthermore, examining revolutionary leaders’ policy choices in the face of
domestic unrest helps us fill in the theoretical gap in literature regarding leaders’ policy
response to dissent. There are extensive studies on leaders’ policy responses to dissent.
However, the research has been divided along two lines: approaches focusing on domestic
measures versus approaches on international measures. Specifically, domestic approaches
have been long occupied by comparativists who study measures like repression, reform,
and co-option, whereas international approaches are in the realm of international relations
scholars who mainly study diversionary war. They barely speak to each other and even
barely think about policy options listed by the other approach as reasonable alternatives on
leaders’ policy menu. For instance, limited research on repression, if any, mentions
diversionary war as a possible response of leaders to dissent. Most comparative studies
only consider domestic measures, such as repression, co-optation, accommodation,
persuasion, and neglect.47 This dissertation, by focusing on a specific group of leaders (i.e.
leaders with rebellion experiences), tries to bring the discussion of domestic measures back
to the study of the internal-external conflict nexus. Therefore, we could provide a relatively
complete picture about leaders’ policy choices in the face of domestic unrest.
In sum, these approaches of rebel leaders and war focus primarily on leaders’
personal preferences rather than on the larger context in which foreign policy is made. They
have tended to emphasize consistencies with the revolutionary leaders to explain their
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foreign policy preferences. This tendency is problematic because it overlooks the basic fact
that revolutionary leaders’ foreign policy from the formation of preferences to the process
of translating preferences into policy is contingent on the context in which they are
operating. A more systematic approach by incorporating the context is needed. Domestic
unrest is a context that provides us with opportunities to study the variation of revolutionary
leaders’ policy preferences and behaviors. Studying revolutionary leaders’ policy
responses to domestic unrest not only expands our understandings of leaders’ policy
preferences, but also enriches the existing discussion of internal-external conflict nexus.
However, before I move to the task of providing such an approach, however, a brief
discussion of research design is followed.

RESEARCH METHOD AND PROCEDURES
I define a “revolutionary leader” or “rebel leader” as one who previously
participated in a rebellion movement seeking to overthrow the current government.
Notably, “rebel leaders” here do not necessarily mean the leaders of rebellion movements
but refer to those with rebellion experience and who come into power later. However, it is
more likely for the leader of a rebellion movement to become the state head later than it is
for the original participants.
In addition, this definition focuses on rebellions rather than just revolutions, thus
expanding those definitions provided by Walt, Colgan and others. 48 The fundamental
difference between revolution and rebellion lies in whether the movement aims at
fundamental societal changes. Specifically, “rebellions are often spontaneous uprisings

48

Colgan 2013; Colgan and Weeks 2015; Colgan and Lucas 2017; Goldstone 2016; Walt 1992; Walt 1996.

18

aimed at changing leaders, policies, or even political institutions, but only rarely involve
efforts to affect larger societal structures and norms/values directly.” 49 In contrast, “a
revolution creates a fundamentally new state based on different values, myths, social
classes, political institutions, and conceptions of the political community.”50
For the purpose of this study, the distinction between rebellion and revolution does
not matter very much. The three approaches on revolutionary leaders and war could be
applied to understand leaders with rebellion experience and war as well. First, rebellions
are risky activities too which may equally select reckless and risk-taking leaders, as
revolutions do. Studies on rebellion all agree that rebellions are extremely risky for
participants and endow participants with some unique characteristics. 51 Second, like
revolutionaries, rebels are equipped with ideologies, which have implications on their
behaviors later. All of these immense anti-government activities need some ideology to
legitimize rebels’ behaviors and mobilize the mass. In this sense, revolutionary ideologies
are not fundamentally different from rebellion ideologies. Third, leaders who come into
power through rebellion are faced with similar domestic situations as leaders who assume
power through revolution. They all need to consolidate power and rally the masses. Based
on existing literature, this need implies a potential need to “use external threats to justify
their actions and rally popular support.”52 Therefore, I will expand the existing studies on
leaders with revolutionary experiences and incorporate leaders with rebellion experiences
into the theoretical analysis.
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Then what is the uniqueness of leaders with rebellion experiences compared to
leaders with no such experiences? What are the policy implications of such uniqueness? In
this dissertation project, I will study rebel leaders’ policy responses to domestic unrest, and
specifically investigate whether they would engage in an international dispute to secure
their power and under what conditions they prefer provoking international conflicts to other
options.
The Sukarno case above provides us with some clues on the questions. First,
revolutionary leaders do use foreign adventure to improve their domestic political fortunes.
But the use of force is contingent on some conditions, such as the intensity level of the
domestic environment. Specifically, the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation was rather an
attempt of Sukarno to consolidate power rather than an attempt to save power, because the
domestic situation then was not so bad as to endanger the political survival of Sukarno. For
instance, by mid-1963, Sukarno had largely restored internal security and issued a series
of policies to address the major economic problems. Also, Sukarno did not have much fear
of losing office. Even at the end of his rule, Sukarno was completely confident in his
popular support.53 As John Roosa articulates, “Sukarno had been the nation-state’s only
president. With his charisma, eloquence, and passionate patriotism, he remained widely
popular amid all the post-independence political turmoil and economic mismanagement.
By 1965 his hold on the presidency was unrivaled. It is testimony to his popularity that
both the movement54 and Major General Suharto justified their actions as means to defend
him. Neither side dared appear disloyal to the president.”55 Therefore, the primary issue
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before the confrontation with Malaysia was that the economic measures failed to prevent
economic deterioration. But according to some scholars, the worsening economic situation
was in part a result of Sukarno’s confrontation policy, since before the conflict, Sukarno
largely abandoned the stabilization measures and stopped all trade with Malaysia.56 In sum,
Sukarno’s foreign aggression was indeed a response to a less severe domestic situation. No
evidence in history indicates that Sukarno utilized international tension to cope with acute
political instability.
Sukarno’s policy response to domestic problems was nothing unique when
compared to the choices of other revolutionary leaders in the similar situations. History has
witnessed few international disputes initiated by revolutionary leaders when they were
faced with severe domestic unrest. Why? Why does their aggressive feature fail to translate
into an aggressive foreign policy response to those intense domestic problems? As
mentioned previously, in this dissertation, I propose a preference modification approach
and argue that rebel leaders’ policy choice during domestic unrest is a product of their preexisting preferences and contextual factors: contextual factors not only constrain leaders’
ability to pursue a certain policy, but more importantly reshape their policy preference.
Specifically, I claim that rebel leaders’ willingness to use force abroad during domestic
unrest is contingent on the severity level of domestic problems. When rebel leaders face
severe internal unrest, they are unwilling to engage in international conflicts because severe
domestic strife will reshape leaders’ perception and neutralize their policy preference
toward international conflict.
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To test the theory, I utilize both quantitative and qualitative methods. I first conduct
a cross-national analysis, using the data of militarized interstate disputes initiation between
1875 and 2000 by leaders under domestic turmoil with differing severity levels. The results
show that rebel leaders’ inclination to use force abroad is conditional on the severity level
of domestic strife. The more severe the domestic strife, the less likely rebel leaders are to
utilize foreign aggression. There are two advantages to begin with a quantitative analysis.
First, nearly all of the prior research on either diversionary war or revolutionary leaders
and war is quantitative. As Oakes articulates, “Using a statistical approach makes it
possible to directly compare the argument presented here with claims in the extant
literature.” 57 Second, quantitative research “abstracts from particular instances to seek
general description or to test causal hypotheses.”58 In this case, cross-national statistical
studies demonstrate the generalizability of the theory and the probability of initiating an
international dispute as a response to domestic unrest.
The next two chapters present in-depth studies of two revolutionary leaders: Mao
Zedong (or Mao Tse-tung)59 of the People’s Republic of China (1949-1976) and Suharto
of Indonesia (1967-1998). To examine the causal mechanisms, I will go over the stories of
their lives with an emphasis on the time period when they were in office. The two case
chapters will start with their life before assuming power and investigate how rebellion
experiences affect their thought. Then the bulk of the following discussions consists of the
two leaders’ policy-making processes when they were faced with severe domestic strife.
Despite the finding that neither of the two leaders chose international dispute as a response
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to acute domestic strife, the section following this emphasizes some aggressive attempts
made by the leaders when the domestic situation was relatively settled. The last section
explores the reasons for international conflicts not yet discussed and finds that none of
these conflicts were launched to deal with acute domestic troubles.
The two cases are chosen for the following reasons. First, the home countries of the
two leaders are divergent with regards to domestic background, institutional arrangement,
culture, ideology, amongst others. As mentioned above, the context in which leaders are
operating matters tremendously. Thus, by introducing two leaders in divergent domestic
contexts, we can eliminate the influence of these variables listed before, thus verifying the
theory efficiently.60 Second, Mao and Suharto ruled their countries in different time periods.
Mao’s rule was from 1949 to 1976 whereas Suharto controlled Indonesia from 1967 to
1998. Drawing the comparison between the two could control the effect of time and
structural factors (e.g. the Cold War). Third, Mao and Suharto have quite different rebellion
experiences, which provides us with an opportunity to study the generalizable patterns of
how rebellion experiences shape leaders’ preferences. Suharto participated in rebellion for
more pragmatic reasons and often changed his opposing targets a few times. In contrast,
Mao was more equipped with revolutionary ambitions and was primarily loyal to one
revolutionary movement. With this in mind, if we can still find some predictable patterns
from leaders with such different rebellion experiences, we may have more confidence in
the impact of rebellion on their future behaviors and beliefs. Lastly, both leaders have ruled
their countries for a significant period of time, which gives us a plethora of cases to explore
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the policy preferences of leaders who are faced with differing intensity degrees of domestic
unrest.

The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents my
theoretical argument in detail and articulates how severe domestic situations interact with
the impact of rebellion experience in reshaping rebel leaders’ policy preference when they
are faced with serious domestic strife. Chapter 3 is a quantitative chapter, including a crossnational statistical analysis of the conditional effect of rebel experience on international
dispute. Chapter 4 and 5 are the in-depth case studies of Mao Zedong and Suharto. Chapter
6 summarizes the major findings of the dissertation and describes their theoretical and
practical implications.
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CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF REBEL LEADERS’ POLICY
RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC UNREST

Those who participated in the events (i.e. revolutions) will be even more affected.
The way they took power, looming so large for them, will influence the concepts and
strategies that they later apply to ruling their country and dealing with the world.
—Robert Jervis,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 1976, p.262

Are rebel leaders more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies during internal
division than their non-rebel counterparts? If so, under what conditions are unpopular rebel
leaders most likely to use violence abroad? When is external conflict a more-effective
response to internal unrest than making political concessions to opposition groups or
suppressing dissent? I argue that the willingness of rebel leaders to use force abroad is
contingent on the severity level of domestic unrest. Specifically, when rebel leaders face a
risk of severe internal unrest, they are unwilling to engage in international conflicts,
because acute domestic instability will reshape leaders’ perception and neutralize their
policy preference toward international conflict through two mechanisms.
First, high seriousness level of domestic strife changes the cost-benefit calculation
of available policy options. Specifically, serious domestic problems call for a direct, speedy,
and “to-the-point” policy response, which enables domestic measures (i.e. co-optation and
repression) to be more efficacious because domestic measures aim to directly and
effectively address the problem that gives rise to the strife. Second, severe domestic unrest
affects rebel leaders’ intuitive behaviors by activating certain predispositions of leaders
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endowed by rebellion experience, which induce them to use other policy response than
initiating an international dispute. To begin with, the extremely unstable environment
compels leaders to choose the policy they feel most confident in. The rebellion experience
makes rebel leaders more confident in utilizing repression to deal with oppositions, given
that they come into power after they survived a severe domestic crisis (i.e. rebellion). This
confidence will translate into a preference of repression during severe domestic unrest. In
addition, severe domestic unrest is often accompanied by the risk of international
intervention. Compared to foreign aggression, domestic measures better conform to rebel
leaders’ appreciation of national authority and sovereignty (a predisposition they obtained
from rebellion experience). Furthermore, rebellion experience predisposes rebel leaders to
ruthlessness toward enemies, which will translate into a policy preference of repression
during severe domestic unrest.
My explanation is laid out in three steps. First, I analyze the unique attributes rebel
leaders share, in order to identify how the experience of rebellion participation affects their
predisposition toward international conflict. I then set aside the subject of rebel leaders to
investigate the internal-external conflict nexus in a general sense, focusing on how internal
division or domestic problems motivate leaders to fight abroad. To this end, I introduce the
severity level of domestic unrest as an important context to understand the internal-external
conflict nexus. Next, I bring these two lines of analysis together and examine the
mechanisms through which differing severity levels of domestic strife reshape rebel leaders’
policy preference. Finally, I identify general hypotheses about rebel leaders’ different
policy choices under heterogeneous context at home.
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REBELLION EXPERIENCE AND PREDISPOSITION TOWARD
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
According to Selbin (2013), “rebellions are often spontaneous uprisings aimed at
changing leaders, policies, or even political institutions.” 61 Rebels attempt to violently
overthrow an existing regime. Nearly all rebellions exhibit certain common features. First,
rebellions, like revolutions, “feature an explosion of political activity.”62 Participants must
share some kind of “grievance” toward an existing regime, and tend to use illegal methods
to challenge and overthrow it.
Second, successful rebellions are followed by a reinterpretation of history. Once
previous rebels come into power, they justify their rebellion in order to forestall similar
things that will happen to them. Third, rebellions, much like revolutions, “are usually
characterized by violence. Force is often needed in order to oust the old regime, and even
when it collapses without a fight, there are likely to be violent struggles among competing
revolutionary [or rebellion] factions.”63 In other words, for rebels, violence is an effective
and necessary way to first overthrow the old regime and later consolidate their power if the
rebellion succeeds.
In terms of the impact of rebellions and revolutions, conventional wisdom agrees
that revolutionary states are more prone to international disputes.64 Many of the existing
studies focus on the system-level factors to explain the conflict-prone trait of revolutionary
states. For instance, as Colgan summarizes, Walt argues that revolutions “(1) create
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windows of opportunity for revolutionary states in turmoil to be at- tacked by other states,
(2) increase the perception of hostility between the revolutionary state and its
nonrevolutionary neighbors, (3) alter the offense-defense balance in the international
system, and (4) increase the chance of miscalculation by lowering the quality of
information available to state leaders.”65
In addition to the system-level mechanisms that link rebellion to international
conflict, there is an individual-level mechanism. That is, rebellions could influence the
participants and predispose them to war. If those who have prior rebel experience come
into power, they are more likely to engage in international conflict. Based on this
mechanism, there is a consensus that leaders with rebellion experience are usually prone
to international disputes and war.66
In particular, the destructive and violent features of a rebellion will greatly
influence its participants and predispose them toward international conflict through two
pathways: selection and “socialization.” Simply put, rebellions first select people with
certain conflict-prone attributes, 67 then reinforce their conflict-preference through the
process of socialization.
In the next two sections, I will delve into these two mechanisms to explain how
rebellion participation experience predisposes participates to use force abroad. Then, a
discussion of the limitations of this individual-level mechanism will follow.
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SELECTION
Rebellions and revolutions are “deadly serious contests for extremely high
stakes.” 68 This means that most people prefer not to rebel. Therefore, people who do
participate in a rebellion must exhibit certain common features that differentiate them from
their non-rebel counterparts. Specifically, rebellions select people with two characteristics:
risk-tolerance and ambition to alter the status quo. 69 In terms of their implications on
international conflict, these two features predispose rebel leaders to use violence abroad.
The first feature is risk-tolerance. Rebellion is such a dangerous activity that
participants may run a tremendously high individual risk, which suggests that rebellion
participants are more likely to be risk-taking than people without this experience. Research
by Elisabeth Jean Wood gives an elaborate account of the high-risk circumstances for
insurgents in El Salvador. During the process of insurgency, “[m]any paid the ultimate
price. Just before and during much of the war, covert death squads and regular military
forces carried out assassinations and disappearances with impunity throughout the
contested areas.”70 To make the account more persuasive, Wood quotes a young woman
who was a resident living in the contested area:
Some armed themselves, others fled. We [those who stayed in the area] were all
seen as guerrillas. Every time we went to the coast, we were searched at the
intersection. 1982 was a year of desperation, almost everyone left. My brother
disappeared in 1982, one of hundreds who disappeared in 1982 and 1983—every
day there were two or three bodies at the intersection. After all these years of war,
the dead weigh heavily.71
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The quote implies that since the primary target of rebellion movement is the government,
rebels are consistently under the threat of state violence. For them, success is a relatively
rare event and failure “will likely result in the rebel’s imprisonment or death.”72 Walt
explicitly articulates the difficulty and rarity of successful revolutions:
Successful revolutions are rare, because even weak and corrupt states usually
control far greater resources than their internal opponents. States have better
access to the means of violence and can use these tools to monitor, suppress;
or coopt potential challengers. It is not surprising, therefore, that most
revolutionary movements are rapidly extinguished, and would- be
revolutionaries often end up in prison, in exile, or dead. Indeed, it is per- haps
more surprising that revolutions ever succeed.73

Hence, those who can still take up arms to rebel against the existing regime must be much
more risk-tolerant than those who do not. Nevertheless, one may question this logic link
by arguing that participating in a rebel movement is not always self-selective and people
sometimes rebel because they lack options. For example, Kalyvas and Kocher (2007)
claims that the risk of participation in an insurgent collective action is not always higher
than nonparticipation, as such, some combatants find that they are better off when
participating in a rebellion.74 It is true that in certain cases noncombatants do run a high
risk as well. However, rebellion participation is generally riskier. After all, it is a movement
undertaken by a relatively small group of people under the pressure of the violent state
apparatus. As an active move, participation in rebel movements is easier to identify and
results in a more grievous punishment if the rebellion fails. In this case, leaders who survive
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rebellion participation have a greater level of risk tolerance, which means they are able to
handle more risk and are more likely to take a riskier move when facing a similar situation.
The implication of this risk-tolerant personality trait of leaders on international
conflict is quite straightforward. Given that international conflict is also a risky policy
option, it is nearly a consensus in conventional wisdom that risk-taking leaders are more
conflict-prone.75 Specifically, leaders with a greater degree of risk-tolerance perceive more
payoff from risky gambles, such as foreign aggression.
Second, as Jeff D. Colgan suggests, “in addition to risk tolerance, revolutionary
politics selects for individuals who have ambitions to change the status quo.”76 That is
because rebellions by their nature are violent activities aiming at changing the status quo
at home. Colgan claims that the ambition of revolutionary leaders makes them more willing
to reject the status quo and engage in international disputes. “[W]hile some
nonrevolutionary leaders are satisfied to simply enjoy the spoils of executive office,
revolutionaries are systematically more likely to come to office with a desire to change the
status quo in society.”77 The foreign policy implication of this is that revolutionary leaders
are inclined to change the status quo of international politics through war. Many other
scholars draw a similar conclusion and use terms such as “transformative goals” or “the
belief in a transformative mission” to describe this characteristic of revolutionary leaders.78
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SOCIALIZATION
In addition to the pathway listed above, participation in rebellion movements
endows participants with new features that make them more conflict-prone. First, through
revolution or rebellion, participants, especially leaders of the rebellion movements, can
foster a sort of revolutionary ideology which would induce them to export revolution to
other countries. As John W. Garver generalizes,
Successful revolutions require leaders who are completely dedicated to the
revolutionary cause, who are willing to persist in the struggle even in the face
of seemingly insurmountable difficulties and setbacks, who are willing to die
for the cause and who have no qualms about the sacrifice of human life entailed
in the victory of the revolution. Deep conviction, a dedication rooted in the very
elements of the leader’s personality, is required if the revolution is to succeed.79

This revolutionary ideology is similar to the ambition discussed above. Both the
revolutionary ideology and the ambition to alter the status quo are derived from the hope
of transforming the domestic society and imply international conflict. Yet, there is a
nuanced difference in terms of the international implication. The ambition to alter the status
quo is more about the preference to transform the domestic society and somehow
unintentionally challenge the existing international rules. In contrast, the revolutionary
ideology dictates that leaders should actively intervene in international affairs and in many
cases, it requires force abroad to export the ideology or externalize the domestic conflicts.
According to Snyder (1999), a major reason for the breakdown of the relationship between
the U.S. and third world revolutionary states is that “the radicals in these revolutionary
states initiated hostilities with the U.S. in order to externalize their domestic conflicts with
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the liberal bourgeoisie, who were previously part of the revolutionary coalitions. Since the
bourgeoisie had strong transnational ties with the U.S., the radicals believed they had to
defeat these moderates in order to establish completely new orders.” 80 Hence, the
revolutionary ideology, compared to the ambition to alter the status quo, has a more direct
impact on the onset of international violence.
For instance, Yang and Xia (2010) points out that Mao Zedong had a natural
inclination toward the worldwide revolution, which was formed during the communist
revolution and became “a pattern of behavior throughout his life.” Sheng’s research also
shows that this inclination is not typical to Mao, but “became the foundation of the
‘psychological self’” for Mao and his revolutionary peers.81 Notably, communist ideology
is not the only revolutionary ideology that might result in the export of revolution, the
ideology of independence, self-determination, or democratization may also predispose
followers to export revolution. That, to some extent, explains why we saw decolonization
movements took place in different countries during the second half of the last century.
Furthermore, through the process of rebellion, people obtain a sense of military
efficacy from their rebellion experience. Rebel leaders, especially those with a successful
rebel experience, are more prone to value the utility of military forces as a policy tool.82
Mao provides us a good example of how rebel experience shapes people’s martial efficacy.
Learning from his rebel participation experience, Mao wrote about his belief on the
Chinese power struggles in 1938— “political power comes out of the barrel of a gun”
(qiangganzi limian chu zhenquan; 枪杆子里面出政权)83, one of his most well-known
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dicta. This dictum dictates the policies of his early years in power when we witnessed high
levels of violence, both at home and abroad. Notably, this dictum also confirms what I
argue above, that is, rebel experience shapes rebel leaders’ beliefs about the game of
political survival.
Rebellion experience also shapes the attitude of participants (especially leaders of
rebellion) toward enemy. Specifically, as psychologists suggest, a successful revolutionist
“is characterized by a conceptually simple level of functioning: He depicts the enemy as
all evil and the revolution as the ultimate good; he evaluates all individuals, classes, and
nations as either enemies or friends, depending on their attitude toward the revolution; his
ultimate court of appeal is the authority of the revolution; and he directs all energies, faith,
and struggle toward the success of the movement. Prominent pre-takeover individuals who
show less than this complete single-minded-ness are probably perceived by other
revolutionists as weak, if not disloyal, which would tend to endanger their later careers.”84
Therefore, rebellion experience usually makes leaders more ruthless toward their enemies,
either because they think this is the right thing to do or because they do not want to be
perceived as weak.
Drawing on the existing literature, Figure 2.1 demonstrates the direct link between
rebel experience, domestic politics, and international conflict. It clearly illustrates how
rebel experience predisposes leaders to foreign aggression. In addition to the strong
predisposition to international conflict conferred by leaders’ prior experience of rebellion
participation, “post-revolutionary leaders are typically free of any meaningful constraint
on their ability to declare war, such as a legal requirement to get congressional or cabinet
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approval.”85 Carter et al. (2012) has similar findings that “revolutionary leaders have at
their disposal highly disciplined organizations that pursue their transformational goals with
exceptional zeal.” 86 Thus, the favorable domestic institutional environment that rebel
leaders face will “amplify the salience of leaders’ characteristics”87 and enable them to be
more likely to use forces beyond the border.

FIGURE 2.1. The theoretical relationship between rebellion participation and international
conflict
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LIMITATIONS
Although empirical research on leaders’ rebellion experience and international
conflict deepens our understandings of the conflict behavior of rebel leaders, it still has
limitations.
One limitation is its inability to explain the variation of policy choices over time.
This inability may first stem from the feature of personal experience factors. Factors that
track individual background information (e.g. gender, education, military service, and
family background) rarely change once a person reaches adulthood. For instance, the
educational background of most people remains fixed after they finish school in late
adolescence or early adulthood. This constancy of those factors makes it difficult for them
to account for the variation of leaders’ policy choices over time. But in practice, leaders’
policy choices may change over time and context. Mao Zedong fought the U.S. in the
Korean Peninsula in the 1950s but achieved rapprochement with the U.S. in the 1970s.
This variation of policy choices presents an example of what cannot be explained by those
static factors.
Furthermore, although empirical studies appropriately take domestic politics into
their analytic framework, they misleadingly equate domestic politics with domestic
political institutions and just discuss how those institutional arrangements affect the
decision-making of leaders.88 Domestic institutional arrangements are relatively static once
set up, which means their effect, as with that of personal experience factors, is constant and
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static. Consequently, their research fails to capture the dynamics of leaders’ decisionmaking processes.
Additionally, domestic politics is not just about political institutions and could be
more dynamic. For instance, the domestic political context, such as domestic stability,
changes over time and accounts for different policy outcomes in various settings.
Specifically, as the following sections illustrate, leaders’ policy making in the face of
severe domestic problems is different from their decision making in peacetime. In this
dissertation project, I will take the domestic stability level into consideration and discuss
how it interacts with rebel leaders’ prior perception and leads to diverse policy outcomes.
The second limitation lies in their understanding of the relationship between leaders’
risk attitude and international conflict. The major mechanism suggested by recent works
that links rebel experience to a high level of international conflict propensity is
revolutionary leaders’ higher level of risk tolerance.89 However, the relationship between
risk-tolerance and foreign aggression is far from definitive. Among the conventional
wisdom on this topic, there is a consensus that a greater degree of risk-tolerance of
decision-makers predicts a higher level of a decision-maker’s propensity for interstate
conflict, given that militarized conflict resembles a risky gamble. The underlying
assumption for this argument is that among all the policy choices on the menu, international
conflict is the riskiest one. It is true that in peacetime, initiating a conflict against a foreign
country could be a risky decision compared to doing nothing. Yet in the real world, the
policy alternative of conflict often extends beyond doing nothing and maintaining the status
quo. For instance, when facing domestic turmoil, in addition to launching an international
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conflict, leaders could also choose to reform or to repress within their border.90 Therefore,
under some circumstances, the alternatives could be as risky, if not riskier, as international
conflict. As scholars on repression long argue, repression is actually a risky choice. “Being
costly and risky, it might not rank high among the ones preferred even by determined
autocrats.”91
Second, international conflict is not the only policy preference induced by the prior
rebellion experience of leaders. As Kim (2016) suggests, the personality trait of risktolerance not only predisposes revolutionary leaders to foreign aggression but also makes
them prone to domestic violence like mass killing.

92
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acknowledges that the ambition of revolutionary leaders “makes it more likely that a leader
will reject the status quo internationally as well as domestically”. 93 In other words,
revolutionary leaders could equally favor both international and domestic violence, which
gives rise to a significant problem: when it comes to the policy choice between domestic
violence and foreign aggression, the explanatory power of rebel experience and risktolerance will be largely undermined. Consequently, a special attention should be given to
this scenario.
Based on the analysis above, I find that the existing discussion of rebel experience
is not persuasive to permit us to predict how leaders will behave. As Walt correctly points
out, “The main difficulty is the lack of a strong theoretical connection between personality
traits and foreign policy preferences. Even if we knew that a leader possessed a
‘revolutionary personality’ (whatever that may be), this knowledge would not tell us very
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much about his or her choice when facing a specific decision for war or peace.”94 Therefore,
I have to bring in factors that are more contextual, structural and dynamic, which here
refers to the domestic political stability. In the following section, I will discuss how the
domestic political context (i.e. the level of domestic stability) will affect leaders’ decisionmaking, and specifically, when and why leaders would like to go to international conflict
in the face of internal problems.

THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONFLICT NEXUS
On April 2, 1982, General Leopoldo Galtieri, the leader of the military junta and
acting president of Argentina, ordered the Argentine armed forces to invade and occupy
the Falklands Islands, which precipitated the Falklands War between Argentina and Great
Britain. Although an immense amount of research has been done on the war, scholars have
not yet reached a consensus on what led to this war. Diversionary theorists perceived the
clash as “the archetypal case of diversionary war.”95 They claim that General Galtieri went
to war in the hope of mobilizing Argentines’ patriotism, rallying people behind the junta,
and thus diverting public attention from domestic problems (e.g. economic decline and
mass unrest).96 Other researchers, like Giacomo Chiozza and Henk E. Goemans, believe
that in this case, “the evidence for diversionary war is limited and questionable.”97 They
argue that “[a]t a time of social unrest and political uncertainty, the invasion of the
Falklands was a unifying mission for an institution that was lacking a sense of purpose and
mission, and allegedly the quid-pro-quo that earned General Galtieri the support for his
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rule from the navy commander, Admiral Jorge I. Anaya.”98 Despite disagreement on the
causes of the clash, people agree that to understand the conflict, “it would be incorrect to
ignore domestic politics.”99
As the Falkland War indicates, domestic unrest may motivate leaders to war.
Theoretically, scholars like Alex Weisiger, also identify that war could be “driven by
principal-agent problems—in other words, misbehaving leaders—in domestic politics.”100
The root of this principal-agent problem lies in the fact that leaders may privately benefit
from war initiation and war is not ex post inefficient for leaders.101 In particular, domestic
unrest increases the incentive for leaders to use force abroad as a way to reduce internal
difficulties and maintain power.102 Conventional wisdom provides four explanations of
why leaders would like to go to war during domestic unrest. The first one is a classic
diversionary explanation, which proposes that leaders instigate an interstate dispute in
order to rally the public support by triggering in-group and out-group bias so that they can
shift the public attention away from the internal problems and remain in power. 103
According to this explanation, international conflict produces in-group cohesion and outgroup bias, which is the so-called “rally-around-the-flag” effect. Ideally, in this scenario,
people put aside their differences and prioritize external threat, so that leaders will be saved
from the domestic strife and gain a short-term boost in public approval. For instance,
conventional wisdom finds that the external use of force by an American president will
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generate a “rally-around-the-flag” effect and thus boost his popular support among the
electorate, if only temporarily.104
The second motivation provided by domestic unrest is what the current research
called “gambling for resurrection.”105 Chiozza and Goemans describe this mechanism as
follows:
leaders who expect to lose power soon can rationally prefer the risky lottery of
war because their punishment in terms of time in office is truncated: they
cannot lose more days in office as a result of war than they expect to have when
they stay at peace. Thus, if staying at peace is very likely to lead to removal
from office, even a small probability of victory – with its associated boost in
tenure – is enough to make war preferable over peace for leaders.106

According to this strand of argument, leaders at risk of losing power postulate that they
would gain more, or at least would not lose more, from the risky gamble of international
conflict. The benefit of conflict initiation for leaders is clear and tempting. For instance,
through international conflict, leaders could gain an opportunity to reveal their competence,
which would give them a better chance to stay in power. 107
Building on these two accounts, Chiozza and Goemans contribute another two
explanations: “fighting for survival” and “gambling for survival”.108 The former refers to
the idea that leaders obtain a better opportunity to defeat their domestic opponents by
initiating an interstate conflict. For instance, they could eliminate their opponents by
sending them to the battlefield or at least distract them from domestic plots. By “gambling
for survival”, Chiozza and Goemans refer to the logic that leaders who have a risk a forcible
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removal are more likely to initiate conflict, because once they win the conflict, they may
have more legitimacy and capability to fight against their domestic opponents. It is a similar
logic to “gambling for resurrection”. As Chiozza and Goemans point out, the major
difference between the two mechanisms is that in their theory, “leaders act to save their
lives, rather than just their job.”109 This difference in goals implies the differing degree of
leaders’ willingness to take the risk and how much risk they would like to take when
making a war decision. Chiozza and Goemans (2011) argues that Saddam Hussein provides
a good example of fighting and gambling for survival, 110 because “Saddam Hussein’s
personal survival played a crucial role in his wars against Iran in 1980 and against Kuwait
in 1991.”111 They quoted The New York Times to specify how Hussein fought and gambled
for survival:
Mr. Hussein told his interrogator on one occasion that a principal reason for
invading [Kuwait, added] was his belief that he needed to keep his army
occupied. One senior intelligence official familiar with that interview said Mr.
Hussein seemed to suggest that he distrusted what his restive officer corps
might do if they were not otherwise distracted.112

Figure 2.2 illustrates the domestic political motivations for leaders to initiate an
international conflict when they are facing domestic strife.
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FIGURE 2.2. The theoretical relationship between domestic strife and international conflict

However, some scholars argue that although internal problems might spark leaders’
willingness to initiate an international conflict, internal troubles could also induce policymakers to avoid foreign aggression.113 For example, according to Geoffrey Blainey, “It
would be surprising if most wars broke out when or where economic pressures and needs
were most compelling, for those are times and places which are less capable of financing
a war.”114 In addition to the inability to fight both internally and externally, the desire to
directly address those internal problems also transfers both leaders’ attention and resources
that they could have otherwise deployed in the domestic arena. This makes leaders less
inclined to ignite or exacerbate international tensions.115
To address this inconsistency, more studies start to realize that oversimplified
aggregation of internal problems largely undermines our understanding of the internalexternal conflict nexus.116 It is significantly valuable to distinguish between diverse types
of domestic strife and not treat them as a single homogenous phenomenon. Building on
this general finding, a number of scholars modify the internal-external nexus argument by
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adding conditions to make the argument hold.117 For instance, some studies focus on a
specific kind of society (e.g. democracies) and identify when domestic problems motivate
leaders toward foreign aggression. Morgan and Bickers (1992) uses data from the United
States from 1953 to 1976 and argues that leaders go to war only when they notice an erosion
of domestic support within groups that are crucial in maintaining their ruling coalition.118
Similarly, Dassel and Reinhardt (1999) finds that domestic strife leads to foreign
aggression only when it threatens the organizational interest of the military.119 Daxecker
(2011) also demonstrates that political instability at home has no independent effect on
international disputes. More specifically, the impact of political instability is contingent on
states’ involvement in a civil war.120
In addition, some other research has a more general scope and investigates how the
differing severity level of domestic strife affects the international conflict propensity. As
Hazlewood (1975) and Levy (1989) suggest, the relationship between domestic
disturbance and international conflict might be curvilinear, not linear. The effectiveness of
international diversion, as a policy response to internal disturbance, is conditional on the
magnitude of domestic turmoil. They argue that when faced with less severe strife,
decision-makers would like to initiate an international conflict to maximize the security of
their hold on office. As the strife becomes serious, leaders believe that the externalization
of the internal problem would exacerbate the strife and threaten their political survival, so
they are less willing to go into international conflict.
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As Charles Tilly points out, “It is not hard, then, to find instances of plausible ties
between domestic and international conflict. The difficulties begin with efforts to
generalize and to model such instances.” 121 The inconsistency of current studies’
conclusions and findings reveals a major limitation of their theories and models: they
overlook the variation in leaders’ personal beliefs. It is true that different domestic
problems may have a diverse impact on leaders’ decision-making. However, current
research spends too much time trying to find the correlation between domestic turmoil and
the onset of international conflict whilst failing to clearly recognize the mechanism through
which domestic turmoil predisposes leaders to war. The fear of losing office, proposed by
the conventional scholarship, is not enough to account for the variation of leaders’
decisions, since other policy options (e.g. domestic repression) could also save them from
losing power.122 Without considering the difference in leaders’ beliefs and preferences, it
is hardly possible to uncover when leaders would like to go to war as opposed to other
policies.
In particular, most literature on the internal-international conflict nexus assumes
that decision-makers have homogeneous preferences and perceptions when faced with
domestic strife, so decisions made by leaders are supposed to be alike in the similar
context.123 Therefore, they only focus on structural factors that shape leaders’ beliefs and
decisions. While this assumption may simplify the research and also provide some useful
explanations of how domestic unrest relates to international tension, it is unable to give a
full picture of the decision-making process because it overlooks leaders’ varying
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preferences. As discussed above, leaders’ preferences do vary, which induces them to
heterogeneous decisions even when facing a similar situation. Hermann (2003) records that
Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States from 1953 to 1961, had a special
preference to “controlling the spread of nuclear weapons through developing peaceful uses
for atomic energy,”124 which was revealed in his decision-making process and relevant
policies. Thus, to better understand the nexus, we should bring leaders back. Specifically,
my argument is that domestic problems affect leaders’ decision-making by reshaping their
beliefs and perceptions of war as a policy response.
In the next section, I will discuss how the interaction between domestic politics and
leaders’ beliefs affects leaders’ policy-making under domestic unrest. In particular,
conventional wisdom on leaders’ experience and conflict propensity has come to the
consensus that rebellion background predisposes leaders to use force abroad.125 However,
this conclusion may not hold consistently when leaders encounter domestic problems with
differing levels of intensity. It will add great value if we can distinguish diverse types of
domestic strife and not treat the domestic context as invariant. As mentioned above, more
and more scholars have realized that oversimplified aggregation of internal problems
largely undermines our understanding of the internal-external conflict nexus. 126
Building on this, I argue that the conflict propensity of revolutionary leaders is
contingent on the seriousness level of domestic problems. That is, some internal problems
of low severity might make revolutionary leaders continue to favor foreign aggression,
whereas others with a higher severity level could totally neutralize their aggressive
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preference beyond the border. In the next section, I will distinguish internal strife with
differing degrees of severity to investigate whether leaders with prior rebel participation
will behave differently. Also, unlike the previous studies that emphasize the effect of
foreign aggression on political survival, I argue that the differing levels of domestic strife
lead to heterogeneous decisions through shaping rebel leaders’ international conflict
propensity and policy preferences.

THE INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC UNREST AND LEADERS’
BELIEFS
As the decision-making approach argues, “an explanation of the foreign policy
actions of states requires an understanding of the processes through which political leaders
perceive the external world and make and then implement their decisions.”127 It follows
that to understand foreign policy decisions we need to understand the interaction between
leaders’ beliefs and the domestic environment in which leaders operate, and why “states
make certain decisions rather than other decisions.”128
When it comes to leaders’ decision-making in the face of domestic troubles,
although foreign aggression has been long regarded as one of the main instruments leaders
could use to deal with internal problems and retain power, there are few comparative and
systematic studies on what makes leaders favor foreign aggression over its policy
alternatives. For instance, most research on international conflict emphasizes the
mechanisms (e.g. diversionary theory) through which internal unrest leads to international
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militarized disputes but overlooks the reasons why domestic repression, as a possible
policy alternative, is less attractive to those decision-makers. 129 As Oakes puts it, “the
decision to launch a diversionary conflict may result more from the inability to reform or
repress, than it does from the perceived utility of using force to rally the public.”130 Thus,
a good explanation for the onset of international conflict during domestic turmoil should
not only account for why violence beyond the border happens but also account for why
leaders do not choose other policy responses.
As discussed above, leaders’ prior rebel experience predisposes them to
international conflicts. Domestic strife also motivates leaders to foreign aggression.
Therefore, there will be a strong expectation that when facing domestic strife, rebel leaders
are more likely to go to war than anyone else. However, violence beyond the border is not
always the option those leaders take. Under domestic unrest, revolutionary leaders could
equally, if not more, favor domestic measures, like repression and co-optation. I argue that
the preference for a certain kind of policy is contingent on the severity of domestic strife.
An extremely unstable domestic environment, such as revolution and civil war, could
neutralize rebel leaders’ aggressive preference abroad, and shift their preference and
priority toward domestic issues. In particular, I argue that the logic of rebel leaders’ policymaking under severe domestic strife is different from the logic under less serious domestic
strife: extremely unstable domestic environment may reshape rebel leaders’ beliefs,
neutralize their international conflict preference, and induce them to domestic policy
options (i.e. repression and co-optation).

129
130

Foster, Mitchell, and Thyne 2010; Miller and Elgün 2011; Nicholls, Huth, and Appel 2010; Tir 2010.
Oakes 2006, 431.

48

WHY DOMESTIC STRIFE SEVERITY MATTERS?
People agree that it is of tremendous value to categorize domestic problems by their
magnitude, but fail to reach an agreement on the rules and standards.131 For instance, some
use the frequency of the political unrest activities (also referred to as intensity) to divide
domestic strife into differing levels, 132 whereas some others employ the presence of
violence as the standard. 133 As Davenport criticizes, only one aspect of dissidence is not
enough.134 Here, borrowing from Davenport (1995), I identify three attributes to illustrate
the seriousness level of domestic strife. They are “1) basic frequency counts of events, 2)
the presence of violence, [and] 3) the variety of strategies employed by dissidents.”135
Two caveats about the definition should be noted before we proceed. First, I do not
include Davenport’s fourth attribute— “deviations from culturally accepted levels of
dissent,” 136 because it will be tautological for my purpose. For Davenport, the fourth
attribute is about how far away the strife deviates from “the particular amount of political
conflict that the regime will allow to take place before it applies repressive behavior.”137
This may have a policy implication on how leaders will respond, which entails a
tautological threat to my theory.
The second caveat is about the relationship between a severe domestic situation and
a substantial threat to leaders’ rule. Although existing studies on the internal-external
conflict nexus do not provide a clear definition of domestic unrest, they generally agree

131

Dassel and Reinhardt 1999; Davies 2002; Gelpi 1997; Levy 1989.
Aflatooni and Allen 1991; Cingranelli 1992; Hibbs 1973.
133
Hazlewood 1975; Levy 1989.
134
Davenport 1995.
135
Ibid., 685.
136
Ibid., 686.
137
Ibid., 688.
132

49

that domestic unrest refers to “internal social, economic, or political problems that threaten
their domestic political survival.” 138 This definition suggests a causal link between
domestic problems and leaders’ rule. That is, domestic problems developed to a certain
degree will result in relatively large-scale dissent which, if growing to a certain level, will
poses a severe threat to leaders’ rule.
A few clarifications should be in order here. To begin with, the definition actually
implies the importance of the severity level of domestic troubles. Different problems may
pose differing degrees of threat to leaders. Furthermore, domestic problems and unrest
could affect leaders’ rule in both direct and indirect ways. One scenario is that domestic
unrest would threaten a leader’s political survival directly because people blame problems
on their leader and oppose his or her rule. For instance, on April 16, 2014, a ferry known
as MV Sewol carrying 476 people sank in South Korea. The sinking of MV Sewol resulted
in popular opposition to the rule of the incumbent President Park Geun-hye since many
people held the president responsible for the incident. The approval rating of President Park
sharply dropped and there was even a call for her resignation.139
The other scenario is that people may not directly oppose the leader’s rule, but their
dissent about the current domestic situation could develop into mass incidents, thus placing
the country into disorder. The disorder in turn weakens the leader’s legitimacy and
capability to control the country. As we will discuss in detail later, domestic turmoil of
China under Mao’s rule was not targeting Mao. Instead, it was a tool of Mao to eliminate
opposition. However, after the unrest developed into large-scale turmoil, Mao’s rule was
weakened and threatened. In both scenarios, the severity level of domestic unrest plays a
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role in linking domestic problems to the threat of leaders’ rule. Although domestic troubles
may not necessarily pose a direct challenge to leaders’ rule, they could be translated into
threat to their rule if they grow to a certain level later.
After making the severity level of domestic strife clear, we should now ask why the
severity level matters.
First, only relatively severe domestic problems that pose a great threat to leaders’
power can get a policy response, because it is not the domestic problem per se but the risk
of losing power incurred by internal troubles that push leaders to respond in different
policies. Most public contention activities targeting the incumbent government are nonviolent with a low-severity level and barely threaten leaders’ power, so leaders may just
ignore them and pay no special attention to them. According to the Crowd Counting
Consortium (CCC), a dataset documenting crowds and contention in the United States,
over 8,700 protests took place from January 21, 2017, through December 31, 2017.
Roughly 1.8 to 2.8 percent of the population of the United States participated in those
protests, and 89 percent of these people were protesting the incumbent president, Donald
Trump, or his agenda.140 Chenoweth and Pressman (2018) also finds that
While the media offer more coverage of the occasional violent protest, the
overwhelming majority of crowds engaged in nonviolent resistance. We find
only 294 injuries and one death (of Heather Heyer in the Charlottesville car
attack) during protests the entire year, fewer than 0.000005 percent of those
who protested. Only 39 incidents involved reports of property damage — less
than 0.5 percent of protests in 2017.141
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Therefore, it is impossible and of little need, if any, for President Trump to respond to each
protest due to the high frequency and the low threat those protests pose to his rule. It is of
particular importance to examine how the increasing severity level of domestic unrest
affects the policy-making of leaders.
Second, severe domestic strife indicates a setting of internal crisis, which may lead
to a completely different decision-making process and thus policy choice. Research on
decision-making under stress already finds that differing levels of pressure could cause a
difference in both the decision-making processes and the policy outcomes by reshaping
leaders’ cost-benefit calculations and cognitive process. 142 Some rationalists argue that a
high-pressure context, like extreme domestic instability, that may forcibly remove leaders
from office, will reframe leaders’ cost-benefit calculations of policy options and predispose
them to gamble on a riskier policy.143 Other rationalist studies, as discussed above, argue
that the choice among different violent policies is conditional on the severity level of the
domestic strife. For instance, drawing on Levy (1989), Gelpi (1997) generalizes the
curvilinear relationship between internal and external conflict as follows: “domestic unrest
may increase incentives for diversion until the disturbances are so great that the dissenting
groups may no longer consider the state to be an in-group. Beyond this threshold of unrest,
diversion is not a viable strategy for leaders to maintain their hold on power, and they must
turn to repression.”144 Researchers focusing on the cognition and psychology of leaders,
such as Elizabeth A. Stanley, propose that different levels of stress activate different
neuroceptive processes, resulting in differing levels of performance.145 Specifically, “[a]t
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low levels of stress arousal, individuals may not experience enough activation to be alert
and motivated to complete the task at hand effectively. Conversely, at high levels of arousal,
individuals may find their attention and energy diverted from the task to focusing on and
coping with the stress itself. As the distress worsens, performance degrades steadily,
eventually reaching a point of paralysis or freeze.” 146 Both rationalists and scholars
emphasizing cognition agree that we should pay special attention to the severity level of
domestic strife because the severity level determines not only whether leaders would
respond, but also how to respond.
In sum, domestic political contexts (e.g. the severity level of domestic strife) matter
because they modify individual leader’s beliefs in the efficacy of policy options and thus
their preference to those policies. When facing low-severity strife, even when leaders do
respond, the low level of stress would not change their pre-existing policy preferences and
beliefs, because individual preferences and beliefs formed during their prior life are
relatively persistent. The reestablishment of personal beliefs needs an external shock. The
extremely unstable internal environment could serve as the external shock for leaders to
modify their pre-existing attitudes and beliefs, dictating leaders to options they otherwise
would not take. Then how does increasing internal instability reshape rebel leaders’ policy
preferences? Are they still prone to fight abroad to save their political life (even physical
life in some cases)?

146

Ibid., 184.

53

REBEL LEADERS AND HIGH-LEVEL STRIFE
The main object of this dissertation project is how rebel leaders respond to domestic
unrest. I argue that the existence of domestic unrest may reshape rebel leaders’ policy
preferences and lead to different policy outcomes from what rebel leaders could have when
they are not faced with domestic unrest. Given the general findings of existing literature
on rebel leaders and international conflict, we already have a general sense about how rebel
leaders will behave in a stable domestic setting. That is, holding other conditions constant,
rebel leaders are more likely to provoke international disputes than their non-rebel
counterparts, when they are not in the face of domestic unrest.147 Thus, in the following
sections, I will not discuss more about how rebel leaders behave when there is no domestic
strife, but rather will focus on rebel leaders’ responses to internal division.
Although leaders with a prior rebellion experience generally have a higher
international conflict propensity and aggressive preference, this propensity and preference
for international conflict are subject to differing levels of domestic unrest. More
specifically, as demonstrated in Figure 2.3, severe domestic strife will reduce their
inclination to use force abroad in two fundamental ways.
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FIGURE 2.3. The effect of severe domestic strife on rebel leaders’ policy preference

Dual-process theories of neurosciences contend that “human thought processes are
subserved by two distinct mechanisms, one fast, automatic, and nonconscious, the other
slow, controlled, and conscious, which operate largely independently and compete for
behavioral control.” 148 In other words, “the human brain uses at least two different
processes of decision-making based on different neural systems: the intuitive system and
the deliberative system.”149 In this case, high-level domestic unrest reshapes rebel leaders’
policy preferences by affecting both their deliberative and intuitive systems. Specifically,
a severe domestic environment not only changes rebel leaders’ intuitive behaviors, which
are guided by predispositions resulting from past experiences, but also alters their rational
considerations based on cost-benefit rationale.
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The Deliberative System of Rebel Leaders and Perception of Policy Efficacy
Severe domestic strife, as a crisis of rule, is more likely to be urgent and to unfold
rapidly. It calls for a more direct, quick, and efficient solution that could solve the problems,
for which international conflict is generally not an effective option. As Chris Zebrowski’s
recent work suggests, “In the time-sensitive field of emergency response, speed is critical.
The sudden onset, non-linear amplification and rapid spread of emergent ‘complex
emergencies’ demand the capacity for a speedy and flexible response.”150
It is true that an international conflict could give leaders a chance to rally support
at home, prove their competence, and even eliminate domestic opponents. However, the
choice of interstate war may be more reasonable and meaningful when the domestic strife
is not as pressing and fatal, as all the benefits of international conflict need time to emerge.
Take the “rally-around-the-flag” effect as an example. A war against a foreign target cannot
spontaneously leads to in-group cohesion and out-group hatred. The formation of the largescale social emotion requires continuous mobilization underpinned by wide-spread and
strong government power. Yet, time and strong government power are the two exact things
that leaders facing severe domestic strife lack. As studies on the causes of domestic conflict
indicate, weak state capacity is a crucial determinant.151 Thus, the emergence of severe
internal strife is always accompanied with weakening state capacity and shattering
government authority. In this case, leaders may not have enough time to wait for an
international conflict to take effect and also are incapable of bolstering the policy to take
effect.
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Moreover, the logic of relying on international dispute to save political life is
roundabout and indirect. This approach aims to use a foreign target, a third party, as a
scapegoat to solve domestic problems. The actual goal here is to buy time or opportunity
to defeat domestic rivals, and not to directly address the problem that threatens leaders’
power. As Fravel correctly points out, “Leaders have little reason to conclude that a shortterm rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction.”152
Also, foreign aggression during internal division will complicate the situation when the
threat is imminent and pressing, by dragging another actor into the game to circumvent the
real problem.
Despite the reasons I list above, some scholars claim that leaders would like to
engage in international conflict when domestic unrest is severe.153 For example, James and
Hristoulas (1994) finds an association between higher levels of political opposition and
American involvement in international disputes.154 Oakes (2006) also claims that “the risky
gamble of diversionary war is more likely to be undertaken by impoverished governments
that are running out of solutions to their mounting domestic problems. While leaders may
prefer simply quashing their opposition to diverting attention, states with access to few
resources often do not possess the capability to engage in repressive internal policing.”155
Given the mixed results of how the severity level of domestic unrest relates to international
conflict, it is meaningful to introduce the role of leaders’ beliefs here to explore the
interactive impact of rebel leaders’ beliefs and severe domestic unrest on the initiation of
international disputes.
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I argue that given the contextual constraint on use force abroad, leaders with
rebellion experience are even less willing to provoke international disputes during severe
internal division than their non-rebel counterparts are.
One of the major reasons is that in the face of a serious domestic problem, rebel
leaders would rather solve it with domestic measures than evade it with use force abroad,
since costs of evading problems could include regime collapse and death, which of course
would be too high for rebel leaders. Countries led by rebel leaders are less likely to be well
institutionalized, which endows rebel leaders with more fear about regime survival. First,
having been part of a rebellion that contributed to their ascent to power, rebel leaders are
more likely than other leaders to think of domestic unrest (such as rebellion) as a real threat
to regime survival. From 1875 to 2000, more than 84.7% rebel leaders lived in nondemocracies, which may imply that people in these countries have less legitimate outlet to
express their grievances and thus have a high probability to utilize illegal methods, like
rebellions. Similarly, Suharto once explicitly expressed his concern about the consequence
of coup: “I was firm in my wish not to hand down a black page in the history of the
Indonesian Armed Forces by staging a coup. Once that had happened, it would always be
open for repetition such as in Latin America or Africa.”156
Second and related, since rebel leaders, by definition, rule at a time shortly after a
rebellion, they are likely to see the stability of their regime as more tenuous than leaders of
a regime that exists decades or centuries after its founding rebellion. From 1875 to 2000,
40% rebel leaders come to power through an irregular way (i.e. ways other than regular
elections) whereas only less than 8% non-rebel leaders assume power irregularly. Thus,
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leaders with rebellion experiences are more concerned for regime stability and survival
than their counterparts.
With weak institutional guarantee, rebel leaders face a much more severe
consequence (e.g. being forcibly removed from the office, physical imprisonment, and
exile) than just losing the job, if they fail to immediately and successfully handle
problems.157 Therefore, in the face of severe domestic unrest, rebel leaders are more eager
to find solutions that could directly and effectively tackle the problem.
Under this situation, international conflict would not be a good choice, because
“unlike repression or reform, it fails to tackle the root problem—a dissatisfied population.
Any amelioration in unrest is dependent on the continuing diversion of the public, a
situation that could end at any time. The problem with offering circuses without bread is
that the population is still hungry after the performance ends.”158 In contrast, domestic
measures, like co-optation and repression, are better options for rebel leaders, because they
directly deal with the internal opposition using either carrot or stick, whilst also reassuring
rebel leaders’ doubts about regime instability. “Event suppression ensures security not by
preventing an event from happening, but by quickly closing down the ‘disruptive’ time of
the emergency event and restoring the linear historical time of standard political
processes.”159
The second reason why rebel leaders are reluctant to use force abroad is that
involvement in foreign aggression during serious internal divisions entails more cost and
less benefit to them. To begin, the effect of international conflict on domestic unrest is
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short-lived.160 This short-term effect could benefit those who aim to boost public support
for electoral purpose but not those who want to maintain political rule for a long time. As
mentioned above, most rebel leaders are from non-democracies, which means that a shortterm boost may not help them achieve their goal.
In addition to the less benefits, engaging in international conflict may entail more
cost for rebel leaders. Given a weaker domestic institutional endowment of most countries
led by rebel leaders, the failure of the conflict could be disastrous. To begin with, initiating
an international conflict drags a third-party into the domestic turmoil, which may be
perceived as aggressive. It will incur criticism from the international community, worsen
the international environment, and in return exacerbate domestic problems. Furthermore,
if the war ends in defeat, “the end of the regime is often at hand.”161 Even before the war
ends, the negative effect appears. For example, if “the war drags on and requires greater
than anticipated sacrifices, the mobilization process will aggravate the social fragmentation
it was waged to ease.” 162 In contrast, domestic measures are much less risky and
straightforward.
In sum, based on the cost-benefit rationale, rational rebel leaders would not count
on an international conflict to maintain their power in the extremely unstable environment,
because this measure is not only inefficient when dealing with the root problems, but is
also too costly.
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The Intuitive System of Rebel Leaders and Policy Preference
In addition to the deliberative system, high-level domestic unrest reshapes rebel
leaders’ policy preference away from international conflict through affecting their intuitive
behaviors in following three ways.
First, rebel leaders, especially those who assume power through rebellion, have
extensive experience in domestic political struggles, which may give them more
confidence in using force at home. As Walt notes, throughout the revolutionary process,
people always feel tempted to use force to enhance their position.163 This indicates that
rebel leaders are more familiar with using force at home than their non-rebel counterparts.
Hermann (2003) finds that predominant leaders “tend to gravitate toward the area of policy
where they feel comfortable”, and the more extensive their experience or expertise the
more likely such leaders become involved in what is happening.164 Although Hermann
focuses more on different areas of policy, the statement can be applied in the policy choice
of leaders as well. Also, previous experience gives leaders a sense of what policies will be
effective or ineffective in a specific situation.165 Thus, rebellion experience predisposes
leaders to use domestic measures, especially repression, when dealing with domestic
oppositions.
Mobutu Sese Seko, the President of the Republic of the Congo (renamed Zaire in
1971), provides us with a perfect example of how rebel leaders favor domestic measures
to deal with internal problems. During his 32-year rule from 1965 to 1997, Mobutu
encountered numerous and persistent challenges from individuals and groups. Among
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them, many of the opposition events were very violent and intense, such as Stanleyville
mutinies and the First Congo War (the conflict that replaced Mobutu with a new rebel
leader, Laurent-Désiré Kabila). To consolidate power and address tthreats and opposition,
Mobutu mainly either repressed or co-opted and never initiated an international conflict.166
On one hand, he relied on brutality to execute his political rivals, like the former Prime
Minister Evariste Kimba, and repress rebellions; on the other hand, he bought off political
dissents through bribery.167 In Mobutu’s eyes, “Leaving people in exile was a danger, they
were making a lot of noise. The game was to neutralise their capacity to damage him.”168
Meanwhile, Mobutu quoted his father’s words to describe his co-opting tactic: “Keep your
friends close, but your enemies closer still.”169 Therefore, the conclusion drawn by existing
work on rebel experience and high international conflict propensity may not hold for rebel
leaders in the context of violent domestic strife.
Second, the prior rebel experience predisposes leaders to domestic measures when
facing severe domestic unrest, because they conform to rebel leaders’ appreciation of
national authority. To begin with, as Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2015) points out “leaders
that participate in rebellions before taking office—whether or not the rebellion itself brings
them into power—have an appreciation of the tenuous nature of national authority and
sovereignty.” 170 The extreme domestic instability could largely undermine national
authority and sovereignty. The appreciation of national authority and sovereignty will
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make revolutionary leaders more inclined to policies that directly preserve independence
and national unity.
Specifically, by dragging at least one foreign country into the existing domestic
strife, initiating an international conflict is more likely to further undermine national unity
by provoking international intervention. For instance, in the face of economic collapse,
political tension and popular dissent, the former Uganda President Idi Amin attempted to
annex the Kagera Salient in Tanzania in 1978. Scholars disagree on whether the severe
domestic situation led to Amin’s external violence.171 Yet, they have little disagreement on
the result of the Uganda-Tanzania War: in response to Amin’s annexation of the Kagera
Salient, the incumbent Tanzania President, Julius Nyerere, “launched a controversial
counter-attack that routed Amin’s forces and swept him from power in April 1979.”172
Whether or not this is an example of failed diversionary attempt, it demonstrates the high
risk of initiating an international conflict when one still suffers from serious domestic
problems.
Third, as discussed earlier, revolutions are more likely to select conceptually simple
individuals who “exaggerates the differences between alternatives, sees all opponents as
evil or cowardly, subordinates all other considerations to the ideas of correct principles,
and is confused and frustrated by the demands of the administrative process.” 173 This
characteristic of rebel leaders predisposes them to repress oppositions, because the
rebellion experience makes them inclined to show no empathy to enemies. Thus, domestic
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measures, especially repression, as a response to acute political instability would appear
more attractive to leaders with a rebel background.
In conclusion, the interaction of high-level domestic unrest and rebellion
experience predisposes rebel leaders to repression instead of international conflict in
response to domestic unrest for three reasons. First, rebel leaders are more confident in
utilizing repression to deal with oppositions because they come into power after they
survived a severe domestic crisis (i.e. rebellion). Second, domestic measures conform to
rebel leaders’ appreciation of national authority and sovereignty. Third, rebellion
experience predisposes rebel leaders to be ruthless to enemies, which will be translated into
a policy preference of repression during severe domestic unrest.

REBEL LEADERS AND LOW-LEVEL STRIFE
In contrast with high-level strife, low-severity level internal dissatisfactions do not
pose such a serious and urgent threat to leaders as the severe strife does, and thus do not
reshape leaders’ pre-existing preferences. Specifically, non-severe strife undermines
government authority less, giving leaders more room and time to choose policies they favor.
First, for rebel leaders, low-level strife does not always call for speedy and direct response,
so provoking an international conflict is possible. Second, for leaders in general, there is
always a temptation to use force abroad to boost short-term popular support. Low-level
strife provides a context where international conflict is less risky and potentially beneficial,
because rebel leaders do not have to worry about the failure of international conflict that
will immediately lead to the demise of the regime.
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Many people may argue that given the confidence in repression, appreciation for
national sovereignty, and ruthlessness toward enemies, we should expect that rebel leaders
are more likely to repress all the time regardless of the severity level of domestic unrest.
However, this is not the case. As a strategy to maintain political control, sheer repression
has its limits.174 As Crawford Young quoted a leading Africanist, “coercion may well be
conceived of metaphorically as a gold reserve underpinning the currency of power. If
constantly employed, the reserves are emptied in short order, and rapid devaluation of
power itself soon follows.” 175 Therefore, even though the inclination to repress, rebel
leader do not always use repression to secure loyalty and bolster legitimacy. Notably, the
predisposition for repression mitigates rebel leaders’ inclination for the use of force abroad
in the face of low-level strife.

No Strife

Low-level Strife

High-level Strife

Rebel Leaders

High

High

Low

Non-Rebel Leaders

Low

High

High

TABLE 2.1. Rebellion participation and the relative risk of initiating international conflict

In sum, internal problems with a low level of seriousness, like street demonstrations
or strikes, are quite common globally, which rarely harm a country’s political stability, so
rebel leaders may behave differently under this circumstance from their actions under
severe domestic strife. Based on discussion above, Table 2.1 above shows the risk of
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leaders with or without rebellion experiences to initiate international conflict across
different levels of domestic strife.
These leads to my central hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Leaders with prior rebellion experience are less likely to initiate
an international conflict when they are faced with more severe domestic strife
than leaders with no such experience.
Hypothesis 1a: Leaders with prior rebellion experience are less likely to initiate
an international conflict when they are faced with high-level domestic strife
than leaders with no such experience.
Hypothesis 1b: Leaders with prior rebellion experience are more likely to
initiate an international conflict when they are faced with low-level domestic
strife than leaders with no such experience.

DOMESTIC REPRESSION VERSUS INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
Although violence has been long regarded as one of the main instruments leaders
could use to deal with internal problems and retain power, existing literature on domestic
turmoil and violent solutions is deeply divided. There are few comparative and systematic
studies of what makes leaders favor one violent policy over the other. Instead, they
developed theories along separate lines. For instance, most research on international
conflicts emphasizes the mechanisms (e.g. diversionary theory) through which internal
unrest leads to international militarized disputes, but overlooks the reasons why domestic
repression, as a possible policy alternative, is less attractive to those decision-makers.176 In
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contrast, as discussed previously, literature on repression rarely sees international conflict
initiation as a reasonable response to domestic unrest.177
Here I try to bring the direct comparison between violence at home and violence
abroad back and explore the conditions under which foreign aggression is preferable to
domestic repression. As articulated above, in the face of severe domestic unrest, rebel
leaders are less likely to use force abroad. In other words, they prefer domestic measures.
Among domestic measures, the most preferable one may be repression. It not only meets
leaders’ need for a speedy and efficient response, but also reflects their preference of being
ruthless to enemies and the belief in military efficacy. Therefore, repression may be even
more preferable than other domestic measures. Building on the previous analysis, I argue
that the choice among different violent policies is conditional on the intensity level of the
domestic strife. One hypothesis follows from this theoretical discussion:
Hypothesis 2: Leaders with prior rebellion experience are more likely to
repress when they are faced with more severe domestic strife than when faced
with less severe domestic strife.

SUMMARY
Given that both rebel experience and domestic strife may predispose leaders to
international conflict, will rebel leaders definitely go to war when facing domestic strife?
This chapter argues that rebel leaders’ inclination to foreign aggression is contingent on
the severity level of the domestic strife. As shown in Table 2.1, the more severe the
domestic strife, the less likely rebel leaders are to initiate an international conflict. This is
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because severe domestic strife reshapes leaders’ perceptions and neutralize their policy
preferences toward international conflict through two mechanisms. First, high seriousness
level of domestic strife changes the cost-benefit calculation about available policy options.
Specifically, serious domestic problems call for a direct, speedy, and “to-the-point” policy
response, which enables domestic measures (i.e. co-optation and repression) to be more
efficacious because domestic measures aim to directly and effectively address the problem
that gave rise to the strife. Second, severe domestic unrest selects many predispositions of
leaders endowed by rebellion experience, which modifies rebel leaders’ preference for
international conflict. To begin with, rebel leaders are more confident in utilizing
repression to deal with opposition because they come into power after surviving a severe
domestic crisis (i.e. rebellion). Moreover, domestic measures conform to rebel leaders’
appreciation of national authority and sovereignty. Lastly, rebellion experience predisposes
rebel leaders to be ruthless to enemies, which translates into a policy preference for
repression during severe domestic unrest.
To verify the theory, the theory generates 2 central testable hypotheses. In the next
chapter, I will conduct a cross-national analysis to test the hypotheses, using the data of
militarized interstate disputes initiation between 1875 and 2000 by leaders under domestic
turmoil with differing severity levels.
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CHAPTER 3: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

Precisely defined statistical methods that undergird quantitative research
represent abstract formal models applicable to all kinds of research, even that for which
variables cannot be measured quantitatively. The very abstract, and even unrealistic,
nature of statistical models is what makes the rules of inference shine through so clearly.
— Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba,
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 1994, p.6

This chapter conducts a cross-national statistical analysis to explore when rebel
leaders are more likely to respond to domestic unrest with an international dispute and
when the alternative policy (i.e. repression) is more preferable. The results support my
hypotheses and suggest that rebel leaders’ inclination to foreign aggression is contingent
on the severity level of the domestic strife. Specifically, rebel leaders are less likely to
initiate an international conflict, the more severe the domestic strife. In the face of serious
domestic unrest, domestic measures, especially repression is more preferable.
This chapter starts with a discussion of the research design, with the first part
focusing on the conditions under which rebel leaders are less likely to use foreign
aggression in response to domestic unrest than their non-rebel counterparts. The second
part explains when repression is preferable to international dispute initiation for rebel
leaders. Then a brief summary and conclusion is in order.

RESEARCH DESIGN
The theory of rebel leaders’ policy response to domestic unrest, presented in
Chapter 2 sees the policy choice of rebel leaders as a function of their policy preferences
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combined with contextual factors. Policy preferences refer to the policies that leaders
would adopt in an ideal situation, and contextual factors refer to the external situations that
reshape their preferences and constrain their ability to adopt certain policies. This chapter
investigates how a particular contextual factor—severity of domestic unrest—influences
rebel leaders’ responses to internal troubles, and especially their decision to use violence
abroad. In the preceding chapter the theory generates two central testable hypotheses: (1)
rebel leaders are less likely to exhibit inclinations to provoke an international dispute than
their non-rebel counterparts when faced with severe domestic unrest; and (2) rebel leaders
are more likely to adopt domestic repression than international conflict, to deal with severe
internal problems.
To follow the practice of previous research, I first conduct a monadic test in which
the unit of analysis is the leader-year and then evaluate these claims using a dyadic
approach, which uses the dyad-year as the unit of analysis. 178 This sequential research
design has numerous advantages. To begin with, as Fravel notes, “the actions and behavior
of opposing states should be unimportant or at least secondary in explaining leaders’
decisions to provoke crises or use force. Instead, the logic of diversion is monadic.”179
Thus, a monadic analysis is appropriate for a monadic theory. However, the sole use of
monadic tests to study international conflicts has been proven to be inadequate, because
though war initiation may appear to be a monadic decision of the initiator, the decisionmaking process does not operate in vacuum. The initiator must take the opposing state into
its consideration whenever it decides to provoke an international dispute. For instance,
leaders must consider whether they can win the war against an opponent, and may not
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challenge someone that they would not unequivocally prevail over. Therefore, a dyadic
analysis helps us to incorporate the opposing state into the game.
In the monadic analysis, there is one observation per leader and per year, spanning
from 1875 to 2000. However, it is possible that in a given year a leader initiated more than
one militarized dispute. Given that all the data is coded on an annual basis, including all of
the dispute observations in a single year does not serve our purpose. Thus, only the first
militarized dispute in a given year is used if the leader initiates several different militarized
disputes in the same time period.
In terms of the dyadic analysis, building on the dyadic dataset of Downes and
O’Rourke (2016), I constructed a directed-dyad dataset of all politically relevant dyads in
the international system from 1875 to 2000. Here, I use Downes and O’Rourke’s definition
of politically relevant dyads— “those pairs that were either territorially contiguous or that
contained a major power.”180 The dataset includes 161,712 directed-dyad years. The use of
directed-dyads could help us specify who the initiator or the target is, which conforms to
the goal of this research: identifying the policy choice of the initiator. Similarly, it is also
beneficial to study politically relevant dyads, as “[t]he use of politically relevant dyads
helps to reduce this problem of irrelevant no-conflict observations on the dependent
variable.”181
The following sections will describe the data used in both analyses and then present
the results of the tests.

180
181

Downes and O’Rourke 2016, 64.
Huth and Allee 2003, 23.

71

REBEL LEADERS, DOMESTIC UNREST, AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
This section primarily tests whether rebel leaders are more likely to provoke
international militarized disputes than non-rebel leaders. In the section, I conduct both
monadic and dyadic analysis. The period of analysis is 1875–2000, given the restrictions
of existing datasets. First, the Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD)
dataset that provides most of the leaders’ experiences variables restricts our analysis start
date to 1875. Second, most recent studies on rebel leaders and international conflicts
employ the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data which ends around 2000. 182
Therefore, using datasets in a similar time frame helps us directly speak to existing research
and avoids inconsistency resulting from utilizing data from different time periods.
The main dependent variable is MID Initiation, which measures whether the leader
of one state initiates a militarized interstate dispute against another state. Borrowing from
the MID dataset, the variable is dichotomous coded 1 if one state, in a given year, initiated
a MID towards another state, and 0 otherwise.183 The MID dataset records five “hostility
levels” in a militarized dispute— “no militarized action”, “threat to use force”, “display of
force”, “use of force” and “war”. In my dataset, I only focus on those disputes with a
hostility level greater than 1 (i.e. “threat to use force”, “display of force”, “use of force”
and “war”), which ends up with 1975 instances of MIDs initiation from 1875 to 2000.
Although the MID dataset has many known disadvantages, 184 it still has a prominent
advantage for our research purposes. Given that war is a relatively rare event, the MID
dataset expands our interstate conflict sample by including events below the hostility level
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of war. “While there is heterogeneity in these events, from full-fledged wars to relatively
minor disputes, they provide considerable information about a state’s interstate
conflicts.”185 Since this dependent variable is binary, I employ a logit regression model
with robust standard errors clustering on leaders in the monadic tests and clustering on
directed dyads in the dyadic tests.
My analysis features two independent variables. The first independent variable of
interest is the rebel experience of leaders. Constructed using the LEAD dataset, 186 the
variable Rebel Experience is binary and codes whether “a leader had prior experience as
part of a rebel movement seeking to overthrow the government of the state.”187 Notably,
unlike some existing studies that tell coup d’état apart from mass upheaval,188 the LEAD
dataset also codes participation in coups as participation in rebellion. According to Ellis,
Horowitz, and Stam (2015), “a leader is coded as a rebel, as long as the coups were carried
out by actors who were willing to use violence to overthrow the leadership of the state.”189
The dataset is comprised of over 2200 leaders in total, of whom 27 percent
previously participated in a rebellion movement. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 display the
distribution of rebel leaders over time and place. As Horowitz and Stam note, two groups
contribute to the increased numbers of rebel leaders in the 1940s and 1950s: “European
leaders who served in resistance movements in World War II and leaders of newly
decolonized countries.”190 Broken down by region, the percentage of rebel leaders varies
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between 15 and 40 percent, with the exception of Oceania. There were no rebel leaders
coded in the region.
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FIGURE 3.1. Frequency of Rebel Leaders over Time

Figure 3.3 illustrates that the percent of leader-year MID initiation fluctuates over
time. Contrary to the prediction of existing studies, revolutionary leaders are not always
more conflict-prone than their non-rebel counterparts. For instance, leaders with prior rebel
participation experience are not necessarily more likely to initiate a MID during 1875 to
1925 than leaders without this experience. Proneness to conflict becomes evident only after
1925. This calls for a further investigation of how rebel experience affects their
international conflict propensity.
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1976-2000

The second independent variable is the Severity Level of Domestic Unrest. To
measure domestic turmoil, I use domestic conflict events from the Cross-National TimeSeries (CNTS) Data Archive.191 The dataset codes eight types of domestic conflict events:
assassinations, anti-government demonstrations, major government crises, purges, general
strikes, riots, revolutions, and guerilla warfare. As Table 3.1 displays, I exclude purges
from the domestic unrest list. According to the definition of the CNTS, purge is defined as
“any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks
of the regime or the opposition.”192 This suggests that purge is indeed a kind of leaders’
response to opposition. Given that the purpose of my study is to investigate leaders’ policy
response to domestic unrest, it is not appropriate to include it as an event of domestic unrest.
To capture the differing severity levels of domestic unrest, I modify the weighted
conflict measure from the CNTS dataset and construct the key independent variable
Severity Level of Domestic Unrest. Specifically, the CNTS dataset gives each event a
different weight to describe its severity level—assassinations at 25, general strikes at 20,
guerrilla warfare at 100, government crises at 20, riots at 25, revolutions at 150, and antigovernment demonstrations at 10. I modify the formula 193 from the CNTS dataset to
calculate the severity level of domestic unrest a country faces in a given year:
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Since I exclude purge from the event list, this will be different from the numbers in the original formula, the number
of event types coded in total in my formula is 7 not 8.
192

76

In order to limit concerns about endogeneity, the variable is lagged by one year. Given that
the study investigates the conditional impact of rebel experience on leaders’ conflict
propensity under different domestic strife, I generate the following interaction term: Rebel*
Severity Level of Domestic Unrest Lag.
The severity score ranges from 0 to 590. Nearly 51% of the data are coded as having
no strife in the previous year with the severity score being 0. Based on this variable, I also
generate a categorical variable to denote the differing levels of domestic unrest. I use 100
as the cut-off point: if the severity score of a country in the previous year exceeds 100, this
means that the country was faced with a high-level strife; if the severity score is below or
equals to 100, it shows that the strife was low-level; and score 0 indicates that there was
no strife. Based on this cut-off points, around 1.2% of the data are coded as having a highlevel strife.
The major reason to choose 100 as the cut-off point is that it is neither too high to
make the sample of high-level strife too small nor too low to fail to distinguish high-level
strife from low-level strife. Also, the weight of guerrilla warfare is 100. One should expect
that high-level strife denotes a situation as similarly severe as a guerrilla warfare. Although
100 as the cut-off point is arbitrarily chosen, I test the models using different cut-off points
(e.g. 50, 60, 90, 105, and 110), and the results are consistent.
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Event

Domestic Conflict Event Data Definitions

Example

Antigovernment
Demonstrations

Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people
for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their
opposition to government policies or authority,
excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign
nature.
Any politically motivated murder or attempted
murder of a high government official or politician.
Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service
workers that involves more than one employer and
that is aimed at national government policies or
authority.
Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on
by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces
and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime.
Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to
bring the downfall of the present regime—excluding
situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow.
Any illegal or forced change in the top government
elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful
or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is
independence from the central government.
Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100
citizens involving the use of physical force.

Brazil 2011

Assassinations
General Strikes

Guerrilla
Warfare
Major
Government
Crises
Revolutions

Riots

Afghanistan
2011
Italy 2011

South
Sudan 2011
Spain 2011

Turkey
2011

Yemen
2011

Source: The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, https://www.cntsdata.com/domconflict.

TABLE 3.1. Domestic conflict event data description

Both monadic and dyadic analysis in the section control for some key individuallevel and state-level variables. Specifically, I control for two binary variables of leaders’
military experience: Military Service Without Combat Experience and Combat
Experience.194 The former measures whether the leader had prior military service but no
combat experience, and the latter denotes whether the leader had combat experience.

194

Data is drawn from the LEAD dataset.
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According to previous research, these two variables have a powerful and systematic effect
on leaders’ conflict propensity.195
Aside from the individual controls, I also control for three binary country-level
variables: material capabilities, regime type, and the number of peace years between MIDs.
First, using the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) scores from the National
Material Capabilities 4.0 dataset of the Correlates of War (COW),196 I generate a variable
Material Capabilities for the country that initiates the militarized dispute. Next, given that
domestic political institutions may not only constrain leaders’ policy choices, but also
affect the likelihood of militarized conflict, this analysis controls for the regime type of the
country in both monadic and dyadic studies. Yet, I employ different datasets and
operationalizations in each analysis. In the monadic analysis, I use an Autocracy variable
constructed on the data from the Polity IV project, to control for the effect of regime type
on the probability of the militarized dispute initiation.197 The variable is coded as 1 if a
state’s Polity score is at or below -7 and 0 otherwise. In the dyadic analysis, however,
constructed using the data from Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013), the variable of regime
type Democracy is dichotomous coded 1 if the state is democratic, and 0 otherwise.198
Utilizing different datasets and operationalizations of regime type may give us more
confidence in controlling for the effect of different domestic institutions on the initiation
of MIDs. Lastly, to control for temporal dependence, I add peace years into control in both
studies.199 There are nuances between the operationalizations of this variable. Given that
the unit of analysis for the monadic test is leader-year, the number of peace years in that

195

Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam 2015; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015.
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study measures the time since the leader was last in MID, whereas the variable in the dyadic
test measures the time since the dyad was last in MID.
In addition to the confounding variables that the monadic and dyadic analysis share
in common, they also select different sets of control variables. In the monadic tests, I
borrow the variable Five-Year Challenge Lag from Horowitz and Stam (2014) to account
for the potential that a country intentionally selects conflict-prone leaders when it faces the
risk of international dispute.200 The variable “measures whether or not a country has been
challenged in an MID in the last five years, a good indication of the interest a country might
have in selecting a leader based on the ex ante risk of a dispute. This controls for the
possibility that a country in a more dangerous neighborhood may be more likely to select
a leader with ex ante characteristics that would bias our results.”201 Table 3.2 shows the
descriptive statistics of each variable in monadic analyses.
In terms of the dyadic analysis, I control for a number of variables identified by
existing studies that affect the likelihood of interstate dispute in a dyad.202 In addition to
the material capability of initiator mentioned above, I also include the material capability
of the target and the initiator’s proportion of dyadic capabilities, using the proxy indicator
of the CINC scores from the COW dataset. 203 Similarly, as democratic peace theory
suggests, the impact of regime type on international conflict is not monadic but relates to
the interactions of pairs of states.204 Therefore, this analysis not only controls for the regime
type of the initiator but also controls for the regime type of the target, as well as an
interaction term to indicate whether both states are democratic. Constructed using the data
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from Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013), the variable Joint Democracy is binary coded 1 if
both states are democratic, and 0 otherwise.205 Furthermore, borrowing from Downes and
O’Rourke (2016), one more dyadic variable is controlled for: the logged distance between
the two countries’ capital cities. The purpose of controlling for the distance between capital
cities is to take the geographic proximity into consideration. Table 3.3 shows the
descriptive statistics of each variable in dyadic analyses.

Mean /
Proportion

SD

Min

Max

Observations

0

1

10,822
6,604
5,410
1,004
190

0

1

10,797

0

590

8,098

0.105

0

1

10,795

0.263
0.012
0.299
0.444
3.158

0
0
0
0
0

1
0.384
1
1
36

10,797
10,822
10,822
10,822
10,822

Dependent Variables
MID Initiation
Violent Policy Choice
Do Nothing
MID Initiation
Domestic Repression

0.146
0.819
0.152
0.029

Independent Variables
Rebel Experience
Severity Level of
Domestic Unrest Lag

0.339
12.283

24.686

Control Variables
Military Service without
Combat Experience
Combat Experience
Material Capabilities
Autocracy
Five-Year Challenge Lag
Peace Years

0.035
4.686

Note: Observations for Violent Policy Choice are from 1955; observations for all the other variables are
from 1875.

TABLE 3.2. Descriptive statistics of variables used in monadic analyses
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Mean /
Proportion

SD

Min

Max

Observations

0

1

180,498
103,756
98,454
1,198
4,104

0

1

154,548

0

590

127,068

0.115

0

1

154,535

0.317

0

1

154,575

Dependent Variables
MID Initiation
Violent Policy Choice
Do Nothing
MID Initiation
Domestic Repression

0.012
0.949
0.012
0.004

Independent Variables
Rebel Experience
Severity Level of
Domestic Unrest Lag

0.310
14.693

26.975

Control Variables
Military Service without
Combat Experience
Combat Experience
Material Capabilities,
Initiator
Material Capabilities,
Target
Initiator’s Proportion of
Dyadic Capabilities
Democracy, Initiator
Democracy, Target
Joint Democracy
Logged Distance between
Capitals
Peace Years

0.426

0.065

0

0.383

180,498

0.426

0.065

0

0.383

180,498

0.500

0.416

0

1

180,498

0
0
0

1
1
1

180,498
180,498
180,498

0.395
0.395
0.194
5.427

3.920

0

9.392

180,498

32.125

32.008

0

184

180,498

Note: Observations for Violent Policy Choice are from 1955; observations for all the other variables are
from 1875.

TABLE 3.3. Descriptive statistics of variables used in dyadic analyses

To test the interactive effect of rebel experience and the severity level of domestic
unrest on MIDs initiation, I analyze a cross-national dataset of 2,258 leaders from 178
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countries between 1875 and 2000. Given that the dependent variable is binary, the model
is
Pr(yit=1|yit-1=0, Xit) = logit-1 (h + aRit + bSit-1 + d Rit Sit-1 + gXit + e),

Where yit is a binary variable measuring whether the leader of country i initiated a MID in
year t in the monadic analysis and whether country i initiated a MID against the other
country in the dyad during year t in the dyadic analysis. Rit is the variable Rebel Experience
whereas Sit denotes the variable Severity Level of Domestic Unrest. Xit is a vector of control
variables. a, b, d, and g describe the influence of those variables on the probability of a
MID onset and e is the error term.

Statistical Results
Before turning to regression analysis, I first conduct a simple descriptive
examination of the relationship among rebel experience, domestic unrest, and MIDs
initiation. As empirical studies note, diverse internal unrest activities could entail different
levels of threat to leaders, not only because they were conceived with differing levels of
severity, but also because they have a different political logic that could affect how leaders
respond.206 Constructed using the variety of domestic unrest events from the CNTS dataset,
Figure 3.4 demonstrates the probability of MIDs initiation of rebel leaders versus non-rebel
leaders when they experienced different internal problems. In general, rebel leaders are
more likely to initiate a MID than non-rebel leaders, but this likelihood varies across
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different types of domestic troubles. Also, compared to a situation without domestic unrest,
both rebel leaders and non-rebel leaders are more likely to provoke an international dispute.
Meanwhile, the likelihood gap between rebel leaders and non-rebel leaders narrows in the
face of internal troubles. This in part confirms our hypothesis that the impact of rebel
experience on MIDs initiation may be contingent on the severity level of domestic unrest,
which calls for a more systematic analysis on the relationship.

Revolutions

Domestic Unrest Events

Guerrilla Warfare
Riots
Assassinations
General Strikes
Government Crises
Anti-government Demonstration
No Domestic Unrest Event
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

Predicted Probability of MIDs Initiation
Rebel Leaders

Non-rebel Leaders

FIGURE 3.4. Rebel experience and MID initiation in the face of different domestic unrest events

As mentioned above, I conduct both monadic and dyadic analyses to examine the
relationship among rebel experience, the severity of domestic unrest, and MIDs initiation.
All the statistical models report Huber-White robust standard errors clustered either by
leader in monadic tests or by directed dyad in dyadic tests.
84

Table 3.4 displays the findings from a logit analysis of MID initiation using
monadic data. Models 1 through 3 show the results of using different samples of the data
whereas Model 4 uses the whole data. Specifically, Model 1 presents that when there was
no strife in the previous year, rebel leaders are more likely to initiate a MID, which
conforms to the findings of existing literature on the conflict-prone feature of rebel leaders.
Model 2 looks at the sample with a low-level strife in the previous year and finds similar
results that rebel leaders are more likely to provoke a MID in the face of low-level domestic
strife. This evidence confirms Hypothesis 1b. In the context of high-level strife shown in
Model 3, no statistically significant effect on MID initiation is detected between rebel
leaders and non-rebel leaders. Although this result fails to confirm Hypothesis 1a (rebel
leaders are less likely to provoke a MID during severe domestic strife), it does show that
rebel leaders are no longer more conflict-prone than non-rebel leaders in that context.
Similarly, in Model 4, the interaction between rebel experience and the severity of
domestic unrest fails to reach the conventional significance level, seemingly casting some
doubt on H1. Despite the insignificance of the interaction term, Model 4 demonstrates that
the impact of the interaction on MIDs initiation is no longer positive, which suggests that
the positive effect of rebel experience is neutralized in the severe domestic unrest. A further
look on the marginal effect of the interaction term confirms this (see Figure 3.5). This
supports our hypotheses.
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FIGURE 3.5. Predicted marginal effect of rebel experience on MIDs initiation with the 95%
confidence interval

Table 3.5 presents the result of the dyadic tests. Models 5 and 8 show consistent
results with the monadic tests. When faced with no strife or low-level strife, rebel leaders
are more likely to initiate an international dispute, which supports H1b. In the face of severe
domestic unrest, rebel leaders are not more conflict-prone than their non-rebel counterparts.
Also, the more severe the domestic problems, the less likely rebel leaders are to provoke a
MID. This evidence further confirms H1.
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Rebel Experience
Severity Level of
Domestic Unrest Lag
Rebel*Severity Level of
Domestic Unrest Lag
Military Service without
Combat Experience
Combat Experience
Material Capabilities
Autocracy
Five-Year Challenge
Lag
Peace Year
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log pseudo-likelihood
SE adjusted for

Model 1
(No Strife)

Model 2
(Low Strife)

Model 3
(High Strife)

Model 4
(Full Model)

0.339*
(0.131)

0.432***
(0.120)

-0.114
(0.182)

0.349
(0.185)
0.150
(0.171)
17.981***
(2.308)
0.465**
(0.149)
0.868***
(0.121)
-0.117***
(0.020)
-2.742***
(0.133)
4,117
0.141
-1187.752
1,030

0.286
(0.151)
0.159
(0.132)
6.436***
(1.311)
0.253*
(0.116)
0.993***
(0.108)
-0.161***
(0.030)
-2.292***
(0.115)
3,863
0.095
-1675.738
1,266

0.468*
(0.224)
0.446*
(0.188)
11.259***
(1.434)
0.384*
(0.186)
0.529***
(0.131)
-0.140***
(0.026)
-2.306***
(0.120)
2，808
0.119
-1054.271
878

0.427***
(0.111)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.280*
(0.128)
0.152
(0.110)
9.226***
(1.414)
0.338**
(0.098)
0.973***
(0.082)
-0.142***
(0.016)
-2.534***
(0.091)
8,078
0.125
-2942.206
1,659

Note: All lagged variables are one-year lagged.
Time for analyses is 1875-2000. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001

TABLE 3.4. The monadic impact of rebel experience and severity level of domestic unrest on the
initiation of militarized disputes, 1875-2000
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Rebel Experience
Severity Level of
Domestic Unrest Lag
Rebel*Severity Level of
Domestic Unrest Lag
Military Service without
Combat Experience
Combat Experience
Material Capabilities,
Initiator
Material Capabilities,
Target
Initiator’s Proportion of
Dyadic Capabilities
Democracy, Initiator
Democracy, Target
Joint Democracy
Logged Distance
between Capitals
Peace Year
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log pseudo-likelihood
SE adjusted for

Model 5
(No Strife)

Model 6
(Low Strife)

Model 7
Model 8
(High Strife) (Full Model)

0.580***
(0.124)

0.209*
(0.101)

0.007
(0.141)

0.317*
(0.157)
-0.015
(0.159)
7.841***
(1.736)
8.050***
(1.441)
0.395
(0.258)
0.415*
(0.183)
0.460**
(0.146)
-1.549***
(0.297)
-0.322***
(0.023)
-0.034***
(0.007)
-4.024***
(0.238)
48,960
0.157
-2298.867
3,533

0.269*
(0.136)
0.143
(0.100)
4.930***
(0.895)
5.860***
(1.301)
0.107
(0.195)
0.095
(0.145)
0.455**
(0.144)
-0.884***
(0.210)
-0.299***
(0.015)
-0.029***
(0.004)
-3.262***
(0.171)
70,814
0.158
-3905.022
3,521

0.211
(0.190)
0.332**
(0.128)
4.645***
(0.981)
3.686***
(1.133)
0.376
(0.226)
0.225
(0.171)
-0.013
(0.215)
-0.607*
(0.296)
-0.168***
(0.016)
-0.017***
(0.003)
-3.719***
(0.182)
34,698
0.062
-2458.611
2,813

0.405***
(0.093)
0.006***
(0.001)
-0.005**
(0.002)
0.279*
(0.113)
0.121
(0.092)
5.521***
(0.958)
7.053***
(1.059)
0.361*
(0.174)
0.198
(0.124)
0.473***
(0.121)
-1.045***
(0.181)
-0.306***
(0.014)
-0.030***
(0.003)
-3.768***
(0.154)
121,763
0.153
-6421.623
3,648

Note: The variable Severity Level of Domestic Unrest is one-year lagged.
Time for analyses is 1875-2000. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001

TABLE 3.5. The dyadic impact of rebel experience and severity level of domestic unrest on the
initiation of militarized disputes, 1875-2000
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Robustness Check
As Horowitz and Stam note, one potential challenge to the results is that “countries
may select their leaders, at least in part, based on the collective beliefs among the country’s
electorate about the international security environment and the military challenges the
country is likely to face.”207 Specifically, countries may select conflict-prone leaders when
they are faced with a potential risk of conflict in the near future. Also, “[f]ormer rebels
might be more likely to enter office during times of domestic turmoil or engage in radical
domestic change, both of which could make militarized disputes more likely.” 208 To
account for this possibility, I first control for the international security environment using
the variable Five-Year Challenge Lag in all the models (see Table 3.4 and Table 3.5), as
mentioned above. Then I run an additional model with a sample that experienced domestic
unrest in the previous year to account for the possibility that domestic turmoil may drive
the results (see Appendix A). Our results are consistent when we control for these two
instances.
Next, I use different measures of domestic unrest to test the robustness of the results.
To measure domestic turmoil, I still use domestic conflict events from the CNTS but
measure them in a different way. Based on their definition, three variables are generated to
capture different types of domestic conflict event: Total Strife, Low-level Strife, and Highlevel Strife. High-level Strife is an aggregate yearly count of guerrilla warfare, riots, and
revolutions, whereas Low-level Strife is an aggregate count of assassinations, general
strikes, government crises, purges,209 and anti-government demonstrations in a given year.
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Similarly, Total Strife is an aggregate yearly count of all the conflict events coded in the
CNTS dataset. In addition, I generate a new categorical variable, Domestic Strife, coded as
1 if there is low-level strife in that year, 2 if there is high-level strife, and 0 otherwise. To
limit concerns about endogeneity, all the variables are lagged by one year. As shown in
Appendix B, in the context of nonviolent strife, the odds of MID initiation of rebel leaders
is 26.4% higher than of non-rebel leaders. However, in the context of violent strife shown
in Model 2, no statistically significant effect on MID initiation is detected between rebel
leaders and non-rebel leaders. This evidence confirms Hypothesis 1.
Table B.2 in Appendix B highlights the robustness check of the interactive models
by using different samples of the data. Model 4 looks at the samples with high-level strife
last year, whereas Model 5 just investigates initiators experiencing low-level strife last year.
The results are consistent with the results presented in Table B.1: rebel experience does not
predispose leaders to ignite international tensions in the context of high-level strife but
does increase the likelihood of international disputes under the circumstance of low-level
strife.

VIOLENCE AT HOME OR ABROAD
In the previous section, we find that rebel leaders are not more likely to provoke an
international dispute than non-rebel leaders in the face of severe internal troubles. This
section uses both monadic and dyadic analysis to primarily test whether rebel leaders are
more likely to provoke international militarized disputes than to repress domestically. The
period of analysis is 1955–2000, as the data of domestic violence is only available from
1955.
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Regarding the variables, except for the dependent variable, this section uses exactly
the same sets of independent variables and control variables as the ones that the previous
section uses.210
The dependent variable of interest in this section is leaders’ violent policy choice
in response to domestic unrest. Specifically, we examine whether leaders will repress
domestically or fight internationally. Given that we already had a clear operationalization
of international dispute, the major problem here is how to measure repression. In practice,
to secure their hold on power, leaders could take different types of repressive measures
ranging from persecuting, executing, purging to mass killing,211 so it is not an easy task to
measure repression. Given the absence of a complete cross-national dataset that includes
all the types of repression in a long time period, here I employ genocide and politicide from
the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) dataset212 as the proxy indicator of repression,
since mass killing (i.e. genocide and politicide) is more comparable to international dispute
than other forms of repression. First, compared to other forms of repression, mass killing
like international dispute is a rare event. The PITF dataset only codes 44 episodes of
genocide and politicide with 286 case-year in total from 1955 to 2017 in the world.213 In
contrast, the CNTS dataset codes 935 case-year of purges from 1955 to 2000. Thus, it
makes more sense to draw the comparison between policies with the similar probability of
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occurrence. Second, mass killing entails more cost and risk for the initiator than other
repressive measures.214 Since the conventional wisdom agrees that international dispute is
risky and costly, 215 only risky and costly policy options such as mass killings are
comparable to international dispute when we investigate the policy preference of leaders.
This dataset follows the definitions and guidelines of the PITF dataset to code
genocide and politicide:
Genocide and politicide events involve the promotion, execution, and/or
implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents—or in
the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—that result in the
deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized noncommunal group.216

Constructed using both genocide/politicide and the MID data, the dependent variable of
the section, Violent Policy Choice, is nominal with three levels. The variable is coded as 1
if the leader decides to initiate an international dispute, 2 if the leader decides to use force
domestically, and 0 if none of these measures are taken. Given that the major object of the
project is rebel leaders’ willingness to use force abroad, if in a given year the leaders use
force both at home and abroad, we code it as 1—use force abroad.
As mentioned above, the primary purpose of this section is to investigate the violent
policy choices of rebel leaders in the face of differing levels of domestic unrest. This
suggests that our subjects of research are rebel leaders. Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 display the
descriptive statistics of variables used in this section.
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Mean /
Proportion

SD

Min

Max

Observations

Dependent Variables
Violent Policy Choice
Do Nothing
MID Initiation
Domestic Repression

2,313
1,744
460
109

0.754
0.199
0.047

Independent Variables
Severity Level of
Domestic Unrest Lag

14.219

26.270

0

590

2,223

0

1

2,306

0
0
0
0
0

1
0.139
1
1
27

2,305
2,313
2,313
2,313
2,313

Control Variables
Military Service without
Combat Experience
Combat Experience
Material Capabilities
Autocracy
Five-Year Challenge Lag
Peace Years

0.170
0.459
0.006
0.559
0.485
3.402

0.016
4.630

Note: Observations for all the variables are from 1955. The total number of observations for rebel leader
is 2,313.

TABLE 3.6. Descriptive statistics of variables used in monadic multinomial analyses
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Mean /
Proportion
Dependent Variables
Violent Policy Choice
Do Nothing
MID Initiation
Domestic Repression

SD

Min

Max

Observations

31,873
28,321
523
3,029

0.889
0.016
0.095

Independent Variables
Severity Level of
Domestic Unrest Lag

14.418

26.033

0

590

31,082

0.153

0

1

31,817

0.511

0

1

31,808

Control Variables
Military Service without
Combat Experience
Combat Experience
Material Capabilities,
Initiator
Material Capabilities,
Target
Initiator’s Proportion of
Dyadic Capabilities
Democracy, Initiator
Democracy, Target
Joint Democracy
Logged Distance between
Capitals
Peace Years

0.026

0.042

0

0.139

31,873

0.036

0.057

0

0.266

31,873

0.473

0.408

0

1

31,873

0
0
0

1
1
1

31,873
31,873
31,873

0.216
0.451
0.104
5.102

4.104

0

9.392

31,873

30.068

29.672

0

178

31,873

Note: Observations for all the variables are from 1955. The total number of observations for rebel leader
is 31,873.

TABLE 3.7. Descriptive statistics of variables used in dyadic multinomial analyses

Given that this dependent variable has three categories, a multinomial logit analysis
with robust standard errors clustering on leaders (for monadic tests) and directed dyads (for
dyadic tests) is conducted. The multinomial logit model is the most often-used method

94

when the dependent variables have more than two non-ordered outcomes, since the model
is straightforward and computationally convenient. 217 Yet, a primary drawback of the
model is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. 218 As Huth and
Allee (2003) illustrates, “The IIA assumption is met when an individual’s preferences
among alternatives remain consistent regardless of which choices are or are not available.
IIA is most likely to be a problem when any two outcome choices are clear substitutes. If
the IIA assumption does not hold, then parameter estimates will be inconsistent.”219 Given
that the standard Hausman test cannot be used to the case in which we want to adjust for
clustering, I use a generalized Hausman specification test via “seemingly unrelated
estimation” in STATA to test the assumption of IIA.220 All my models cannot reject the
assumption.

Statistical Results
Table 3.8 presents the results of the multinomial logit analysis in the monadic tests.
“The multinomial coefficients must be interpreted in the context of the base category …
and the other coefficients for that variable.”221 The base category for the whole section is
MID initiation. As shown in Table 3.8, compared to doing nothing, rebel leaders are more
likely to initiate a MID when domestic unrest becomes more severe. However, the more
severe the domestic unrest, the more likely rebel leaders are to utilize domestic repression
rather than MID initiation, which provides evidence in favor of H2. The impact of the
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severity level of domestic unrest on rebel leaders’ violent policy choice, in the monadic
tests, is statistically significant.
The multinomial model in Table 3.9 examines rebel leaders’ violent policy choice
using the dyadic data. Consistent with the monadic analysis, the high severity level of
domestic unrest predisposes rebel leaders to use violence at home, rather than to use
violence abroad, which supports H2.

Robustness Check
Given that there is no relatively unified measure of domestic repression, I use
another popular measure of repression to test the consistency of my results. To measure
repression, I employ the Cingranelli-Richards Physical Integrity Rights Index (CIRI).222
This variable scales states between 0 and 8 based on the level of disappearances,
extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture. Low scores denote no
governmental respect for physical integrity rights and a high number indicates government
respect for human rights. In the dataset, I convert the variable of repression into a
dichotomous variable coded as 1 if there is no government respect for human rights (i.e.
the physical integrity score is 0), and 0 otherwise. Notably, the start date of CIRI data is
1981, which leaves the time period between 1875 and 1980 out of the multinomial models
on policy choices. The drawback of this is that it leaves us less observations, while the
advantage is that by using datasets with different time intervals, we can control for the
temporal dependence.

222

Cingranelli and Richards 1999.

96

Violent Policy Choices
Doing Nothing

Domestic Repression

-0.009*
(0.004)
-0.314
(0.206)
-0.078
(0.175)
-16.575**
(5.886)
-0.129
(0.162)
-0.815***
(0.139)
0.158***
(0.030)
1.785***
(0.189)

0.009*
(0.004)
-0.130
(0.600)
-0.561
(0.617)
-9.205
(5.576)
0.376
(0.388)
-0.440
(0.387)
-0.043
(0.073)
-1.238
(0.523)

Severity Level of Domestic Unrest Lag
Military Service without Combat
Experience
Combat Experience
Material Capabilities
Autocracy
Five-Year Challenge Lag
Peace Year
Constant

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log pseudo-likelihood
SE adjusted for

2,215
0.108
-1342.493
312

Note: The reference category of policy choice is MID initiation. All lagged variables are one-year
lagged.
Time for analyses is 1955-2000. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001

TABLE 3.8. The monadic impact of the severity level of domestic unrest on rebel leaders’ violent
policy choices, 1955-2000
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Violent Policy Choices
Doing Nothing

Domestic Repression

-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.157
(0.183)
0.092
(0.170)
-3.170
(2.238)
-9.296***
(1.764)
-0.429
(0.259)
-0.114
(0.248)
-0.401*
(0.158)
0.769*
(0.358)
0.314***
(0.020)
0.053***
(0.008)
2.865***
(0.243)

0.010***
(0.002)
-0.741***
(0.226)
-1.348***
(0.226)
-0.335
(2.783)
-7.853***
(2.283)
0.774*
(0.371)
-3.726***
(0.709)
-0.680***
(0.182)
2.275**
(0.806)
0.361***
(0.026)
0.047***
(0.008)
0.433
(0.303)

Severity Level of Domestic Unrest Lag
Military Service without Combat
Experience
Combat Experience
Material Capabilities, Initiator
Material Capabilities, Target
Initiator’s Proportion of Dyadic
Capabilities
Democracy, Initiator
Democracy, Target
Joint Democracy
Logged Distance between Capitals
Peace Year
Constant

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Log pseudo-likelihood
SE adjusted for

31,017
0.195
-9934.0425
1,604

Note: The reference category of policy choice is MID initiation. All lagged variables are one-year
lagged.
Time for analyses is 1955-2000. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001

TABLE 3.9. The dyadic impact of the severity level of domestic unrest on rebel leaders’ violent
policy choices, 1955-2000
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Based on this, I generate the dependent variable Violent Policy Choice, which is
nominal with more than two levels. The variable is coded as 1 if the leader decides to
initiate an international dispute, 2 if the leader decides to repress domestically, 3 if the
leaders use force both at home and abroad, and 0 if none of these measures are taken. Given
that the second dependent variable has four categories, a multinomial analysis with robust
standard errors clustering on directed dyads is conducted.
The dyadic test using the new measure finds a consistent and statistically significant
result that as the severity level of domestic unrest increases, rebel leaders are more likely
to repress domestically, rather than provoke a MID beyond the border. This gives us more
confidence in H2.

SUMMARY
This chapter conducts two sets of statistical analyses to respectively test when rebel
leaders are less likely, or at least no more likely, to provoke international dispute than their
non-rebel counterparts and also when rebel leaders are inclined to use repression rather
than international dispute. It not only draws the comparison of policy choices between rebel
leaders and non-rebel leaders, but also examines variations of rebel leaders’ response to
different situations. The statistical results provide strong supporting evidence for both
hypotheses: (1) compared to non-rebel leaders, rebel leaders are not more likely to provoke
a MID in the face of severe domestic unrest; and (2) when the severity level of domestic
unrest increases, rebel leaders are more willing to use violence at home, not abroad.
However, the statistics do not reveal the process by which severe domestic unrest
affects rebel leaders’ willingness to provoke an international dispute. In Chapter 2, I have
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outlined the main pathways through which the preferences of rebel leaders and domestic
environments interact to generate different policy responses to internal problems. As Oakes
notes, evaluating whether these variables interact along these causal pathways is “best
accomplished with the careful study of individual cases.”223 Therefore, in the Chapters 4
and 5, I conduct in-depth case studies of Suharto and Mao Zedong to investigate theses
causal pathways.
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CHAPTER 4: SUHARTO AND INDONESIA UNDER HIS
RULE
The indirect Javanese style of the letter belonged to President Suharto, and
showed the remarkable combination of threat and solicitation that was the hallmark of
Suharto’s rule.
—Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia, 2005, p.169

On March 11, 1966, the incumbent president of Indonesia, Sukarno, signed a
presidential decree (i.e. Supersemar) ceding much of his authority to General Suharto. This
indicated that all the de facto presidential power was gradually transferred into the hand of
General Suharto, despite the fact that Sukarno remained the lawful president.224 Since then,
Suharto and his New Order administration (as opposed to the Old Order of Sukarno) ruled
the country for more than thirty years, until his dramatic resignation in 1998.225 Not only
was Suharto the leader of a military-dominated government, he also had a rebel background.
As such, militarist and individual experience theories would predict Suharto to have a great
interest in using force abroad.226
Yet, although Suharto occasionally was faced with strong domestic opposition and
acute political instability during his long rule, he rarely, if ever, provoked international
conflict as a response. This is because, I argue, that the high intensity levels of domestic
turmoil negate his inclination towards foreign aggression, resulting from his formative

224

Abdulgani-Knapp 2007, 57–58; Vickers 2005, 160.
Right after the ouster of Sukarno in 1967, Suharto was appointed as acting president, and then as president in the
following year.
226
For example, Colgan 2013; Colgan and Lucas 2017; Colgan and Weeks 2015; Gurr 1988; Horowitz and Stam 2014;
Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015; Weeks 2012; Weeks 2014.
225

101

revolutionary experience. Four specific reasons explain why Suharto seldom turned to use
force abroad to retain his power during emergencies: first, previous rebellion experience
made Suharto more experienced in domestic measures, like repression. Thus, he had more
confidence in his capability to utilize violence at home to achieve his goal; second, in the
face of acute domestic problems, he saw repression as a more effective policy option to
directly address the root problem; third, he needed a stable external environment to bolster
domestic development. This neutralized his preference toward international conflict; and
lastly, the Chinese Indonesians served as a worthwhile substitute for foreign scapegoats in
the face of severe crises. Thus, when his rule was challenged, his direct policy response
never included provoking an international conflict.
In the next section, I will first review Suharto’s early life before he came to power,
including his humble origin, harsh military career, and rebellion experience. These factors
may provide us with some clues for predicting his future behaviors. Then I briefly introduce
how Suharto responded to major political threats during his rule and explain why foreign
aggression was not favorable. It is important to establish that Suharto’s intrinsic
unwillingness to use force abroad during domestic unrest does not mean that he was
reluctant to use scapegoating more generally. Therefore, the section following, will
examine how he utilized the tactic towards a domestic target—ethnic Chinese—to retain
his power under the circumstances of severe internal turmoil. The last section of this
chapter addresses the one major international conflict initiated by Suharto, that is, the
invasion of East Timor in 1975. The in-depth investigation of this conflict shows that it, by
no mean, aimed at dealing with domestic troubles.
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SUHARTO’S EARLY LIFE: A COMMONER
Suharto was born on 8 June 1921 during the Dutch colonial era, in Kemusuk, a
small village near the city of Yogyakarta in Central Java. His father, Kertosudiro, was an
ulu-ulu, also known as an irrigation official of the village. Suharto grew up in the village
but due to his parent’s divorce and subsequent remarriage, just after Suharto’s birth, he
lived in various homes away from his parents. He finished secondary school but failed to
continue studies in 1939 when his father and relatives could not afford the school expenses
any more.227 Both his origins and early life show that Suharto did not have a privileged
background – he was just a commoner.
With a period of unemployment, young Suharto was “yearning for a job,” and for
him, “[a]nything would do, as long as it was legal.”228 In 1940, he finally got his chance
for a career when the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) had an opening. On 1 June
1940, Suharto joined the Kortverband (a three-year short-term service) of KNIL at
Gombong and started his long military career. There he received tough military training
and was promoted to Sergeant. On 8 March 1941, when the Dutch surrendered to the
Japanese, Suharto fled to Wurjantoro in order not to be detained by the Japanese. After
several months of unemployment and recuperation from malaria, Suharto knew that the
police were recruiting, so he decided to take the risk. Suharto joined the Yogyakarta police
force, one of the Japanese-organized security forces. As Suharto recalled, soon after, the
Japanese chief of police more or less suggested that he should enlist in the Defenders of
the Homeland (Pembela Tanah Air, or PETA), the newly formed voluntary army to defend
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the homeland.229 Suharto was transferred from the police to the Japanese-supported militia.
The harsh training in the PETA fostered Suharto’s nationalist sentiment and solidified his
militarist ideology that would have a profound influence in his future thinking and
behaviors. 230 Following the surrender of Japan and the proclamation of Indonesian
independence in 1945, “the young Suharto felt he had been ‘called’ to join the new People’s
Army.”231 He joined the People’s Security Force (Badan Keamanan Rakyat, or BKR) and
then the People’s Safety Army (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, or TKR).232
In the meantime, the Dutch did not recognize the independence of Indonesia. With
the assistance of Great Britain, the Netherlands tried to regain control of Indonesia. With
the arrival of the Allied troops in October 1945, tensions mounted and conflicts broke out.
Suharto participated in fighting against the Allies first around Magelang and then
Semarang. His success in the battlefield had earned recognition and respect as a military
officer. Soon he was appointed “Commander of the Third Regiment with the rank of
lieutenant colonel” in control of “the Yogyakarta region with Major Rekso as deputy
commander.”233
On 19 December 1948, the Dutch launched a second aggression by initiating a
surprise attack on Yogyakarta from Maguwo. Suharto organized guerilla warfare against
the Dutch to weaken the enemy’s position and tried to recapture the city. His success in
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this fight was “an important factor contributing to his later position in the armed forces.”234
Under pressure from the United Nations, the Dutch eventually withdrew and transferred
complete sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia in the December of 1949. After the
transfer of power back to the Sukarno government in 1949, Suharto participated in a
number of operations to cease resistance and revolts to the new unitary state.235 His talent
and loyalty demonstrated in the post-independence period from 1950 to 1965, led to a
smooth military career with frequent promotions.
As important as the power Suharto obtained during this time period was, the beliefs
and perceptions that he formed. These were the most significant factors that would shape
his future behaviors once he assumed power. First, his nationalism and patriotism
exponentially grew during his military training. He wrote in his autobiography that “All
my experience in PETA convinced me that in no way could we condone the brutal
treatment meted out by some of the Japanese officers. I felt a growing desire to fight
back.”

236

This patriotic sentiment pushed him to prioritize national unity and

independence.237 For instance, Suharto opposed any idea that foreign countries could use
foreign aid to override the Indonesia government, despite the dependence on foreign aid
for Indonesian development. He stressed that “we continue to regard foreign aid as
supplementary. We also guard against letting foreign assistance lead to any undue burdens.
Foreign aid should not in any way lessen our own capability.”238
In addition, his previous experience during revolutions (e.g. the experience of
mopping up revolts) endowed him with great appreciation for conformity and loyalty, and
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deep distaste for rebellions. “To some extent this heavy emphasis on internal security was
already imbued in those officers who had served in the Dutch colonial army, where the
ever-present threat of insurrection underpinned military training.” 239 Suharto was no
exception. His great appreciation of internal stability led to his brutal suppression of those
opposing groups. As Retnowati Abdulgani-Knapp notes,
He had no empathy for those who rebelled against the lawful government. He
showed no qualms and was always ready to go after the rebels. It was for this
same reason that he did not trust the Indonesian Communist Party which
argued that the “Indonesian revolution is not over.” For him, the communists
were using this as an excuse to put an end to imperialism and feudalism in
order to generate social disorder.240

Lastly, the military and revolutionary experiences predisposed Suharto to see more
efficacy and more confidence in the use of force at home to deal with internal problems,
compared to other policy responses. The decisive role played by the military in the defense
of the Republic during the Independence Revolution between 1945 to 1949 enabled
military leaders, like Suharto, to consider the military as the defender of the unitary country
and “the embodiment of Indonesian nationalism.”241 The suppression of domestic revolts
in the 1950s reinforced the perception that the military should take on the sole
responsibility to ensure internal security.
As Michael R. J. Vatikiotis articulates, neither his boyhood nor his experience in
the military during the early years differ greatly from other people in his era.242 However,
these early life experiences did still mold Suharto’s thought, directing his future preference
and behaviors in a specific way after his accession to power.
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SUHARTO’S RISE TO POWER: THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT
The previously little-known General Suharto came into power out of the chaos of
the 30 September Movement in 1965. Unlike the rise of Mao, many people do not think
that Suharto’s rise to power was destined. Instead they see it as “a result of his being in the
right place at the right time.”243 Therefore, to understand the rise of Suharto, people have
to look at the still unexplained coup attempt on 30 September.
In the evening on September 30, 1965, a clique of military conspirators gathered in
Jakarta. At dawn on October 1, the group, “on the orders of a commander of President
Sukarno’s Palace Guard, Lieut. Colonel Untung, and a commander of the Army’s Jakarta
region, Colonel Latief,” kidnapped and assassinated six244 top generals of the Army.245
“Whether the events of 30 September/ 1 October 1965 were mounted by dissident soldiers
against President Sukarno, or with the President’s connivance against the army leadership
remains to this day unresolved.”246 According to the official explanation, this abortive coup
was attempted by the Communist Party of Indonesia (i.e. Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI)
against President Sukarno, but it failed. However, there is a suspicion that Suharto actually
involved in the coup.
On the night of 30 September 1965, six hours before the military coup, Latief
confirmed with Suharto that the plan to kidnap seven army generals would soon
start. Latief was an officer attached to the Jakarta military command. As head
of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), Suharto held the optimum
position to crush the operation, so his name should have been at the top of the
list. When troops who conducted the kidnappings asked why Suharto was not
on the list, they were told: ‘Because he is one of us.’247
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Given the controversy about who plotted the coup, what we know for sure is its epochal
effects: “It marked the beginning of the end of Sukarno’s presidency and the rise to power
of Suharto.”248
As many scholars agree, it was Suharto’s decisive moves to restore order after the
30 September Movement that “earned him kudos he would have found hard to accumulate
under normal circumstances.” 249 Dake (2005) comes to similar conclusion: “The only
person, in that confused situation, who advanced sure-footed was Suharto. His new official
responsibility was national law and order, and he exploited it to the hilt.” 250 After
Lieutenant Colonel Untung announced that the movement had controlled all state power
and taken Sukarno under its protection on October 1, Suharto, the commander of the Army
Strategic Reserve Command, “moved quickly to marshal his forces. By the end of the day
he had taken over the key installations from Untung’s troops. With the radio transmitter in
his hands, he was able to prevent the broadcast of an order by Sukarno for all troops to be
confined to their barracks and for Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudro to take over
administration of the army.” 251 Later, Suharto proclaimed that he had assumed the
leadership of the army.252 “By 2 October Suharto’s group had a firm grip on power, and on
5 October when the funeral procession was held for the dead generals, the military
propaganda campaign against the PKI swept the country.”253 If crushing the 30 September
Movement was the most straightforward step in Suharto’s rise to power, cleansing the PKI
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was the next key step to consolidate his rule, since the PKI was the army’s only serious
competitor.254
The rise of Suharto saw the brutal massacre of communist supporters and
Sukarnoists, coupled with the stigmatization of the PKI as the primary plotter of the 30
September Movement.
Army leaders allied to Suharto organised a demonstration in Jakarta in which
the PKI headquarters was burned to the ground – after they had removed all
documents of interest. There was some confusion within the military as to who
should be regarded as Communist and who not, so the ever-helpful CIA created
lists of those who should be rounded up. Leading Party members were
immediately arrested, some summarily executed, and the airforce in particular
was targeted for a purge. The purge rapidly spread to Central Java, to where
Chairman Aidit had flown in early October, and where other leftist officers had
also supported the Movement through local actions in Yogyakarta, Salatiga
and Semarang.255

Up to a million of people lost their lives after the military “encouraged a witch-hunt against
members of the Communist party of Indonesia.”256 Vatikiotis (1998) portrayed the horror
of the situation:
Tens of thousands of artists, intellectuals and civil servants who had made the
mistake of either joining the Communist Party or tagging along to benefit from
its patronage, were arrested and classified by their degree of involvement with
the PKI. Many thousands ended up on Buru island, a remote prison camp in
the Moluccas.257

In the autobiography, Suharto emphasized his respect for Sukarno and expressed
no intention to take power from the incumbent president,258 however, analysts agree that
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those were his “clever subterfuge,”259 and “[t]he months to come saw a fierce battle for
power between the President, who fought tooth and nail against further erosion of his
authority, and Suharto.”260 As John Roosa notes, “Suharto used the movement as a pretext
for delegitimizing Sukarno and catapulting himself into the presidency. Suharto’s
incremental takeover of state power, what can be called a creeping coup d’état, was
disguised as an effort to prevent a coup.”261 Through cleansing the PKI and the supporters
of Sukarno, the previously little-known general appeared on screens nationwide. On March
11, 1966, Sukarno signed a presidential decree ceding much of his authority to Suharto,
which indicated that although Sukarno remained the lawful president, all the de facto
presidential power was gradually transferred into the hands of Suharto.

THE HALLMARK OF SUHARTO’S LONG RULE: THE
COMBINATION OF STICK AND CARROT
Before examining the reasons for Suharto’s specific policy response in the context
of political unrest, it is worthwhile to briefly review the history of how he dealt with major
domestic challenges. In the late 1960s, Suharto rose to power in the context of political
turmoil and faced strong opposition from Sukarno supporters. He consolidated his power
through the brutal repression of communists. Despite his consolidation of power in the
1970s and 1980s, Suharto’s rule still encountered occasional domestic challenges from
opposing groups. The most significant challenge Suharto faced in this period was the
Malari Incident in 1974. In response to this challenge, Suharto, true to form, ordered the
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military to curtain the opposition operations. In the late 1990s, when faced with economic
and political crisis, Suharto encountered a large-scale public resistance against his
presidency. Suharto, predictably tried to suppress the movement, however his policy failed.
Evidently, when faced with acute political instability, Suharto never engaged in
international dispute to retain his power, instead he heavily relied on internal measures,
especially repression. In the following sections, I will specifically examine how Suharto
responded to serious domestic problems over time.

SUHARTO’S RULE IN THE 1960s
In the wake of the 30 September Movement in 1965, General Suharto emerged on
top. Suharto described the situation after 1965 as “disquieting.”262 There were “dangerous
clashes of opinions” which lead to the actual confrontation “between groups for and against
Soekarno.” 263 Vatikiotis (1998) quoted Slamet Bratanata, a former Indonesian Cabinet
Minister, to describe the tentative nature of Suharto’s personal power in the early years:
“In the period 1965–7 Suharto’s was a frail shell of power. On the outside he appeared in
control, but inside there was an empty void. Sukarno could have struck at any time.”264 For
Suharto, the priority in the 1960s was political stability and the restoration of security and
order.265 Through the process of order restoration, Suharto consolidated his personal power.
The brutal massacre and repression of communist supporters was the primary step
of Suharto to restore order and consolidate power in the aftermath of the 30 September
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Movement. Suharto accused the PKI of “masterminding the movement and then
orchestrated the extermination of people affiliated with the party. Suharto’s military
rounded up more than a million and a half people. All were accused of being involved in
the movement. In one of the worst bloodbaths of the twentieth century, hundreds of
thousands of individuals were massacred by the army and army-affiliated militias, largely
in Central Java, East Java, and Bali, from late 1965 to mid 1966.”266
Although Suharto did not mention his engagement with the egregious anticommunist killing starting from 1965, in his autobiography, he did mention a few political
unrest activities in this period, which, according to his account, were either crushed or
solved through negotiation. 267 In his own words, “First, peace had to be restored and
maintained. In an effort to secure political stability, I put pressure on hard-liners, no matter
what groups they represented.”268 In 1965, Suharto set up the Operational Command for
the Restoration of Security and Order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan
Ketertiban or Kopkamtib), a secret police operation through which Suharto could tightly
control internal security before it was dissolved in 1988. As Crouch (1988) points out, the
Kopkamtib served as a powerful institutional arrangement for Suharto to use force at home,
since it “had almost unlimited power to seek out and detain the regime's opponents.”269
The initial goal of the Kopkamtib was to organize the liquidation of the PKI and its related
organizations. However, after the bloody cleansing of communist supporters and proSukarno groups, by 1968, the PKI was no longer a threat to Suharto’s rule. Suharto had
successfully consolidated his power in the late 1960s.270
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In terms of foreign policy, unlike what existing studies on leaders’ experience
would expect, in this period in Indonesia there was an era of tranquility with few, if any,
international disputes. Additionally, to a significant extent, Indonesia actively sought for
peace and cooperation with foreign countries. For instance, shortly after he sized power
from Sukarno, in June 1966, Suharto delegated Adam Malik, the current Foreign Minister
of Indonesia, to reach a tentative agreement to end the confrontation (i.e. Konfrontasi) with
Malaysia. 271 By September, Indonesia rejoined the United Nations and other international
institutions. 272 One year later, on August 8 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
One of the primary aims of ASEAN is to promote regional peace and collaboration.
To summarize, in the aftermath of the 30 September Movement, Suharto’s power
was not consolidated as he faced strong opposition from the communists. His response was
to brutally repress communists domestically and meanwhile he sought to improve foreign
relations with the West. Notably, international conflict was an option that had never been
put on the table, when Suharto was faced with the great domestic challenge in this period.

SUHARTO’S RULE IN THE 1970s AND 1980s: THE MALARI INCIDENT
Suharto’s rule in the 1970s and 1980s experienced much less social unrest and
domestic resistance, compared to his rule in the late 1960s and 1990s. For instance, during
this period, the diminution of domestic political competition meant that Suharto’s New
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Order government could formulate and implement its preferred foreign policies without
the need to consider the impact of these policies on political competition.273 The political
stability of Suharto’s rule during this period was mainly due to the measurable economic
growth of Indonesia which earned legitimacy for Suharto. Just as Michael Leifer mentioned
in the Preface of Vatikiotis’s book: “The basis of that power had been a sustained economic
success.”274 In addition to the positive effect of economic development on his leadership,
Suharto further secured his unanimous power through various institutional arrangements
that in turn dissolved potential opposition and repressed actual resistance. The most
important institution to recognize is the re-organization of the Party of the Functional
Groups (i.e. Partai Golongan Karya or Golkar). To participate in elections, Suharto needed
to be affiliated to a political party. He decided to align with Golkar and transformed this
institution into his electoral machine in 1969. In the subsequent legislative elections under
Suharto’s rule, Golkar won every time by a landslide from 1971 to 1997. To guarantee the
predominance of Golkar, Suharto kept reducing the influence of other parties as described
in detail below.
In 1973 the government forced all the non-government parties to regroup in
two new parties which were both placed under leadership amenable to the
military. In the four tightly controlled elections held during the 1970s and
1980s the combined non-government vote has declined from a high of 38 per
cent in 1977 to 27 per cent in the 1987 election. In any case the non-government
parties have been weeded of dissidents by the Kopkamtib and have always
proclaimed their support for the President during election campaigns.275
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Another set of institutions that bolstered the leadership of Suharto was the state security
network, like Kopkamtib mentioned above.
The overall stability during this period, however, does not negate domestic turmoil
that did occur. The most dangerous challenge Suharto faced with in this period was the
Malari Incident, which took place in January 1974. As David Bourchier notes,
By 1974 considerable resentment had built up among groups that had
supported the New Order’s rise to power over a number of aspects of the
government’s economic management. First, and earliest, was the extent of
corruption among government officials in general and among Soeharto’s circle
in particular. Student protests became more frequent from 1970 and criticism
of government corruption and wastage in newspapers such as Harian Kami
more strident. There was also a nationalist dimension to criticism of the
government’s economic policies. This was because of the government’s
approval of large-scale foreign investment in industries, such as textiles, that
were traditionally dominated by indigenous producers. Nationalist sentiment
was also stirred by the well-founded perception that the government’s
economic policies favoured the domestic Chinese, who had long dominated the
retail and trade sectors.276

There was a general “apprehension of the New Order’s reliance on foreign aid and
investment which was seen as an act of ‘selling out the country to foreign capital’,
especially to the Japanese,”277 and civilian discontent reached a peak in January 1974 with
the outbreak of large-scale student protests on the occasion of Japanese Prime Minister
Kakuei Tanaka’s visit to Jakarta. In the morning of January 15, the next day after Tanaka’s
arrival, tens of thousands of students marched through the city of Jakarta calling for “the
dissolution of the Aspri278, the reduction of prices, and the suppression of corruption.”279
Soon the demonstrations turned into violent riots. According to Harold Crouch,
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In the afternoon, however, the student demonstration turned into an
uncontrolled riot in which the main participants were youths and children from
Jakarta's slum areas, who burned Japanese and other cars, wrecked the showrooms of the Toyota-importing Astra Motor Company (with which the
president's wife was said to be associated), attacked a Coca Cola plant, and
the following day burned and looted the huge Senen shopping complex.280

Analysts maintain that the Malari Incident presented the most dangerous challenge
to the Suharto leadership because it also heightened intra-military tensions.281 The tensions
were centered around two leaders of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata
Republik Indonesia, or ABRI): General Sumitro, the Commander of Kopkamtib, and the
Major General Ali Murtopo, one of President Suharto’s Aspri. In early January 1974, there
was a rumor that Suharto had decided to dismiss Sumitro. “It can be surmised that Sumitro
hoped that the student protest against Tanaka's visit could be used to weaken the position
of Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani282, both of whom were identified in the public
mind with a pro-Japan outlook.” 283 As a response, Murtopo “ordered his formidable
network of underworld provocateurs to join the demonstrations, causing the mass rallies to
degenerate into violent riots. This served to discredit the genuine protesters while
demonstrating Sumitro’s inability to control the situation.”284
To deal with this incident, Suharto relied heavily on domestic measures. Before the
occurrence of the violent riots on 15 January 1974, Suharto agreed to meet student leaders
to peacefully solve the problem. However, after the demonstration turned violent, the
military began to suppress it. In the wake of the incident, Sumitro was forced to retire and
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Aspri was disbanded. After the riots had been quelled, Suharto further cracked down on
the press, the universities and the intelligentsia. “Six daily newspapers and four weekly
magazines were shut down, troops occupied the University of Indonesia, and over 800
people were detained, including several of the nation’s leading intellectuals and rights
activists.”285 Again, the option of using force abroad during this serious internal division
was never put on the table.
As mentioned above, the governmental response to this incident involved both cooptation and repression. It was through these uses of state violence that Suharto managed
to uncover internal dissent and suppress domestic turmoil. 286 As Vatikiotis points out,
“Instead of gaoling his people, Suharto relied on elitist fears about social unrest and
religious extremism. Opposition to his rule was numbed by these fears and advancing
levels of prosperity so long as the economy ticked along nicely.” 287 After the Malari
incident, there was “almost a decade of inactivity on the nation’s campuses.”288 This again
signals the political stability in Indonesia during this period. To sum up, under the help of
both domestic development and terror, the Suharto administration in the 1970s and 1980s
enjoyed popular support, feeble resistance, and legitimate dominance.
Yet, the political tranquility of 1980s hides the “slow erosion of Suharto’s
popularity.”289 On one hand, there was an increasing criticism of Suharto family as they
engaged in corruption throughout the 1980s. “By the late 1980s the scale of Suharto’s
family enterprise was so great that scarcely any large project could proceed without the
involvement of one or another of the family’s business groups. Government ministers came
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under pressure to channel tenders and projects their way.”290 On the other hand, by the late
1980s, as Suharto grew old, Indonesia was enveloped in an atmosphere of uncertainty about
the succession.291 According to Vatikiotis’s account,
By the time he was elected to his fifth term of office in March 1988, a generation
had come of age who knew no other president than Suharto. Yet muted criticism
of his rule was being heard from young and old alike in educated circles. After
almost a decade of inactivity on the nation’s campuses, students in late 1988
began, in small numbers, to call for a change of leadership. By the middle of
1989, student protests—still in limited numbers and seemingly guided by the
armed forces—were regularly reported in the press. In the course of 1989, the
size and frequency of these protests increased, and some arrests were made to
keep it all under control. The focus of demonstrations in the mid- and late 1970s
had been on corruption. Now the ‘corruptors’ were singled out.292

SUHARTO’S RULE IN THE 1990s
Vickers (2005) describes Suharto’s regime as a bubble, “but one that took a
remarkably long time to burst.”293 The 1990s was the time the bubble burst. The end of the
Cold War marked the period where the US would no longer tolerate Suharto on the
accounts of corruption and human rights issues. In the meantime, Suharto adopted a policy
of social liberalism—Openness. Under the policy, the government loosened its control over
the economy. The economic liberalization and subsequent development gave rise to a
growing middle class and the rise of a middle-class social consciousness, which lead to
increasing discontent with Suharto’s autocracy and corruption of his families. Coinciding
with the growing middle-class discontent, Suharto diversified his power base away from
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the military. As such, the military were no longer able to hold a tight control on people’s
lives. Since the late 1980s, Suharto perceived a growing threat to his power from the
military, so he tried to downplay the role of the military in politics. The first step was the
dissolution of Kopkamtib in 1988. By the 1990s, civilian politicians started to dominate
Suharto’s government. All of these changes in the late 1980s and the early 1990s prepared
the Suharto bubble for its burst. “There was in 1997, already before the economic crisis set
in, a widespread feeling that the Suharto era was approaching its end.”294
As mentioned above, it was the sustained economic success that bolstered the long
rule of Suharto. However, as Michael Leifer describes, following the Asian Financial Crisis,
from mid-1997, “Indonesia was afflicted with an acute economic adversity which exposed
the structural defects of his rule. The scale of economic failure served to undermine his
legitimacy and precipitated his political downfall some two months after his re-election for
a seventh consecutive term of office.”295 By October 1997, “depreciation of the rupiah had
reached 55%, while it was 41% for the Thai baht, 31% for the Malaysian ringgit, 34% for
the Philippine peso and only 11% for the Singapore dollar.”296 With the collapse of the
Rupiah, Indonesia’s economy suffered severe damage, which weakened Suharto’s power.
The economic meltdown resulted in crisis of trust. People started to put blame on Suharto
for their negligence of the real needs of their people.297 Critics identified the causes of the
economic crisis as “corruption, collusion and nepotism” (i.e. korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme, or
KKN) of Suharto’s government and demanded a total reform.298 The deep discontent and
anger among Indonesians soon developed into increasing political tension and widespread
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unrest. “By the end of 1997, with the economy in disarray and social discontent brewing
within the society, it looked as if a big opportunity for the anti-Suharto opposition might
be approaching.”299
Initially and true to form, Suharto used state violence in an attempt to curtail the
social unrest. For instance, by 1998, students organized a series of national demonstrations
calling for Suharto’s resignation and reform. In May 1998, students assembled against the
Suharto government at Trisakti University in Jakarta. This demonstration incurred
governmental repression: four students were killed and dozens of demonstrators were
injured. “The violence of government forces had turned from marginal areas to the centre
of power, against the children of the middle class. The outrage was overwhelming.”300
Given the overwhelming outrage caused by the Trisakti shooting, riots and mass violence
broke out throughout the country and the military gradually lost its control. This eventually
led to the resignation of Suharto. Due to the inability of the military to control the situation,
Suharto tried to appease demonstrators by promising to resign in 2003 and reshuffle the
cabinet. However, these efforts did not work as well as they used to. Suharto’s political
allies, like Emil Salim, who had public support and credibility, abandoned him and refused
to join the new cabinet. Emil Salim even joined the student demonstrators. It was not until
then did Suharto finally realize the game of his long rule was over. He announced his
resignation on 21 May 1998 with the current vice-president Habibie assuming the
presidency as Indonesia’s third president.301
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To sum up, Suharto’s long rule as President was characterized by a political game
of retaining power in the face of opposition and turmoil. He utilized domestic measures to
successfully maintain his power for more than thirty years. As Adrian Vickers summarizes,
the hallmark of his rule is “the remarkable combination of threat and solicitation.”302

WHY IS FOREIGN AGGRESSION UNDER SEVERE DOMESTIC
STRIFE NOT FAVORED?
According to existing studies on how formative experiences and domestic
institutions shape leaders’ inclination toward foreign aggression, Suharto, under this
analysis, is predicated to be a leader with a strong motivated bias toward using force abroad,
as he was a leader backed by the military and he had a rebellion experience. 303 For instance,
Jessica Weeks categorizes the Suharto government as a personalist regime led by military
strongmen, which in turn forecasts a higher likelihood of international conflict initiation.304
After tracing the history of Suharto’s rule, however, a puzzle emerges: in the face of severe
turmoil that threatened his rule, why did Suharto not favor international conflict as a
potential policy response to retain his power?
Current research seeks to answer this question from different levels of analysis. For
instance, Dassel (1998) argues that “the military prefers to maintain its interests by using
force internally. If, however, the domestic use of force will divide the military against itself,
then the military will protect its interests by pursuing diversionary aggression abroad.”305
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Hence, compared to Sukarno’s belligerent stance on the international issues, Suharto
demonstrated a pacific inclination, as there were no longer “contested institutions” that
opposed the internal use of force and thus “[t]he military under Suharto’s leadership could
now protect and advance its interests by using force at home, should it prove necessary.”306
Other research on the militarist establishment of Indonesia claim that repression may
appeal to Suharto more than other policy choices because he was better equipped with
institutions of repression, such as Kopkamtib and ABRI.307 Thus, it is easier for Suharto to
rule “by a violent and ruthless military bureaucracy which controls every facet of life.”308
Yet, these domestic political arguments heavily neglect the role of Suharto and his
individual perception. Actually, in the majority of his time as President, Suharto’s position
“as the ultimate decision-maker remained unchallenged.” 309 Hence, his perceptions
mattered greatly when he was curating his own policy. It is true that the lack of militarycivilian cleavage and the institutionalization of Suharto’s system of repression enabled this
policy choice to gain more leverage in the face of acute political instability. However, one
of the initial causes that led to the lack of military-civilian cleavage and the
institutionalization of the repressive system in the New Order government itself, could have
been Suharto’s preference for domestic measures, such as repression. Scholars on the
institutionalization of Indonesia find that, Suharto himself, was the key promoter of
institutionalization during his rule. 310 For instance, it was Suharto that created the
repressive institutions, like Kopkamtib, as instruments to consolidate his power and
eliminate opposition. Suharto’s skillful maneuvers of both stick and carrot enabled his final
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consolidation of power, that was eventually coupled with little political debate from the
opposition. Hence, it is clear that during this process, Suharto’s individual perception of
how to cope with internal opposition is integral.
Some may question the importance of the President’s perception alone and propose
that as a leader backed by the military, Suharto also had an organizational interest to use
force. Yet, many scholars, like Max Lane, disagree with the idea that Suharto had a military
organizational interest in the first place. According to Max Lane, “The Suharto regime is
not a military regime but a militarist regime—it uses military force to rule but the interests
of the military as a social or political group are not its first concern.”311 Even though we
agree on the existence of Suharto’s organizational interest with the military, the major
problem is that this theory cannot solve why Suharto preferred the use of force at home as
opposed to the use abroad, in most cases. A perfect example to explain this was the general
demilitarization in the late 1980s, which was obviously not due to an organizational interest
in the military, but rather Suharto’s individual perception towards this idea. Since the 1980s,
Suharto perceived more threat to his power from the military than other spheres, so he
adopted a series of policies to downplay the role of the military in the politics. “By the
early 1990s, the demilitarization of Suharto’s New Order had gone so far it could barely
be recognized as a military-led government.”312
Some others may contend that, despite the recognition of the importance of
Suharto’s perception, it is not necessarily his perception of military efficacy at home and
confidence in repression that matter. It could be that the Suharto government had a peaceful
worldview and despised foreign aggression. We do see many peaceful moves taken by the
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New Order administration right after Suharto’s accession to power. However, in reality,
this is not the case. Drawing on in-depth interviews conducted during 1969 and 1970 with
Indonesian foreign policy elites, Franklin B. Weinstein finds that “Indonesian leaders on
the average answered 73 percent of the relevant questions in a manner indicating adherence
to the hostile world perspective. Those components of the foreign policy elite closest to the
center of power in the New Order-namely, the army, technocrats, and foreign ministrywere all above the average in holding to this view.”313 Even Suharto himself held a very
suspicious and hostile view of some countries, especially China. He often used foreign
scapegoats (e.g. China) to explain the government’s inability to solve problems.314 Yet,
despite the hostile view Suharto bore to Communist countries, he did not tend to initiate an
international conflict toward those countries when faced with severe domestic problems.
In addition to the competing explanations focusing on the first and second images,
people could also question the feasibility and desirability of initiating an international
dispute during domestic turmoil in general from a perspective of international system.
Specifically, they may argue that the weak national capability and small numbers of
neighboring states made international conflict not feasible for Suharto. However, this is
not the case. As exemplified by the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia during
Sukarno’s rule, despite the weak national capability, it was still feasible and beneficial to
use force abroad.
Therefore, the question remains: why did Suharto not favor the use of force abroad
but show a particular bias toward domestic measures? I argue that Suharto’s preference of
domestic measures compared to international conflict, in the face of severe domestic unrest,
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is not only due to a calculation under the current circumstance, but also his choice has a
dispositional root that derived from his previous experience. His experiences prior to his
accession to power and the extremely instable situation he inherited motivated him to
perceive more efficacy and more confidence in the use of force at home, when trying to
cope with the severe internal threat.
Throughout Suharto’s rule, development and stability were the two paramount
themes. “Development was Suharto’s leitmotiv” 315 that justified his personal power,316
whereas domestic stability was the prerequisite for development. “He was a firm believer
that people had a moral duty to respect the order of existence: they had to respect the order
of society, and honour the elderly and their superiors because development could only take
place in the presence of stability. Growth could not take place if political and social
instability abounded.”317 In addition to the rational calculation, as discussed above, his
respect of national unity and stability has a dispositional root that was formed through his
revolutionary and military experiences. The priority of national unity and stability under
Suharto’s administration predisposed him to favor domestic measures, not international
conflict, in the face of severe internal strife.
First, leaders perceived that domestic measures are more effective in coping with
severe unrest yet, the high intensity level of internal unrest will neutralize the motivated
bias of revolutionary leaders like Suharto. Specifically, under severe strife, there is limited
time for international conflict to take effect, since for example, it will take some time for
the “rally-around-the-flag” effect to work. In contrast, domestic measures are the quickest
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response to directly solve imminent problems. For Suharto, he adopted domestic measures,
especially repression, to deal with his major threats because those threats were so imminent
that he had no choice but eliminate them.
Before he fully consolidated his power, Suharto had seen or personally encountered
opposition and tensions that were created by different groups who posed a threat to the
lawful government. This left him with different perceptions about each opposing group. In
other words, he cultivated a threat perception with diffing degrees, with some groups being
perceived as extremely threatening and others less threatening. By corresponding to the
differing degrees of threat posed by various groups, he was inclined to adopt different
policy responses while in power. For example, as mentioned before, previous experience
gave him a strong distaste for communists and political Islam extremists which he
perceived as the major threats to the unity of the nation. Suharto had “no empathy for those
who rebelled against the lawful government,”318 and showed “no qualms and was always
ready to go after the rebels.”319 Once he detected a threat from these groups, he would
always choose to repress. This previous experience and subsequent perception meant that
Suharto’s rule manifested itself in ruthless suppression and the brutal massacre of
communists and Islamic extremists. According to Adrian Vickers, “The New Order’s claim
to represent law and order meant that its enemies were to be ruthlessly suppressed.”320
However, Suharto did not always repress the opposition with cruelty. In contrast to
his deep hatred of communists and political Islamic extremists, Suharto’s feelings toward
students was more complicated as students helped him to come to power yet later voiced
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oppositions to his rule. 321 Hence, Suharto’s policies toward student movements were
complex, “combining mild forms of repression (compared to the brutal treatment of
Communists) with manipulation and cooptation.”322 Specifically, “[s]tudent groups that
demonstrated against the Soeharto government were disbanded and their leaders arrested.
More cooperative students joined a government-sponsored youth organization and played
a leading role in the formation of the government party Golkar.”323
Second, it is known that previous experiences in coping with opposition during
revolutions enable these leaders to have more confidence in utilizing domestic measures.
Prior to his accession to power, Suharto mainly participated in two conflicts that had a
foreign target: the fight against the Allies (primarily Great Britain) around Magelang and
Semarang in 1945, and the Second Dutch Invasion against the Dutch from 1948 to 1949.
Despite the success he obtained in the battlefield, his role was a minor one, since he was
not a highly ranked military officer at that time.324 In contrast to his few experiences and
his minor role in international conflict, his experiences in coping with oppositions
abounded.
After the transfer of sovereignty to the Hatta government under Sukarno’s
constitutional presidency in 1949, Suharto, now a lieutenant-colonel,
participated in a number of operations to mop up resistance to the new unitary
state in the Eastern provinces. Suharto’s troops, known as the ‘Martaram
Brigade’, were among those sent to South Sulawesi in April 1950 to put down
a revolt.325
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In addition to the abundance of experiences of using force at home, his formative years as
a divisional commander in 1950s “provided him also with a pool of loyal subordinates, on
whom he was to draw to appoint his key henchmen before and after 1965 in Jakarta.”326
With the help of these loyal subordinates, Suharto set up the powerful security apparatus
of the Department of Defense and Security, which “enables the authorities to arrest and
hold indefinitely anyone whom they suspect of subversive activity.”327
Third, during serious domestic unrest, initiating an international conflict would risk
complicating the situation further by dragging a foreign country into the turmoil, and thus
undermining the national unity, destabilizing the country, and jeopardizing the
development. Given the centrality of development within Suharto’s policy, “the principal
duty of Indonesia's foreign policy was to serve national interests defined largely in terms
of economic interest.” 328 Put differently, in Suharto’s view, Indonesian development
required both internal and external stability.329 Thus, on one hand, he restored and ensured
domestic stability by cooptation and repression; on the other hand, he adopted a “lowprofile” foreign policy to create a relatively stable environment for economic
development. 330 In this case, when faced with serious internal tensions, Suharto was
reluctant to appeal to international conflict, because destabilizing the external environment
would contradict his fundamental principle of maintaining internal and external stability
for development.
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Simply put, Suharto primarily relied on domestic measures to cope with severe
strife, because the high intensity level of the domestic situation molded his inclination
toward the use of force abroad. This was achieved in the following three ways. To begin
with, Suharto perceived more efficacy from domestic measures in the face of severe strife,
since this was an immediate response and directly addressed the problem. Additionally,
due to his abundant experiences in domestic repression, Suharto was more confident in
using force at home. Lastly, under domestic strife, Suharto was unwilling to be provocative
in the international realm, as an international response would potentially make his situation
worse by destabilizing the international environment for development and further
undermining national unity. Therefore, during Suharto’s rule, he has imposed “a pattern of
state-society relations that combines cooptation and responsiveness with repression.”331 In
contrast, foreign aggression as a potentially reasonable policy response to domestic strife
was never favored by the Suharto administration.

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SCAPEGOATS
Some may think the lack of engagement into international conflict during
Indonesian severe domestic strife was because Suharto was not a huge fan of diversionary
tactics and scapegoating practices. Yet, it is not the case. Throughout his rule, Suharto had
both international and domestic scapegoats for his policy failure. For instance, Suharto
liked to hold international Communist subversion, especially that emanating from China,
responsible for the government’s inability to solve domestic problems.332 In the aftermath
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of the 30 September Movement, Indonesia’s ally, the U.S., attempted to link the Movement
plotters to China. Bradley R. Simpson cited some resources to illustrate the situation:
U.S. officials were particularly interested in linking the September 30th plotters
to Beijing. They helped to spread stories about China’s alleged involvement
and reported on caches of weapons purportedly “discovered” by the
Indonesian army with the hammer and sickle conveniently stamped on them.
“We have bonanza chance to nail chicoms (Chinese Communists, added) on
disastrous events in Indonesia,” Green 333 wrote the State Department. He
urged a “continuation [of] covert propaganda” as one of the “best means of
spreading [the] idea of chicom complicity,” an allegation still being put forth
by former U.S. officials forty years later.334

Despite the active efforts of the U.S. to implicate China, the Indonesian army leaders took
a more tentative approach. 335 The Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the
Department of State on October 17, 1965 quoted one general of Indonesia: “We already
have enough enemies. We can't take on Communist China as well.” 336 This partially
explains why, although international communism (mainly China) was made to be a
scapegoat, coupled with the rapid deterioration in relationship with China and Soviet Union,
Suharto was not prone to organize aggression towards those foreign countries to divert
public attention when his rule was threatened. Given the complication of the domestic
environment and Suharto’s priority of development, an international conflict with China,
which may have been potentially escalated into a world war in the Cold War era, it was not
desirable for Suharto to engage with this – however it was possible.
In contrast, Suharto was more likely to use force with a diversionary purpose
toward domestic targets—primarily Chinese Indonesians. Basically, scapegoating ethnic
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Chinese followed by anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia has become a common occurrence.
This scapegoating occurred in 1945-1949, 1966-1967 and 1997-1998 when there was
widespread discontent, severe social unrest and serious political breakdowns. A brief
historical background may illuminate the frequency of anti-Chinese outbreaks. The antiChinese sentiment in Indonesia can be tracked back to the Dutch colonial era when the
Dutch “both utilized and distinguished the Chinese, allowing them a favoured status,
although it subjected them to legal restrictions and higher taxes compared to the native
group.”337 The growing economic power of the Chinese and the inherent difference in
religion between Chinese and the native groups gradually prompted the resentment among
the indigenous Indonesians. It is agreed that the affluence of the Chinese made them easy
scapegoats. 338 The existing resentment under the manipulation of the government was
easily translated into anti-Chinese riots ever since the Indonesian revolution. During times
of economic hardship especially, the native Indonesians were easily persuaded by the
government that “Chinese traders are responsible for their difficulties.”339
Suharto came into power in the aftermath of the brutal massacre of communists and
ethnic Chinese. Suharto’s policies towards Chinese Indonesians while in power were
complex. On one hand, Suharto utilized the Sino-Indonesian community, which was
economically powerful but politically weak, as an avenue for diversification to reduce
potential political risk. Specifically, Suharto promoted the private activities of SinoIndonesian entrepreneurs by offering benefits like tariff protections and preferential access
to monopoly licenses and contracts. In turn these Chinese entrepreneurs provided Suharto
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with “an important source of financing as well as an increased domestic tax base” 340
without posing a credible threat to his power, conceived by the historical resentment toward
them and their weak political position. 341 Consequently, many Chinese Indonesians
accumulated wealth during this process, while Suharto successfully diversified his ruling
base. However, his political tactics often backfired. For instance, the close relationship
Suharto and his family had with Chinese businessmen provided his opponents with an
excuse to criticize him for his collusion with Chinese business interest.342
On the other hand, surprisingly, the Suharto regime “systematized, institutionalized,
and routinized many of the pre-1965 discriminatory practices against ChineseIndonesians.”343 Specifically, Suharto kept scapegoating Chinese minorities for his policy
failure by drawing on nationalist sentiments to divert public discontent. This peaked in the
anti-Chinese campaign in 1998. Starting from January 1998, there were growing episodes
of violence toward Chinese Indonesians. The first significant anti-Chinese events took
place on Java in the early January, and in the late January a new round of violence against
Chinese targets began between the cities of Semarang and Surabaya. “These violent events
demonstrated that the political potential for anti-Chinese riots both to displace contentious
politics against the regime and the willingness of state officials at both local and national
levels to incite violence against ethnic Chinese as a diversionary strategy aimed at
stabilizing the regime nationally.”344 In the meantime, Suharto was faced with a severe
regime crisis, with widespread discontent and opposition. With the increasing demands for
his resignation and the approaching of the presidential election, Suharto initiated a
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campaign to scapegoat the Chinese Indonesians and took advantage of existing small
episodes of anti-Chinese violence.
In February, President Suharto accused a conspiracy of domestic and
international elements of trying to destroy the rupiah, and alluded to ‘certain
business people’, a thinly veiled reference to the country’s ethnic Chinese,
supposedly responsible of triggering the crisis. Meanwhile, Aburizal Bakrie,
chairman of the Indonesian chamber of commerce, Kadin, and the leader of
one of Indonesia’s largest non-Chinese business conglomerates, suggested that
the economic crisis be used by the government to redistribute the property of
the ethnic Chinese to indigenous Indonesians.345

Thus, the first months of 1998 saw growing numbers of small-scale anti-Chinese
violence which escalated into larger and more organized events with either implicit
endorsement or active involvement of the government.346 As Panggabean and Smith (2011)
points out,
During the first half of February, following the end of Ramadan, a new round
of government rhetoric against Chinese Indonesians emerged, this time linked
with important Muslim organizations. Following a meeting on January 23
between Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s son-in-law and Commander of the
army’s Special Command Unit, and leaders of the Association of Indonesian
Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), demonstrations against Chinese targets close to
the regime escalated. The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama
Indonesia, or MUI) declared a need to protect pribumi business interests
against outsiders. Army generals Feisal Tanjung and Syarwan Hamid made
statements accusing Chinese Indonesians implicitly or explicitly of hoarding
capital. In short, the regime both cultivated and responded actively to the
expression of popular anti-Chinese sentiment on Java by stoking those
prejudices and giving them official cover.347

In short, the anti-Chinese campaigns “served to deflect attention from the government’s
handling of the crisis and to achieve Suharto’s smooth re-election as president in
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March.”348 In the short term, these diversionary tactics were successful, given that through
the anti-Chinese violence, Suharto’s regime managed to survive and even got re-elected in
March.
The efficacy of scapegoating Chinese Indonesian emboldened the Suharto
administration. In May 1998, when the student demonstrations grew out of control, the
government not only tried to “shift the frame of rioting from anti-regime to antiChinese,”349 but they also got involved in a series of anti-Chinese incidents in that month.
However, this time the diversionary tactics backfired. Just as Eklof concludes, “In the short
term, the tactics were successful, in that they managed to mobilise support for the president
and silence or isolate oppositional voices within the elite. In a little longer perspective,
however, these tactics carried high costs in terms of increasing social and political
polarisation and increasing levels of intra-elite competition and suspicion.” 350 Suharto
eventually paid the cost and resigned on 21 May 1998.
It is thus evident that Suharto had more confidence in playing the ethnic Chinese
card, rather than using force toward a foreign scapegoat, when trying to consolidate power.
First, anti-Chinese racism had long historical roots, back to the Dutch colonial time, so it
was easy to rally the indigenous Indonesian population. Second, as the head of the state,
using force toward a domestic target is safer and more legitimate. For a long time, Suharto’s
brutal repressive measures in the country did not displease the international community
and thus suffered little international pressure. Simply put, the lack of international conflict
as a response to severe domestic strife does not result from Suharto’s distaste of the
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diversionary tactics. On the contrary, he adopted the violent diversionary tactics very often,
but toward a domestic scapegoat—the Chinese Indonesians. Partially due to the advantages
of targeting domestically, Suharto never tended to initiate an international conflict when
faced with a severe regime crisis.

THE INVASION OF EAST TIMOR
Despite the relative international tranquility Indonesia enjoyed under Suharto’s rule,
Suharto did in fact initiate international conflict. The major event was the invasion and
occupation of East Timor in 1975 after he had fully consolidated his power in the country.
Given that the Malari incident took place just a year previously, some may contend the
conjecture that the invasion had a domestic root. However, this was not the case. This
conflict had nothing to do with Suharto’s solution of domestic problems and the need to
retain power. Indeed, as discussed before, by the time Indonesia invaded East Timor,
Suharto’s rule was relatively unchallenged and faced with little, if any, internal resistance.
East Timor (at the time a Portuguese colony) “stood on the threshold of
independence in 1975.”351 In 1974, the authoritarian Portuguese regime of the Estado Novo
was overthrown during the Carnation Revolution. The new government decided to
withdraw from East Timor, which created a power vacuum in the area and led to a civil
war between East Timorese political parties, in 1975. The civil war ended with the victory
of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), a leftist party. Fretilin
declared independence of East Timor on 28 November 1975. But nine days later, Suharto
authorized a full-scale invasion of East Timor, claiming to prevent the establishment of a
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communist state. To gain the support of Western countries, “Indonesia used Fretilin’s
vaguely Marxist leanings to discredit it in the international media, and the spectre of a civil
war was conjured up to induce Australia and the US to support Indonesian actions.”352 On
July 17 1976, East Timor was officially annexed into Indonesia as the 27th province.353
Scholars agree that the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, by nature, was a
territorial conquest using the anti-communism cover.354 As Abdulgani-Knapp describes,
“Indonesia’s argument when President Soekarno wanted West Irian back as part of
Indonesia’s lawful territory was the same argument President Soeharto has used, that East
Timor belonged to Indonesia.”355 This territorial conquest in East Timor, as well as the
takeover of West Papua 356 in 1969 was under the guidance of Suharto’s nationalist
sentiment of a “Greater Indonesia” which he and Sukarno both shared. 357 Therefore,
undoubtedly, Suharto’s goal of the invasion was totally territorial, since it was by no means
domestic. Yet, the consolidation of his power at home in this period definitely gave Suharto
the courage to engage in international conflicts like this, given the long-lasting severe
separatist resistance of East Timorese since 1975.
To consolidate his control over East Timor, Suharto’s policy was nothing different
from his policy toward communists. In the face of an indigenous separatist movement, with
varying degrees of intensity in East Timor since 1975, “the army’s methods of counter-
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insurgency were at best heavy-handed, at worst brutal.”358 Suharto perceived the resistance
in East Timor as a threat to the unity of the state and thus used this method.359 A huge
number of East Timorese perished in the civil war, the invasion and the following
consolidation of Indonesian rule.
The president of the pro-Indonesian provisional government of East Timor,
Lopes da Cruz, announced on 13 February 1976 that 60,000 people had
already been killed “in the six months of civil war in East Timor,” suggesting
a toll of over 55,000 in just the two months since the invasion. A late 1976
report from the Indonesian Catholic Church estimated that 60,000 to 100,000
Timor- ese had perished. In March 1977, Indonesian foreign minister Adam
Malik conceded that “50,000 people or perhaps 80,000 might have been killed
during the war in Timor.” On 12 November 1979, Indonesia’s new foreign
minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja estimated that 120,000 Timorese had died
since 1975.360

The 1991 Dili Massacre marked a turning point for the East Timorese independence
cause. 361 On 12 November 1991, Indonesian troops fired on several unarmed proindependence protestors in Dili, the East Timorese capital. This massacre, for Suharto, was
nothing different from what he had done within Indonesia. However, the event had a
profound effect. The broadcasting of the massacre heavily damaged Suharto’s international
image and transferred the attitudes of international community, and eventually led to the
international support of East Timorese independence.
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SUMMARY
As a military-backed government leader with revolutionary experience, why did
Suharto never initiate an international conflict in the face of severe domestic strife? I argue,
in this chapter, that his potentially aggressive inclination toward foreign aggression had
been cancelled out by the severe domestic context. In the context of severe internal strife,
for Suharto, domestic measures, namely cooptation and repression, are more appropriate.
First, imminent and severe problems call for direct and time-saving solutions and in this
regard, domestic measures are much better options for Suharto. Second, Suharto had more
experiences in using domestic measures, which gave him more confidence in utilizing them.
Confidence of leaders in policies is important, especially when they are dealing with
emergencies. Third, as a leader prioritized development and stability, for Suharto, the loss
of initiating an international conflict during severe internal division outweighs the gain,
since fighting with a foreign scapegoat will destabilize the external environment, damage
development, and incur international censure. Lastly, the Chinese Indonesians served a
good substitute for a foreign target for his scapegoating purpose during severe regime crises.
All the reasons above predisposed Suharto to take domestic measures instead of
international conflict, as a policy response when his rule was threatened.
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CHAPTER 5: MAO ZEDONG AND CHINA UNDER HIS RULE
A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or
doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind,
courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of
violence by which one class overthrows another.
—Mao Zedong, Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement
in Hunan, March 1927

Mao Zedong, the founding father of the People’s Republic of China, ruled the
country from its foundation in 1949 until his death in 1976. Unlike Suharto, who pledged
loyalty to different lords (i.e. he used to work for the Dutch colonizers and then the
Japanese), Mao almost only had one faith (i.e. communism) and participated in one
overarching movement (i.e. communist revolution) throughout his life. Thus, he had an
even stronger revolutionary belief. Most of time, Mao adopted a revolutionary foreign
policy and tried to export revolution, which was manifested as his aggressive stance on
international issues. For him, world revolution was the way to achieve international peace.
As Mao clearly expressed in the “Opening Address at the Eighth National Congress of the
Communist Party of China” in 1956,
To achieve a lasting peace in the world, we must further develop our friendship
and co-operation with the fraternal countries in the camp of socialism and
strengthen our solidarity with all peace-loving countries. We must [endeavor]
to establish normal diplomatic relations on the basis of mutual respect for
territorial integrity and sovereignty, and equality and mutual benefit, with all
countries willing to live together with us in peace. We must give active support
to the national independence and liberation movement in countries in Asia,
Africa and Latin America as well as to the peace movement and righteous
struggles in all countries throughout the world. We firmly support the entirely
lawful action of the Government of Egypt in taking back the Suez Canal
Company, and resolutely oppose any attempt to encroach on the sovereignty of

139

Egypt and start armed Intervention against that country. We must completely
frustrate the schemes of imperialism to create tension and prepare for war.362

However, sometimes foreign aggression lost its attractiveness and necessity to Mao. When
faced with severe domestic strife, Mao refrained from using international conflict as a
response and would intentionally avoid engaging in international disputes so that he could
focus on solving domestic problems.
Mao’s reluctance to rely on international conflict was a result of both his
revolutionary experience and the domestic context. First, during the long revolutionary
years, Mao fostered a strong capability for defeating opposition within the party. This gave
him more confidence to deal with those issues directly, rather than using a circumvent way,
like provoking an international conflict. Second, the concerning domestic environment
forced Mao to look for a response that would be quick and direct, in other words, he needed
a timely solution, like domestic measures. Lastly, through reviewing Mao’s long rule, little
evidence indicates that Mao’s high level of risk-tolerance predisposed him to ever engage
in international aggression during acute domestic instability. At this time, his conflict
paradigms were pragmatic and contingent on the context. This means that although his
high levels of risk-tolerance would endow Mao with a preference for foreign aggression,
the possible alternatives, coupled with the severe domestic situation, may neutralize his
inclination toward international dispute as a response.
In the following sections of the chapter, I will illustrate a brief history of young
Mao in the first two sections, with an emphasis on how he fostered his revolutionary ideas
and how he managed to come into power. The third section will primarily address the
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various major problems Mao was faced with after 1949, how he coped with the severe
domestic situations, and why international conflict was not an option for Mao in those
situations. However, the absence of international conflict used by Mao in the face of severe
domestic strife did not mean that Mao never used the technique. Therefore, in the following
section, I elaborate some cases in which Mao utilized international conflict to achieve his
goal. The section following this investigates all the major conflicts Mao engaged in during
his long rule and specifically discusses the causes of those conflicts and why none of them
took place as a policy response to severe domestic problems. The last section is a brief
summary of the chapter.

EARLY YEARS: A REBELLIOUS YOUNG MIND (1893-1918)
Mao Zedong was born on 26 September 1893 into a relative wealthy rural family
of Shaoshan village, Hunan Province. During his childhood, Mao was by no means more
rebellious than his peers. Mao’s rebellious behaviors were at most enjoying stories of
rebellion, running away from school to avoid being beaten by the teachers, and
contradicting his harsh demanding father. The unpleasant father-son relationship seemed
to be the only major adversity in Mao’s childhood.363
At age sixteen, Mao left home and entered a new school.364 There he absorbed new
knowledge and learnt about the West. Through the readings, he was deeply impressed by
the reform movement of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. As Mao recalled, he at that time

363
364

Terrill 1980, 5.
Lawrance 1991, 3.

141

was not yet an antimonarchist, as he still held a positive view about the Chinese Emperor
and thought that Kang Youwei’s reforms were beneficial to the Emperor himself.365
One year later, Mao gained an opportunity to study at the Xiangxiang Middle
School in Changsha, the capital city of Hunan province. Before long, however, “he was
caught up in the political enthusiasm when the revolutionary forces of Sun Yat-sen (Sun
Zhongshan, added) attempted to seize the city in October 1911.”366 Mao changed his idea
about the Qing monarchic system and joined the regular revolutionary army in the hope of
helping complete the revolution against the Manchus, but still admired Kang and Liang.367
During this time period, he first learned the term “socialism.” 368 In his first rebellion
experience, with little or no fighting, Mao did not form a deep attachment to the army
life.369 Mao resigned from the army half a year later when Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shikai
came to an agreement to unify the North and South, which in his mind signaled the end of
the revolution.370
In 1912, Mao continued his study and entered the Hunan Normal School. During
that period, his “political ideas began to take place.”371 At that time, according to Mao,
“my mind was a curious mixture of ideas of liberalism, democratic reformism, and Utopian
socialism. I had somewhat vague passions about ‘nineteenth-century democracy,’
utopianism, and old-fashioned liberalism, and I was definitely antimilitarist and antiimperialist.”372 Through his reading of revolutionary magazines, like the New Youth (Xin
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Qingnian; 新青年 ), Mao modified his political belief, rejecting the reformism of his
previous heroes, Kang and Liang. Hu Shi373 and Chen Duxiu374 became his new intellectual
models.375 However, he had not yet formed a systematic revolutionary ideology. “Mao in
these years rarely uttered the word ‘revolution,’ and when he did he meant by it only a
sweeping away of the old.”376
There, he gradually built up a group of friends around himself to exchange their
political beliefs and later formed different closely-knit organizations. For instance, in 1918
he founded the Xinmin Institute (xinmin xuehui; 新民学会), a fully political organization.
Many of its members (e.g. Li Weihan) later became communists, taking the lead in Chinese
communism and the Chinese Revolution.
His early school life armed the young man with knowledge, inner strength, and a
group of friends who shared his political concerns. As Ross Terrill summarized, Mao’s
early life surroundings and experiences endowed him with the traits of earthiness, a spirit
of rebellion, Robin Hood romance, love of books, a good sense of organization, and care
for public affairs.377 In 1918,
Mao was only a student leader. His radical plot was merely to take cold baths.
But the nature of the times clinched a link that Mao himself perhaps could not
yet see. Education; the body; a political revolution.
The three were linked because, given China’s mess, knowledge was for action,
and action would mean sweat and the gun. To be a student rebel and a physical
fitness zealot at FTTS378 during World War I was by its own logic to take a big
stride toward Marxism—rather Leninism—even though there was not in 1918
a single Marxist doctrine in Mao’s tousled head.379
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REVOLUTION YEARS: FROM A REVOLUTIONARY TO A
REVOLUTIONARY LEADER (1919-1949)
The establishment of Mao’s power has been intertwined with the complex history
of the Chinese revolution. His accession to power was not accidental and without challenge.
Mao eventually established his power within the Communist party, despite numerous
struggles within and outside the party, and later became the founding father of the People’s
Republic of China.
In 1918, Mao went to Beijing.380 During his stay in Beijing, Mao became more
interested in politics, and his political mind became increasingly radical and developed
rapidly towards a Marxist framework.381 When he returned to Hunan in 1919, he was more
directly involved in politics. Especially after the May Fourth Movement, Mao tried to
influence student movements and organized a general student strike against the warlord
ruler of Hunan, Zhang Jingyao. Under the help of Xinmin Institute, this later developed
into a general antimilitarist movement. In this process, Mao gradually realized that “only
mass political power, secured through mass action, could guarantee the realization of
dynamic reforms.”382
In the winter of 1920, under the influence of Marxist theory and the Russian
Revolution, Mao, for the first time, organized workers politically. By 1920, Mao said “I
had become, in theory and to some extent in action, a Marxist, and from this time on I
considered myself a Marxist.”383 Then Mao organized a Communist Party in Changsha and
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participated in the first Party Congress as a delegate in 1921.384 The establishment of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), made Mao into the communist revolutionary he is known
to be.
After returning from the founding meeting of the CCP, Mao “led the movement to
unionize the urban workers of Hunan,”385 for the next two years. The Third Party Congress
of the CCP in 1923 made the historic decision that the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT)
would cooperate and create a United Front against the northern militarists. Mao was
assigned to coordinate the measures of the CCP and the KMT.386 Since 1924, Mao had
been a member of the political bureau of the CCP.387
In March 1925, Sun Yat-sen, a strong advocate of the United Front and the leader
of the KMT, died, and Chiang Kai-shek became the new Commander-In-Chief. The nationwide political activities following the May 30th Movement388 made Mao start to realize the
importance of “class struggle among the peasantry.”389 Mao proposed for the vigorous
organization of the peasantry. However, Chen Duxiu, the General Secretary of CCP then,
objected to this proposal, as he believed that the role of the CCP was to organize workers
and win over the cities.390 Later, Mao was sent to Hunan to inspect peasant organizations.
Based on this experience, Mao made his famous article “Report on an Investigation into
the Peasant Movement in Hunan” in March 1927, “urging the adoption of a new line in the
peasant movement.”391 This proposal again was rejected by the Central Committee of the
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CCP. This discussion of the party line was interrupted by the White Terror in April. In
April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek instigated the violent suppression of left-wing supporters in
Nanjing and Shanghai, and later Guangdong. This marked the failure of the First United
Front between the CCP and the KMT, and gave rise to the downfall of Chen Duxiu.392
In August 1927, an extraordinary meeting of the CCP Central Committee (i.e. the
August 7th Meeting) was held to discredit Chen Duxiu and his policy of cooperation with
the KMT. A new party line of building up its own military and struggling with the KMT
was adopted. This signaled the beginning of the long, open struggle for power between the
CCP and the KMT.393 Later, CCP launched several uprisings against the rule of Chiang
Kai-shek. The Autumn Harvest Uprising in September attacking Changsha, led by Mao,
was one of them. The uprising was soon defeated by the KMT. Mao decided to give up on
the offense and abandon the attack of the big city (i.e. Changsha), so he transferred the
troops to Jianggangshan, the border area between Hunan and Jiangxi, and established a
base there. The Central Committee blamed the failure on Mao and dismissed him from his
position.394 However, Mao ignored the decision, recruited more people into the army, and
became its commander.395 In the course, Mao realized the importance of the CCP’s control
over military forces and “put forward two famous principles: ‘The Party commands the
gun,’ and ‘Establishing party branches at the company level.’”396
Since Mao established the revolutionary base in Jinggangshan, the struggle
between Mao and the Central Committee had continued for years, because the Central
Committee believed that Mao’s commitment to the peasant revolution was a defection from
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the party line of the proletarian revolution. Mao insisted on his agrarian mass movement in
the base.397 Inner-party struggle led to several political ups and downs for Mao. In 1930,
Mao was put on the Politburo again.398 With the Central Committee moving to Jiangxi in
1931, on November 7, the Soviet Republic of China, an independent Communist-governed
state, was proclaimed, with Mao as Chairman. During this period, Mao “gave up his hopes
of easy victory.”399 Again, he was proved to be right. Through a moderate agrarian reform
and a democratic program, the CCP gradually consolidated its dominance in those new
bases.
In the meantime, Chiang Kai-shek launched a series of Encirclement Campaigns to
annihilate the Chinese Red Army and the newly-built Jiangxi Soviet, from the end of 1930.
The first four Encirclement Campaigns were defeated by the Jiangxi Soviet. However, the
Fifth Encirclement Campaign between 1933 and 1934 almost destroyed the Jiangxi Soviet.
One of the major reasons for the CCP’s failure in this Counter Encirclement Campaign was
the defection from Mao’s previous war strategies.400 As a consequence, the CCP decided
to abandon the Jiangxi base and started the Long March (1934-1935) to transfer the main
living forces of the Red Army to a new base.401 In October of 1935, the Long March ended
with the Red Army reaching Shaanxi and enlarging its base in China’s Northwest.402
During the Long March, in January 1935, an “enlarged” meeting of the politburo was held
at Zunyi. Mao “persuaded his old opponents to accept his strategic concepts and his
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leadership,”403 and was elected the Chairman of the politburo. In this meeting, Mao finally
established his dominance in the party.
With the increasing pace of the Japanese aggression, the Communists, under the
leadership of Mao, actively sought cooperation with the KMT against the Japanese. In late
1936, the Second United Front between the CCP and the KMT was formed. Throughout
the eight-year anti-Japanese war (1937-1945), Communists developed tremendously. “By
1945 Red China had ninety million people led by one million party members and defended
by nearly one million soldiers.”404 This lay down a solid foundation for the Communists
success in the Civil War. After four-year fight, the Chinese Civil War ended with a
Communist triumph.
In general, since the establishment of Mao’s leadership in 1935, the CCP and Mao
had achieved great military success in the Anti-Japanese War and the Civil War, which
reaffirmed the potency of Mao’s strategies and awarded him with unprecedented popularity
and prestige. Before long, on October 1 1949, Mao proclaimed the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China and unfolded the rule of Mao over the whole country.

MAO’S LONG RULE OVER THE NEW CHINA
The long period of Mao’s rule could be divided into two major political eras: from
the foundation to the Cultural Revolution (1949-1965) and the Cultural Revolution years
(1966-1976). During the first political era, the central leadership acted with high unity and
enjoyed nationwide popular support, while in the second political area, in the Cultural
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Revolution years, there was a deep division within central leadership and a growing dissent
across the country. As one of the most “dangerous” men in the world, Mao initiated and
engaged in numerous international disputes when he was in power. Some of the disputes,
like the Second Taiwan Straight Crisis, were on the brink of a major power war or even a
nuclear war. However, Mao barely ever initiated an international dispute out of domestic
political reasons. Instead, to cope with the serious dissenting voices, Mao was more likely
to use domestic measures, like repression and co-optation throughout his rule. This reveals
that his high level of risk-tolerance and perception of military efficacy failed to translate
into a policy preference toward international disputes. These “dangerous” characteristics
his previous life experience had endowed him with disposed Mao to domestic measures,
particularly repression, when he was faced with severe domestic strife.

THE FIRST ERA: REMOLDING, BUILDING, AND EXPLORING (1949-1965)
Right after the establishment of the New China in 1949, Mao’s tasks were mainly
domestic: consolidation of CCP power within liberated parts of China; the liberation of
Taiwan, Hainan and Tibet; and economic recovery, reform and development.
Internationally, Mao chose to “lean to one side,” this being the Soviet side in the Cold War.
As mentioned above, the central leadership of CCP during this period enjoyed high levels
of solidarity and popular support, so there were few dissenting voices across the country.
The two major events of domestic unrest occurred during the Hundred Flowers Movement
and the Great Leap Forward Movement. To address the public dissent, Mao did not try to
divert the public attention by creating international tension, but utilized domestic measures,
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such as initiating a repressive campaign towards the dissenters and making compromises
to pacify the turmoil. For most of the time, use force abroad was never even a viable policy
option in response to severe internal divisions. Therefore, in the sections followed, I will
trace back in history to discuss the reasons why international conflict was not favorable, or
even thinkable during this period.

The Hundred Flowers Movement and Its Aftermath
In early 1956, Mao inaugurated the Hundred Flowers Movement— “Let a hundred
flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend,” to relax the political control over
intellectuals and encourage their open expression. 405 These series of liberalization policies
aimed to “harness the enthusiasm and talents of the intellectuals” 406 and to expedite
socialist transformation and economic development of the new China. Mao evidentially
did realize that conformity of intellectuals would hold back economic progress.407 In the
beginning, the campaign was limited to academic debate. Soon, Mao extended it into the
political sphere with an encouragement of criticism of the party cadres, because for him,
shortcomings of the party, like bureaucratism, would impede modernization.408 Most of his
colleagues had strong reservations of this task conversion. However, as the ultimate
authority, Mao easily overrode dissenting opinions.409 In Mao’s view, criticism by nonparty people was helpful in its nature.410 “The Hundred Flowers policy was predicated on
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the belief that a genuine exchange of ideas and the criticism of repressive officials would
ultimately lead to ideological unity.”411
At first, the response of the intellectuals was tepid. Meanwhile, student
demonstrations and workers’ strikes took place due to “the de-Stalinization of the Soviet
Union and the international crises in Poland and Hungary,412 hasty social reforms, and
unbalanced domestic investments.”413 This did not worry Mao too much, because on one
hand, he believed that CCP rectification could prevent Poland and Hungary-type riots from
happening in China, and on the other hand, Mao had the faith in the loyal support of the
“masses”. 414 Under the continuing call of the government and the mounting pressure on
staying silent, in the spring of 1957, those bold intellectuals started to speak out. Before
long, the intellectual criticism deviated from Mao’s expectation. In May 1957, complaints
gradually targeted and questioned the party authority, and some even proposed for
institutional change, such as converting the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) into an upper house of the National People's Congress (NPC).415
What concerned Mao more was that although critics still expressed loyalty toward his
leadership, they unavoidably denounced some of Mao’s policies and even Mao himself.
Increasingly wary of the “malicious criticisms”, Mao’s attitude toward the Hundred
Flowers Movement had changed. Mao started to think about the policy response to deal
with the changed situation. Political crackdown was not Mao’s immediate option, despite
the strong preferences toward a tough policy, suggested by his colleagues. Mao’s
reputation was at stake if he decided to crack down on the movement, as it was he who
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rejected the leaders’ opposition to allowing the expansion of criticism into the political
sphere. The defeat of the Hundred Flowers Movement would also be a defeat for Mao,
since it showed that his idea of “a benevolently-run communist society”416 was wrong.
Thus, Mao adopted a so-called “open conspiracy” plan. Specifically, the party continued
to encourage the free expression of intellectuals, so that it could lure out “poisonous weeds”
(i.e. malicious intellectuals), or the “rightists”, who favored capitalism and were against
socialism.
However, the growing student unrest in Beijing made the situation deteriorate. In
May 1957, large-scale student demonstrations against existing political institutions broke
out, which pushed Mao to take a serious counter-measure. Students established the
Democracy Wall and Democracy Square at Peking University, which spread to other
universities. This “may have finally convinced even Mao that China might be on the verge
of a Hungarian-type uprising.” 417 Soon in early June 1957, a counterattack, the AntiRightist Campaign, was launched, which marked the end of the Hundred Flowers
Movement. Those who were labeled as “rightists” “were subjected to violent press attacks
and large-scale struggle meetings and forced into abject confessions.”418 From the policymaking level, there was no discussion of policy choices within the party leadership.
Crackdown was the only option on the board and an international conflict was not an option
for discussion. “The only difference was the timing of the crackdown.”419
A couple of reasons made international conflict rare. First, revolutionary
experiences and experiences in suppressing counterrevolutionaries predisposed Mao and
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his colleagues to choose repression as their first response to deal with domestic oppositions,
as it was aligned with their revolutionary ideology and tough stance against enemies.
Chung (2011) describes how quick and easy it was for Mao and his high-ranking colleagues
to arrive at the consensus on a crackdown. All the revolutionary top favored a tough stand
against critics.420
On 27 May, the Party Centre held a meeting of provincial Party secretaries
during which Deng made a speech on behalf of the Centre. In this speech Deng
assessed the current situation and asserted that “obviously, some Rightists are
trying to compete with us for the leadership,” and therefore “the Party Centre
has no choice but to struggle with them.”421

Also, the previously successful repressive and revolutionary experiences gave Mao
and his revolutionary colleagues much more confidence in utilizing repressive tools against
enemies. As Strauss (2006) concludes, “[t]he successful regime consolidation of the
revolutionary PRC owed much to its inheritance from the KMT and its own superiority in
definitively ‘out-generalling’ the KMT military in the civil war and crushing meaningful
military resistance.” 422 Its glorious past endowed CCP, under Mao, with “the absolute
confidence in its moral correctness” and efficacy of repressive measures.423 For example,
Yang (2008) identifies that the successful campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries (the
zhenfan campaign) in the early 1950s “was an important watershed in solidifying Mao’s
view that class-based analysis and class struggle ought to be carried out by the
revolutionary state. Thus the zhenfan campaign set the young People's Republic of China
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well on the road to later campaigns against class enemies such as the Anti-Rightist
Campaign and the Cultural Revolution.”424
In addition, Mao’s goal of eliminating domestic enemies quickly and effectively,
would only be made possible through suppression. For Mao, the Hundred Flowers
Movement proved the unreliability of the intellectuals. Some of them even held the
malicious intention of overthrowing the regime. Thus, the ideal policy choice to deal with
this situation should be the one that was able to stop the criticism immediately and force
intellectuals under the party control in the long run. According to Merle Goldman, the AntiRightist Campaign exactly had this dual purpose and successfully helped Mao achieve his
goals: first, silencing the critics he had summoned, and second, damaging the prestige of
intellectuals by labeling them as “rightists” and re-imposing tighter controls over their
life.425 In contrast, initiating an international conflict would have been too indirect to solve
these immediate problems. Regardless of the potential costs of dragging a foreign country
into the complication, it was impossible for Mao to eliminate his potential enemies through
an international conflict. Although an international conflict may divert public attention
from the criticism toward the party and achieve the first goal, it failed to enable Mao to
distinguish the malicious rightists from the rest of the group and thus have the ability to
impose a tighter control over intellectual life again. Under an international dispute,
problems would stay unsolved with the “poisonous antisocialist weeds” remained
untouched.
In conclusion, the development of the Hundred Flowers Movement in the early
summer of 1957 posed a great threat to Mao’s leadership. Mao later on 13 November 1957
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characterized the time period as “a time when the skies were covered with dark clouds.”426
To deal with the urgent situation brought about by the Hundred Flowers Movement, Mao
and his revolutionary colleagues had refrained from initiating an international dispute as a
policy response. First, their revolutionary experience predisposed them to have a tough
stance against enemies. Repression was their natural response against dissents. Second,
due to previously successful repressive experiences, Mao and other revolutionary leaders
perceived more efficacy in using repression against domestic oppositions. They were more
confident in the repression as a powerful tool to eliminate dissenting voices. Lastly, unlike
the indirect measures, such as the initiation of an international conflict, domestic repression
better served Mao’s goals. The crackdown of the Hundred Flowers Movement not only
stopped the criticism against the party immediately, but also forced the intellectuals under
the party’s control. This eliminated the long-term threat posed by the intellectuals.

The Great Leap Forward and Its Aftermath
With the waning credibility in the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the strained
relations with the Soviet Union, Mao “desperately needed a new initiative” to restore his
credibility and divert public attention toward economic production.427 Also, for Mao, the
superiority of the Soviet model vanished over time. By the end of the First Five Year Plan
(1953-1957),428 the Soviet model had created many economic problems that would hold
back China’s modernization. For example, there was emerging development imbalance
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between agriculture and industry. Agriculture fell behind the demands of industrialization,
which in the long term, would undermine the development of the Chinese economy.429
According to Mao on February 27, 1957, “with over 80 per cent of her population in the
rural areas, industry must develop together with agriculture, for only thus can industry
secure raw materials and a market, and only thus is it possible to accumulate fairly large
funds for building a powerful heavy industry.”430 Mao continued to point out that there
were “two different attitudes towards learning from others. One is the dogmatic attitude of
transplanting everything, whether or not it is suited to our conditions. This is no good. The
other attitude is to use our heads and learn those things which suit our conditions, that is,
to absorb whatever experience is useful to us. That is the attitude we should adopt.”431 Thus,
Mao intended to break with the Soviet model and find China’s own model for development.
Eventually in 1958, driven by the overall optimism of the top CCP leadership about their
economic development ability, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward (GLF) movement
as an alternative strategy to the Soviet model. This relied on the massive mobilization and
the rapid increase of the industrial and agricultural production and for the People’s
Communes (i.e. collectives or cooperatives) to undergo a socialist transformation.
In its New Year’s editorial, the People’s Daily—the official newspaper of the
Chinese Communist Party— proclaimed that the GLF would propel China to
surpass Great Britain in industrial production in 15 years and the United States
in 20 or 30 years. The nation was soon propelled to a state of exuberance, as
news about extraordinary gains in agricultural and industrial production broke
out across the country.432
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The program itself showed Mao’s great confidence in his policy choices during the
revolutionary years, such as mass mobilization and guerrilla warfare. His success during
the revolution enabled him to believe that these techniques would be still helpful in
economic development. However, the program did not progress as smoothly as Mao and
his colleagues initially expected. With a nationwide frenzy of enthusiasm in the
revolutionary change, severe problems unavoidably arose. For instance, grain output fell
precipitously, which jeopardized economic development.433 By the end of 1958, Mao was
aware that “extremism in the name of the Leap was already causing some damage,” and he
tried to rectify the excesses to “keep the movement on track.”434 For example, intellectuals
were allowed to criticize the irrationality of the GLF publicly.435 In middle of 1959, while
retaining the job of the CCP Chairman, Mao stepped down as head of state and gave way
to Liu Shaoqi (the new State Chairman) and Deng Xiaoping (the CCP General Secretary)
to bring economic recovery. Unfortunately, the Lushan Conference in July 1959
interrupted Mao’s process of modification. In the conference, Peng Dehuai, the minister of
National Defense, made a harsh criticism of the GLF. Peng’s critique coincided with the
Soviet criticisms of the program, which made Mao suspect that Peng was supported by the
Soviet Union to challenge his leadership. Thus Mao responded sharply. Mao first dismissed
Peng from his position with Lin Biao as the replacement, and then launched a nationwide
purge of Peng’s supporters. The immediate result of this was that Mao “produced a second
upsurge in radical policies lasting into 1960.”436
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The GLF turned out to be a disaster, which resulted in economic recession,
widespread famine, and minor revolts.437 Due to the campaign, millions of people died and
“China lost five years on its new long march to modernity.” 438 Faced with the severe
economic crisis, Mao supported his colleagues’ recovery policies and decided to retreat
from the radical GLF. In June 1961, “Mao made a self-criticism at a key Party meeting in
Beijing, and the Party as a whole adopted policies of retrenchment as official doctrine.”439
With the retreat from the GLF, economic problems soon began to ease. Although the
economic stagnation did not develop into popular opposition against Mao, Mao’s power
and image did erode, as the GLF itself was mobilized based on people’s “impressive loyalty
to Mao’s summons.”440 This increased his concern of a potential tarnished influence, so
Mao sought to regain his power once the economic tensions were reduced. This move
caused further split of CCP leadership. According to Kenneth Leiberthal, starting in 1963,
Mao utilized two strategies to boost his policy preference. The first was to promote the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as the role model for the Chinese people and subsequently
propagandized its achievements, such as the victories in the border conflict with India in
1962 and the development of the first atom bomb in 1964. The second measure he took
was through open debate with the Soviet Union about what real socialism looks like. This
tried to engage the domestic audience and dismiss the policies he disliked.441 Also, in the
battle with his colleagues, Mao gradually formed a new coalition to enhance his strength
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between 1962 and 1965, which lay the political foundation for the future Cultural
Revolution.442
In retrospect, Mao’s response towards the domestic unrest caused by the GLF
varied from case to case, but he never chose international conflict. First, when he felt
severely threatened by Peng’s criticism in 1959, he took repressive measures by
denouncing Peng and his supporters as “bourgeois” and later initiated a campaign against
them. Subsequently, as the GLF became an economic disaster, Mao decided to retreat and
made compromises with his colleagues. Once the economy recovered, Mao was able to
mobilize support from the opposition through non-violent mean, such as establishing a new
coalition, propagandizing the PLA achievement, and open debate with the Soviet Union.
International conflict again, was not an option. The reasons are as follows. First,
Mao’s prior revolutionary experience neutralized his propensity toward international
conflict and predisposed him to alternative policy options when he was faced with severe
domestic strife. During the process of his accession to power during the revolutionary ages,
Mao had developed a strong ability “to prevail over his colleagues, to subdue them, and to
manipulate them, against their better judgement, into willing and even enthusiastic
supporters of his vision and policies.”443 It could be the case that this ability was so strong
that it not only predisposed Mao to deal with within-party oppositions through the strategy
of political maneuvers (i.e. repression, cooptation, and coalition), but also to unconsciously
eliminated international conflict as an alternative. As Alfred L. Chan concluded, Mao had
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showed his primary ability to “define and redefine ideology, and to set the agenda” during
the GLF to “assure his unassailable position.”444
Second, domestic measures directly addressed Mao’s concern in a short time frame.
Specifically, during the GLF, Mao’s major concerns were twofold: opposition within the
party and popular unrest caused by the economic disaster. Domestic measures solved
Mao’s problems efficiently and quickly. On 23 July, nine days after Peng made the
criticism, Mao asked his colleagues about their opinions on the issue. They convinced him
that “he had a snowballing problem on his hands that he had better deal with quickly and
decisively.”445 Soon Mao decided to fight back through repressive measures, since this was
a solution that could fix the problem quickly and decisively. Through the campaign against
Peng and his supporters, the dissents within the party “were either destroyed politically or
converted to the Maoist cause.”446 This fundamentally solved the problem for Mao and
maintained his dominance in the party. Similarly, his compromises made with moderate
colleagues brought about the economic recovery and eliminated the causes for popular
unrest. These benefits could not be obtained by utilizing international conflict as a policy
response.
To conclude, the GLF was catastrophic in both a domestic and international sense.
Domestically, it jeopardized the development process and created domestic unrest. Also, it
set the stage for the final split of the CCP leadership.447 Internationally, the open debate
about the GLF and socialism further strained the relationship between China and the Soviet
Union, which in turn caused the domestic situation to deteriorate. To cope with the
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domestic problems caused by the radical campaign, Mao never turned to using international
conflict as a policy response. Under the serious domestic circumstances, it was vital that
Mao chose a policy response that was quick, effective and easy to adopt. These two
requirements together ruled out international conflict as an alternative policy for discussion.

THE SECOND ERA: CULTURAL REVOLUTION (1966-1976)
As mentioned above, the failure of the GLF led to the split of central leadership and
the authority crisis within the party. Fortunately, the series of recovery policies enabled the
CCP to weather the crisis. By 1966, the country had been recovered from the economic
disaster. “But the Cultural Revolution overwhelmed careful plans and policies. For a
decade, the Chinese political system was first thrown into chaos and then paralyzed.”448
The decision of launching the Cultural Revolution reflected “Mao’s reactions to a
complex mix of domestic and foreign developments over the decade preceding its
launch.”449 The final split of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the furious polemics between the
two countries impelled Mao to rethink the fate of the Chinese communist revolution.
Domestically, people had lost the faith in collectivism due to the travail of the GLF. The
pragmatic economic policies adopted by Mao’s colleagues to recover the economy in the
aftermath of the GLF, deviated from Mao’s revolutionary routes. Dissatisfied with the new
moderate direction and his reduced authority, in 1963, Mao launched a Socialist Education
Movement (SEM). The two themes Mao intended to emphasize in the SEM were: fighting
corruption of rural cadres and fostering revolutionary consciousness. Compared to the

448
449

MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2008, 2.
Ibid., 3.

161

corruption problem of rural cadres, “[i]t was the ideological backsliding of party members
and the consequent danger of a capitalist restoration that concerned him more.”450 For
example, during the SEM, some of his colleagues, such as Liu Shaoqi, were not fully
supportive of Mao’s specific radical policies, which seemed to Mao as threatening, because
“with a strong base in the party machine”, Liu was “able to topple him if he turned his
back.”451 Also, the fall of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union in 1964 alerted Mao to the
danger of his similar fate. Under this circumstance, Mao needed a more fundamental
movement that could help him to remove the high-level “capitalist roaders” in order to
continue the revolution and regain his power to lead the country. Therefore, history
witnessed the advent of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966. As the CCP’s
Central Committee concluded in its 1981 Resolution on Party History:
The “cultural revolution,” which lasted from May 1966 to October 1976, was
responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the
Party, the state and the people since the founding of the People’s Republic. It
was initiated and led by Comrade Mao Zedong.452

The Cultural Revolution years were characterized by anarchic chaos with massive
violence and turmoil. Mao had been faced with different forms of strife and domestic
opposition that all required his response. As Mobo Gao points out, “[t]he violence, cruelty,
suffering and deaths that occurred during the initial years of the Cultural Revolution were
caused by different groups of people, for different reasons. Some conflicts were of a class
nature, others were social in character; some of the violence involved personal grudges, in
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other cases the violence was due to blindness, ignorance and stupidity.”453 The most salient
unrest events were the massive turmoil in the late 1960s (including the Wuhan Incident),
and the turmoil manipulated by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four454 . In order to restore
disorder and thus maintain authority, Mao utilized various measures, but refrained from
using international dispute as a response, even international conflicts were generally rare
during this period. In the following sections, I will go over the brief history to explain why
international conflict was not a favorable option for Mao to deal with severe domestic
unrest.

The Initial Years of the Cultural Revolution
The initial years of the Cultural Revolution, especially from 1966 to 1969, were full
of violence and turmoil. Some turmoil even posed a severe threat to the leadership of Mao.
Therefore, Mao had to deal with this strife with caution. Most of the time, Mao chose to
suppress the violent turmoil. International dispute was never an option. More accurately,
when faced with severe domestic turbulence, Mao intentionally avoided international
disputes, and never utilized international tension to solve domestic problems, as he needed
to focus on domestic issues.
The Cultural Revolution, by its nature, was an extension of the class struggle. Mao
tried to rally the people against the “revisionists” and “capitalist roaders” in power. As
Zhou Enlai clarified later, the movement would “target the center, rather than the localities,
the domestic scene rather than the international one, inside rather than outside the party,
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and higher levels rather than lower levels.” 455 To achieve this goal, Mao decided to
mobilize the mass and “create ‘great disorder under heaven’ for the purpose of ultimately
achieving ‘great order under heaven.’”456 Similarly, Mao’s blueprint of the revolution, the
“Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” also known as the Sixteen Points, clearly indicated the
importance of mobilizing the mass and building up a new order through disorder. For
instance, the third point was to “put daring above everything else and boldly arouse the
masses,” because “[t]he outcome of this great cultural revolution will be determined by
whether the Party leadership does or does not dare boldly to arouse the masses.”457 The
fourth point directly mentioned that “[d]on’t be afraid of disorder.”458 Therefore, starting
from the summer of 1966, Mao manipulated the popular opposition, specifically within
schools, to target the incumbent top officials of the government. “A mood of rebellion
spread through colleges and schools across China.”459 Before long, the mood developed
into “red terror.” Student rebels, or the Red Guard, with the endorsement of Mao, engaged
in violent attack against the “revisionists” and their supporters. In the fall of 1966, “the
violence ranged from the destruction of private and public property, through expulsion of
urban undesirables, all the way to murder.” 460 Under the chaotic circumstance, many
people took advantage of the opportunity to topple the incumbent power figures whom they
may have had personal grievances with.
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The increasingly intense “red terror” and mob violence destroyed the political
instrument, and many top leaders of the CCP had been denounced during the Red Guard
Movement. By the end of 1966, “the threat to the very existence of the party became acute,
Mao was forced to choose between Leninism and anarchy. He had no hesitation in
preferring the former.”461 The army started to intervene to restore order.462 However, in the
beginning of 1967, while urging caution on the application of violence, Mao tried to
restrain the army to make it secondary to the movement. For example, in a short note to
Lin Biao, Mao expressed clearly that “the military should be dispatched to provide support
to the broad masses of the left.” 463 The violence and chaos continued and ultimately
mushroomed. By the summer of 1967, “China descended into a state of what Mao later
described as ‘all-round civil war’. At the start of this rival groups used cudgels and knives,
but soon moved on to machine guns and artillery.”464 MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2008)
quotes a Chinese historian to describe the situation at that time: “in actual fact, violent
clashes occurred in all of China’s cities. There were virtually no exceptions.” 465 The
domestic turmoil and revolutionary violence culminated in what is known as the Wuhan
Incident.
The Wuhan Incident of late July 1967 by its narrow definition, refers to the “the
kidnapping on 20 July of the two Central Committee emissaries,” Xie Fuzhi and Wang Li,
“by dissident worker and military units in Wuhan.”466 However, it was not an isolated event,
but rooted in a long series of armed clashes over the control of the Wuhan, the capital city
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of Hubei Province, between two contending factions—mass organizations of rebels and
established Party authorities.467 The latter468 was led by the regional military commander,
Chen Zaidao. “When the rebels became strong enough to present a real challenge”, Chen
physically suppressed their activities, outlawed their organizations, and arrested their
leaders. 469 With the support of Beijing, rebels “set aside their factional disputes and
returned, united, to the streets, denouncing Chen.”470 Soon, disputes evolved into clashes
and by early June major clashes became a regularity. By late June, Chen’s group had gained
the upper hand, which alerted Beijing. The center decided to further denounce Chen’s
conservative orientation and to endorse the rebels. Meanwhile, the Cultural Revolution
Committee in Beijing sent two members, Xie Fuzhi and Wang Li to Wuhan “to investigate
the cause of the trouble and work out a solution.” 471 After the investigation, the two
delegates “severely criticized Chen’s use of troops against the rebel masses” and advised
him to work with the rebels.472 These decisions and what followed until mid-July, indicated
that the top leaders, such as Zhou Enlai, “greatly underestimated the depth of anger among
the ‘conservative’ politico-military establishment at having become the principal target of
the Cultural Revolution, and overestimated the power of the military commanders to
control the tense situation in Wuhan.”473 A few days later, instead of accepting the advice,
Xie and Wang were kidnapped.
In Mao’s view, the incident was extremely threatening. First, when the incident
took place, Mao was in Wuhan. Although Mao’ presence was a secret and he believed that
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“the danger from the wounded Chen Zaidao was minimal,” Mao was still concerned that
“as a result of events that he had set in motion, his safety from a mob of soldiers and party
cadres could not be guaranteed.”474 Therefore, he left Wuhan in the early morning of July
21. Other than his personal safety, Mao feared more a spillover effect of the incident. The
incident marked the first time that regional military leaders disobeyed the order of Beijing,
which could have had a spillover effect and ultimately have led to a widespread military
revolt. According to Thomas W. Robinson, “Recurrence (of this type of incident, added)
would mean a severe defeat for the Cultural Revolution but more importantly could place
China as a whole in danger of widespread warlord-type conflict leading to incipient
breakup.”475
Under this seriously intense circumstance, Mao and his colleagues first designated
the incident as a “counterrevolutionary revolt.”476 In the meanwhile, Mao ordered to rescue
Xie and Wang and sent troops to surround Chen and his regional army. This “was the only
instance where regular troops in battle array actually faced each other during the Cultural
Revolution.”477 Realizing “the futility of fighting,” Chen surrendered and was dragged to
the capital.478 Chen was dismissed and replaced with loyal supporters of the Revolution.
After successfully dealing with the incident, Mao adopted a harsh policy against regional
military authorities. First, in the Hubei area, the killing continued for months. “In the
months that followed, more than 184,000 alleged members and supporters of the Million
Heroes in Hubei province were beaten up or killed; in Wuhan, 66,000 were wounded, over
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600 killed.”479 More broadly, to avoid the recurrence of the incident, Mao purged the army.
“Thus, from the end of July onward, calls were made to ‘drag out’ the ‘handful’ in the
Army itself.”480
The event was perceived as a turning point of the Cultural Revolution.481 Following
the incident, Mao had to gradually give up his original thought of creating order through
disorder and carefully deal with “actual threats of anarchy.”482 However, this change did
not take place right after the end of the incident. As MacFarquhar and Schoenhals point
out, “Mao’s first reaction to the Wuhan incident was to strengthen the left, not to back
down for fear of a PLA revolt.”483 In other words, Mao was still hopeful that the new order
could be built on an armed left and a restrained army. On July 22, Jiang Qing, the wife of
Mao and one of the leaders of the Cultural Revolution Committee, reiterated and endorsed
the idea of “attack with reason, defend with force” (wengong wuwei; 文攻武卫). The rebels
took this inflammatory remark as an endorsement of armed rebellion, which further
intensified armed clashes across the country. With nationwide fighting and industrial
disruption, in the fall of 1967, Mao called for the regular army to restore order. However,
Mao initially still felt uncertain about the role of the PLA and did not give explicit
permission to the army to use force to suppress the rebels. Without Mao’s permission, “the
PLA was powerless to cope with the fresh outbreak of factionalism in November and
December which threatened once again to plunge China into ‘armed struggle’ and
anarchy.”484 Later, “the army was given authority for the first time to use its power to
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defend itself from attack,” and “the Cultural Revolution therefore entered a phase of overt
military take-over.”485 Therefore, domestic strife and violence was not fully contained until
1969 which marked the end of the “exuberant phase of the Cultural Revolution.”486
Another objective of Mao at that time was “to dissociate Mao and his Cultural
Revolution from responsibility for the violence and lawlessness endemic in China by
finding new scapegoats.”487 For instance, Wang Li was purged and scapegoated for the
armed struggle in Wuhan.488 Similarly, leftist forces were purged and many rebels became
victims themselves.489 Mao blamed domestic friction on the Red Guards and their violence,
so he proposed ultimate military control and dispersed the Red Guards through the
campaign “up to the mountains and down to the villages” (shangshan xiaxiang; 上山下

乡). “[T]he glory days of the Red Guards were over soon after July 1968.”490
During the initial years of the Revolution, Mao’s attitude toward domestic strife
changed over time. Initially, he believed that the Chinese mass were on his side and that
disturbance or armed clashes could work for his revolutionary goal. Thus, Mao’s major
strategy was to take advantage of the chaos. But when the chaos became threatening, as
Robinson summarizes, Mao “had no choice but to deal severely with the regional
authorities.”491 This lack of choice not only reflected the inability of international conflict
initiation, as a policy choice, to cope with the severe danger, but also indicated the
predisposition of Mao to repression. First, the intense turmoil required imminent policies
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that could directly coped with the threat. Take the Wuhan Incident as an example. The
primary concerns Mao had during the incident were Chen’s regional military group and the
potential military revolt in other locations. Using force abroad was not able to eliminate
Chen and his supporters, nor help to prevent the recurrence of a military revolt. In contrast,
repressive measures, such as purge and suppression directly dealt with these concerns.
Through repressive measures, Mao ensured that those who had previously, or sought to,
defy his revolutionary policies were eliminated so that he could reduce the possibility of
the occurrence of another Wuhan Incident.
Second, his preference for military intervention to restore order had a deep root in
the early 1960s when he felt “the party to be slipping from his grasp” and decided to
“develop a power base” in the PLA.492 This set the stage for “the dialectic between anarchy
and military control during the period 1966-72.”493 “Not until after the fall of Lin Biao
would Mao be able to start trying to recover power for civilians.”494
Furthermore, Mao’s capability to mobilize, which he fostered through the
revolutions, did not predispose him to international conflict in the face of severe domestic
strife. The initiation and development of the Cultural Revolution reflected Mao’s
astonishing capability of mobilization and ultimately his dominance in the country. As
Chan puts it, “at those times when he was being driven by a utopian vision, as during the
GLF and the ‘Cultural Revolution’, his dominance was especially pronounced. The breadth
of Mao's dominance was made crystal clear by his ability, time and again, to inspire, to
arouse, and to motivate virtually the entire Chinese population from the central bureaucracy
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down to the grass roots.” 495 Specifically, during the first couple years of the Cultural
Revolution, the cult of Mao reached the apex. He had successfully mobilized the public to
work for his revolutionary goal. Therefore, another round of mobilization along the line of
conflict/cohesion did not make sense for him to deal with the problems he was faced with.
Lastly, during this time period, Mao intentionally avoided international tensions so
that he could focus on domestic issues. The initial years of the Cultural Revolution was a
time when “China was surrounded by hostile superpowers.” 496 For example, along the
northern border, war with the Soviet Union was possible, which was confirmed later by the
clash on Zhenbao/ Damansky Island between the two communist countries.
Simultaneously, the United States posed a potential threat on China’s southern border. The
fear of war spread across the country. Contrary to what the diversionary theory of war
suggests, Mao and his colleagues carefully dealt with those tensions and tried their best to
avoid provoking their rivals during their own domestic strife. As MacFarquhar and
Schoenhals points out, “Mao had launched the Cultural Revolution on the assumption that
the Vietnam War would not spill over into China at a time of internal upheaval.”497 Not
until late 1968 when the upheavals mostly ended and the relatively greater stability
assumed, did Mao and his colleagues “ponder the threatening international
environment.”498 This indicated that, at a time of severe domestic strife, Mao refrained
from diverting public attention through international disputes. Instead, he intentionally
avoided any potential conflict with foreign countries so that he could stabilize the internal
environment first.
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To conclude, the interactive effect between severe domestic strife and Mao’s
revolutionary experience resulted in diversion never being an option for solving these
threatening circumstances in the initial years of the Cultural Revolution. Specifically, first
the severe situation required a quick, direct, and to-the-point response, such as repression.
This was coupled with his former revolutionary experience that predisposed him to
repressive measures rather than to foreign aggression.

The Lin Biao Affair and Its Aftermath
By 1969, the radical Red Guard movement subsided, but the country was split along
antagonizing factional lines. Among them, two opposing power groups “emerged from the
chaos of the Cultural Revolution: Jiang Qing and her Central Cultural Revolution Small
Group (CCRSG), and Lin Biao and his generals.”499 Although the two groups were usually
put together as “counter-revolutionary cliques” and accused of creating disastrous
consequences of the Revolution, they “had little in common and were often in conflict.”500
Their struggle for power resulted in the turbulence and crisis in the last part of the Cultural
Revolution.
With Mao’s increasing trust of Lin Biao and the rising role of the military, Lin was
officially designated as the closest comrade-in-arms and successor of Mao in 1969 by a
new party constitution issued at the Ninth National Congress of the CCP. To explain this
official designation, MacFarquhar and Schoenhals quoted Edgar Snow’s observation “Lin
Biao’s ascent to power shows that militant communism has the upper hand on bureaucratic
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communism.”501 However, the reaffirmation of Lin’s position not only failed to prevent
but intensified the power struggle.
The tension between Lin and Jiang was nothing new. It dated back to the Red Guard
Movement when the military, under Lin, felt dissatisfied as they were under constant attack
by the rebels and Jiang was discontented with the military officers’ reluctance to accede to
her wishes.502 The accumulated tension gradually evolved into rupture. In 1969, Ye Qun,
Lin’ wife, dictated the military not to vote for Jiang and her supporters in the election of
Party Central Committee members. This irrigated Jiang. “Jiang Qing openly turned against
Lin Biao after the Ninth Congress.” 503 The Lin-Jiang tension then catalyzed the split
between Lin and Mao. In August 1970, the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee
was held at Lushan. Lin, under the instruction of Mao, criticized Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang’s
supporter, without mentioning his name. Most delegates preferred Lin’s group to Jiang’s
group because Lin’s policy was less radical. The rupture between the two groups became
evident, which pushed Mao to make a decision. Despite the catalyst role that the Lin-Jiang
tension played in the Lin-Mao split, the relationship between Mao and Lin was not
seamless in 1969. Mao and Lin were increasingly at odds. The major issue of dispute was
the role of the military. After the radical violence subsided in 1969, for Mao, “it seemed
unnecessary for military personnel to remain on the civilian posts.”504 However, Lin was
reluctant to “accept the renewed subordination of the army to the party.” 505
Mao’s role in helping to stir up the factional struggle during the Lushan conference,
remained opaque and indecisive. Some scholars argued that popular support for Lin’s
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position altered Mao. When Jiang Qing tried to defend Zhang and tole Mao that Lin’s
critique “was actually directed at Mao and the Cultural Revolution,” Mao was
convinced.506 In contrast, some other scholars are inclined to believe that Mao played an
independent and active role in the process. The rationale behind this was that Mao tried to
whip up emotions against the rump of the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG) to
justify his “moving against the military faction loyal to Lin Biao.”507 Regardless of Mao’s
true thought was, on August 25, Mao defended Zhang and expressed his discontent with
Lin’s group, which marked the beginning of Lin losing Mao’s favor. After the Lushan
Conference, Mao on one hand attacked the members of Lin’s faction but not Lin himself
so as to “lull Lin Biao into a sense of false security.”508 On the other hand, Mao made a
series of changes in terms of the military, such as weakening the military control of
governments and reorganizing military regions to make sure that troops around Beijing
were only loyal to him. Gradually, the tension between Mao and Lin became apparent.
Mao criticized Lin and his supporters in the military and compelled them to make selfcriticism.509 However, Lin refused to do so. Mao was frustrated and afraid of Lin’s faction
against his Revolution line.510 In Mao’s mind, “he regarded his wife and her henchmen as
his true ideological heirs.”511 Therefore, “[b]y July 1971, Mao had decided to get rid of Lin
Biao and his generals.”512
The following events remain mysterious. According to the official Chinese account,
in 1971 Lin Biao plotted an assassination of Mao during his inspection tour of southern
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China. This is called the “571 project.” It is also said that “the alleged coup was a Maoist
invention to depose Lin Biao, whose power within and over the PLA had grown too fast
and great for Mao to countenance. Rather than a successor, Lin had become a rival.”513
What was similarly mysterious was the primary conspirator of the coup. Little evidence
has showed that Lin Biao was the primary conspirator. Instead, based on current sources,
people were inclined to believe that Lin’s son, Lin Liguo, was the one who devised the plot
to react to increasing challenges from Mao.514 Given the mysterious nature of the event,
the only element that is evidenced is that after the failure of the project, Lin and his family
intended to flee to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, their airplane crashed in Mongolia on
September 13, 1971. After the Lin Biao incident, Mao eradicated the military dominance
of the party and “averted any danger of a military coup.”515
Whatever the root of the incident, many scholars agree that “the day of the incident,
September 13, 1971, was also the day of the greatest crisis in Mao's China.”516 It was
difficult for Mao to “make his people believe that their ‘beloved vice-chairman,’ who had
helped whip the country into the frenzied cult of Mao's personality, had turned overnight
into a would-be assassin of Mao himself and a traitor to the country.”517 Over the next
several months, Mao directed nationwide denunciations of Lin. “As knowledge of it spread,
the Lin Biao affair had a profoundly negative impact on perceptions of the Cultural
Revolution among all Chinese who had any pretensions to political literacy.”518 The fall of
Lin Biao heavily discredited the Cultural Revolution.

513

Karl 2010, 145.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2008, 324–336.
515
Ibid., 336.
516
Qiu 1999, 4.
517
Ibid., 5.
518
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2008, 338.
514

175

During the whole process, no matter when Mao was faced with the potential
military opposition or the actual abortive coup of Lin, Mao’s reaction was direct and
immediate, for example the purging of Lin’s faction and downplaying the role of the PLA
demonstrates this. Mao not only refrained from using foreign aggression, but also
intentionally improved China’s international environment. Before we investigate the
possibility that Mao may have used foreign aggression as a response to specific domestic
problems, we should first examine the changes in the context as well as Mao’s international
visions. From late 1960s, Mao gradually changed his originally aggressive international
view out of both pragmatic and emotional reasons.
First, the dangerous situation China was faced with urged Mao to take a less
provocative stance to deal with international relations. With the scare of the Soviet
preemptive strike against China in the north and the threat of the United States in the south,
Mao’s goal now was to contain the Soviet Union and avoid war - not to provoke the Soviet
Union and America. Second, Mao was “extremely disappointed with the outcome of
continually launching and fomenting world revolution in the preceding decade. Chinesesupported violent insurgencies in both Africa and Latin America failed to produce
appreciable results.” 519 With the vanished confidence in a world revolution and the
perceived threat of the Soviet Union, Mao became less aggressive internationally. The best
example of this was the US-China rapprochement, which took place in early 1970s.
Other than the general inclination against international tension, international
conflict was not useful to Mao’s domestic problems. The major domestic threat for Mao
was Lin and his military faction. To get rid of them, international conflict would not be a
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good choice, because “if preparing for war remained the principal preoccupation of the
Chinese state, then inevitably the PLA and its leaders would dominate the political
stage.”520 The Nixon administration’s change to their strategic posture made the time ripe
for Mao to open up to America so that he could neutralize the Soviet threat and thereby
diminish the role of the PLA and Lin. In sum, the threat of Lin and his military coup did
not motivate the revolutionary leader to adopt an aggressive foreign policy. Instead, Mao
dealt with internal pressure through the combination of domestic repression and
rapprochement with the former rival, America.
In the aftermath of the Lin Biao affair, Mao suffered from a dramatic physical
decline.521 For him, the main problem now was “to reconstruct the top leadership and in
particular to select a credible successor.” 522 Despite severe health problems, Mao’s
dominance within the party was unquestionable. This absolute control did not relieve
dismay and disillusionment. When he was faced with challenges from different factions
and popular chaos, he tried to manipulate the existing factional struggle to achieve his goal.
Despite the possibility of foreign aggression, Mao still remained concentrated on solving
problems with domestic measures and avoiding international tension.
Unlike what the radicals expected, the demise of Lin did not bring about the rise of
Jiang and her faction. Instead, Mao elevated Zhou Enlai and rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping.
Mao’s passive attitude toward ideological issues after the Lin Biao affair provided Zhou
and Deng an opportunity to “cool the temperature of the Cultural Revolution.”523 This
posed a danger to the radicals because leaders of the radicals, like Jiang, came to
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prominence due to the ideological preference of leftists. Jiang aligned with Wang Hongwen,
Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan against Zhou and Deng. This political coalition was
later dubbed as “the Gang of Four.” They kept on mobilizing the mass into ideological
campaigns in order to suppress their enemies. The factional political struggle therefore
continued.
Since Mao still favored a like-minded successor, the Tenth Party Congress held in
August 1971 marked the resurgence of the radicals. After recapturing the political highland,
the radicals started to get rid of their old enemy, Zhou Enlai. Contrary to what the radicals
expected, the terminal illness of Zhou “posed Mao a major political problem, and he solved
it in a manner repugnant to his radical followers.”524 Broadly speaking, the radicals were
good at manipulating domestic violence and stirring up factional emotions, but Mao was
well aware that he needed someone to replace Zhou as the stabilizing force in order to
prevent total chaos.525 Narrowly speaking, Mao did not trust Jiang’s political capability
and no one else in the radicals showed a strong competence in replacing Zhou’s role.526 In
a Politburo meeting in July 1974, Mao for the first time publicly criticized Jiang’s political
action, and referred to her coalition as a “Gang of Four.”527 Later, Mao decided to put Deng
Xiaoping in charge of the country, which irritated the Gang of Four. However, the elevation
of Deng did not indicate that Deng had won the war. Mao’s attitude was ambivalent
throughout Deng’s year in power. He defended Deng’s measures from attacks by the
radicals, but his view remained leftist and radical.528 This led to another fall of Deng after
the death of Zhou in 1976.
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In the last days of Mao, he did not trust either faction and eventually chose Hua
Guofeng as his heir, who Mao thought would preserve Maoist road without precipitating a
backlash.529 This simply was another mistake of Mao to choose Hua. Instead of promoting
unity within CCP leadership and preventing factional disputes, it became the springboard
for a new round of power struggle after Mao’s death on September 9, 1976. By 1976, “the
chaos had spread from the Politburo to society at large. China was plagued by economic
stagnation, rising social discontent, an upsurge of crime, and a rash of workers’ strikes.”530

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS IN RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC
UNREST UNDER MAO’S RULE
The failure of international conflict as a potential policy response to severe
domestic unrest does not mean the absence of the strategy during Mao’s rule. Mao did use
the tactic when he was not facing severe domestic strife. As discussed later, the Second
Taiwan Crisis and the Zhenbao Island Incident have been long argued as Mao’s
diversionary attempts when he was not faced with severe domestic problems. According
to Jian Chen, “[i]n order to justify and promote this process of revolutionizing China's Party,
society and population, Mao, informed by his previous experience, fully realized that the
creation of a perception of China facing serious external threats would help strengthen the
dynamics of revolutionary mobilization at home, as well as his authority and controlling
position in China's political life.”531
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In the 1960s, Mao took advantage of the war-time situation in Vietnam to eliminate
opposition within the party and prepare for starting the Cultural Revolution. For instance,
in 1962, when Wang Jiaxiang, the head of the CCP International Liaison Department
argued that China should not engage in another Korean-style confrontation with the United
States in Vietnam, which incurred quick and harsh criticism from Mao. Mao viewed this
idea as demonstrating a revisionist tendency, which should be eliminated from the party.
Before long, Mao publicly announced a more belligerent policy toward Vietnam. With this
strategy and rhetoric, Mao won the potential confrontation with his colleagues and
reconsolidated his dominance in the party.532
Similarly, in 1964, right after the escalation of the Vietnam War, Mao launched a
nationwide “Resist America and Assist Vietnam” movement to mobilize the Chinese
people along his revolutionary lines - this lay the basis for the future revolution.533 Notably,
unlike what traditional diversionary war theory implies, Mao in 1960s was unwilling to see
the situation where the Chinese support for Vietnam would evolve into a direct
confrontation with the United States. On 2 April 1965, Zhou Enlai, the premier, asked the
President of Pakistan to convey a message to Washington. Part of his message suggested
that China would not initiate a war with the United States, but to be prepared for a defensive
war.534 In other words, Mao only intended to take advantage of the tension among China,
Vietnam, and the U.S. without being directly involved in the conflict. Thus, based on the
severity level of the event, this case was not disastrous, however, this low-level of severity
ought not to discredit its importance as an attempt to deal with domestic troubles through
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international dispute. The goal of the belligerent attempt was clear: rally people around the
flag to eliminate within-party opposition and promote domestic policies. This perfectly
conforms to the prerequisite of diversionary conflict.
To sum up, as a leader who had demonstrated a great talent in massive mobilization
during the revolutions, Mao never neglected the power of the mass. The GLF was an
example of Mao’s use of massive mobilization as a strategy in economic construction and
societal transformation. Therefore, it was not surprising that he would use international
tensions to mobilize the population to achieve his goal. However, historical evidence
indicated that he only provoked international conflict when he was not faced with severe
domestic strife. Mao’s encounters with severe situations of domestic unrest required
measures that were quick, direct, and decisive, which absolutely neutralized his preference
of international dispute.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS UNDER MAO’S RULE
Throughout Mao Zedong’s rule, from the establishment of the People’s Republic
of China in 1949 to his death in 1976, China engaged in dozens of international disputes.
It is argued, by the existing literature, that Mao is an exemplar for aggressive features in
revolutionary leaders.535 However, none of these international conflicts were resulted from
Mao’s intention to address severe domestic strife. The existence both an intense domestic
turmoil and a dangerous revolutionary leader failed to translate into a real international
conflict. In this section, I will go over all the major international conflicts that China, under
Mao’s leadership, had engaged in and briefly discuss the reasons for China’s participation.

535

Horowitz and Stam 2014; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015; Kennedy 2011; Tudoroiu 2014; Tudoroiu 2016.

181

THE KOREAN WAR
The Korean War, “a civil war fought as a product of the incomplete independence
of Korea from the Japanese after the Second World War,” broke out as the North invaded
the South in the early 1950s.536 As Chen puts it, “The eruption of the Korean War on 25
June 1950 did not take Beijing’s leaders by surprise, but Washington’s decision to
intervene not only in Korea but also in Taiwan did.”537 Khrushchev recalled that during
Mao’s visit to Moscow, Mao expressed his opinion on the issue that the United States
would not interfere in such an internal affair as the Korean War.538 The involvement of the
U.S. concerned Mao and made him gradually acknowledge that it had changed China’s
strategic position. Specifically, after the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the U.S. not only
interfered in Korean war but had also changed its indifferent policy toward Taiwan. China
was now “compelled to face challenges in two directions at once, Taiwan and Korea.”539
Mao had to choose one challenge to concentrate China’s forces on. By October 1950, the
U.S. troops had great success in the battlefield and almost reached the Yalu River, the
border between China and Korea. “A faction of U.S. senators loudly supported the ‘nuking’
of China, or at least, an invasion to overthrow Communism.”540
Under this circumstance, Mao “quickly concluded that the real U.S. aim was to
threaten China itself, and he began to act accordingly.”541 On October 19, 1950, Chinese
troops crossed the Yalu river and entered the war, which marked the beginning of the threeyear long fighting between the two sides. China’s interference into the conflict has two
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explanations: one being a threat explanation and the other being an opportunity explanation.
The latter argues that the Korean crisis provided Mao with various opportunities. First, it
“would help establish the foundation for Mao’s grand plans to transform China’s old state
and society into a new socialist country.”542 Second, the Korean War was perceived by
Mao as a revolutionary war, so the success of the war could advance China’s international
reputation and influence.543 The considerations of domestic mobilization and international
reputation advancement may have also motivated Mao to interfere in the Korean War.
In retrospect, Mao’s decision to enter the war was due to the combination of threat
and opportunity, and it had nothing to do with the domestic politics. For the moment, the
relationship between internal problems and external conflict was not what the diversionary
war theory predicted: leaders tried to divert public attention from domestic problems via
initiating an international dispute. Rather, the real situation in China was that the
international conflict urged Mao and his colleagues to eliminate domestic problems. After
the Chinese entry into the Korean War, Mao launched a series of campaigns, such as the
campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries from February 1951 to 1953. As Frederick C.
Teiwes puts it, “Party leaders saw a genuine need for vigilance, given not only the danger
of American attack but also the possibility of KMT efforts to return to the mainland. In any
case, KMT sabotage operations were real, and dissident elements were encouraged by the
potential opportunities created by the Korean involvement.” 544 Another impact of the
international conflict on domestic situation was that “the war placed huge strains on an
already fragile economy and society.”545 After the Chinese involvement in the Korean war,
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domestic policies had shifted to a more radical line. “As a result, the new land reform
program of stepped-up implementation, an emphasis on class struggle, and mass
mobilization even at the risk of some social disorder was in sharp contrast to the principles
of the agrarian reform law.”546
Some may argue that the Korean War did help the new CCP government
consolidate its power. This may relate to why Mao decided to participate in the conflict in
the first place. However, the actual consequences of the event did not necessarily imply the
causes of the event. Most of the time, they do not, partially because “many of the results
of actions are unintended.”547 In terms of the situation here, it is true that after the Chinese’s
intervention in the war, “the regime penetrated society in a much more thorough manner
than initially.”548 This does not mean that Mao intentionally engaged in the conflict for the
purpose of consolidating power and dealing with domestic problems. Therefore, we can
conclude that China’s entry in the Korean War had no domestic root.
With the actual fighting moving into a stalemate, the two sides started to negotiate
a peace treaty. Eventually, on July 27, 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed,
which marked the end of fighting in the Korean War.

TWO TAIWAN STRAIT CRISES
During Mao’s years in charge, there were two Taiwan Strait Crises: one took place
in 1954 and the other in 1958. Although the two crises were the continuation of the Chinese
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Civil War and should not be treated as purely international conflicts, the crises shared some
basic logic with international conflicts. The primary reason for these common features is
that the crises occurred in the shadow of the Cold War, which means it was not just about
the CCP and the KMT, but also involved international players (i.e. the Soviet Union and
the U.S.). As Allen S. Whiting puts it, “The Taiwan Strait situation was a function, at least
in part, of Sino-American relations with a history extending back to the first offshore island
crisis in 1954-55.” 549 Therefore, it is reasonable to investigate the two crises for our
purpose.
The First Taiwan Crisis of 1954-1955 refers to the offshore armed conflict between
the CCP and the KMT. China’s plan to seize the offshore islands was not a new thought.
It was a continuation of the long-standing civil war. Meanwhile, the U.S. did not intervene
when China took small islands along Zhejiang’s shoreline, since “the view in Washington
was that while the islands were useful, they were probably not worth fighting for.”550
However, the situation changed considerably in the summer of 1954. Mao launched a
nationwide propaganda campaign to reiterate the slogan of “liberating Taiwan.” Later, Mao
intensified the hostility against Jinmen and Mazu in addition to the military operation along
the coastline of Zhejiang. For Washington, the assault on Jinmen seemed to be the first step
of Mao’s “liberating Taiwan” campaign.551 Therefore, on September 3, when the Chinese
artillery started to shell Jinmen, it quickly turned the continuation of the civil war into “a
full-blown international crisis, pushing Washington to the brink of a nuclear
confrontation.”552
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Mao’s provocative decision was deeply rooted in his long-standing fear of
inevitable direct military confrontation with the United States regarding the strait.
Specifically, Mao thought that war with the U.S. was most likely to take place in three
places: the Korean Peninsula, Indochina, and Taiwan. With the easing situation in Korean
and Indochina, it became increasingly possible that war may occur around the Taiwan
Strait. The fear urged him to adopt an aggressive policy which he thought would frighten
the U.S. from aligning with the KMT government and thus drive them apart. However,
“his action completely defeated his purpose: he pushed Washington much closer to
Taiwan.”553 On one hand, Washington and Taipei were officially aligned. On December 2,
1954, Washington and Taipei signed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, which
was ratified by the U.S. Senate on February 9, 1955. On the other hand, the U.S. seriously
considered the possibility of using nuclear weapons against China. “The threat of a nuclear
war and firm commitment finally caught up with Mao.”554 In April, under the direction of
Mao, Zhou Enlai expressed China’s willingness to negotiate with the United States. A few
months later, the First Taiwan Crisis ended. It is evident that the onset of the crisis was
purely due to foreign policy considerations rather than domestic political purposes. The
termination of the crisis was cursory and indecisive. It failed to address the fundamental
areas of dispute, so before long, the Second Taiwan Crisis broke out.
In 1958, Mao ordered the shelling of the KMT-held offshore islands, which was
known as the Second Taiwan Crisis. There are various explanations of the event. Some
argue that the crisis had a deep root in the Sino-Soviet split and reflected Mao’s anger about
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Soviet appeasement with the United States.555 After the death of Stalin and the ascent of
Khrushchev, the Soviet Union adopted a “peaceful coexistence” foreign policy and tried to
avoid the possibility of a nuclear war. “This implied Soviet acquiescence in the American
defense commitment to Taiwan, which shielded the Chinese Nationalists from final defeat
in their civil war with the Communists.”556 Thus, as scholars like Whiting and Melvin
Gurtov summarize, the outbreak of the Second Taiwan Crisis, according to this school of
argument, was due to either Mao’s intention to test the reliability of the Sino-Soviet alliance,
to demonstrate to the Soviet the vulnerability of the U.S. and drag the Soviet back into the
revolutionary orbit or because of his increased confidence in winning the region prompted
by the Soviet missile achievements.557
Another group of analysts sees the crisis as a function of Sino-American relations
and argues that Mao’s bombardment decision was actually a reaction to American actions
in Taiwan, elsewhere in Asia, and in the Middle East. 558 For instance, the increasing
military KMT buildup on the islands and the acquiescence of the U.S. convinced Mao that
“he must take direct action in the Strait.”559 Therefore, Mao ordered “a limited, low-risk
preemptive move against the offshore islands” in order to “deflect a dangerous and growing
threat to China’s security at a time of rapid domestic change and military weakness,” and
“bring the Americans to their senses about their ally on Taiwan.”560 In this sense, scholars
of this group are implying that the two Taiwan crises shared the same goal for China:
driving a wedge between the U.S. and the KMT.
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In addition to the two sets of foreign policy arguments, existing literature suggests
that the crisis was also prompted by domestic considerations.561 Michael Sheng concludes
that the crisis, in part, was due to Mao’s intention to manipulate “international tension to
serve his goal of domestic mobilization”, and promote his domestic agenda of the GLF.562
As Mao’s speech in September 1958 clearly pointed out, “besides its disadvantageous side,
a tensed [international] situation could mobilize the population, could particularly mobilize
the backward people, could mobilize the people in the middle, and could therefore promote
the Great Leap Forward in economic construction.”563 Similarly, Gurtov indicates that,
other than the mobilization argument, there is a diversionary explanation of the crisis.564
Specifically, this explanation tries to link the onset of the crisis to domestic problems and
argues that Mao used the crisis to silence domestic opposition. However, Gurtov
challenged the argument, because he thought Mao’s authority was secure at that time.565
Notably, secure authority of leaders does not imply the absence of domestic strife and
revolt. Thus, theoretically it is possible for leaders to initiate a diversionary dispute when
they feel secure about their power. Whether or not the crisis was a diversionary attempt per
se lie outside the focus here. What I care more about is that even if it was resulted from a
diversionary consideration, it took place when Mao did not face a severe domestic
opposition. Sufficient evidence has proven this, as discussed before.
American reaction to the Second Taiwan strait Crisis was different from its reaction
to the first one. This time “the United States was fully committed to the defense of the
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offshore islands, and was dangerously drawn to the brink of war with China.”566 In the face
of a possible direct military confrontation against the U.S., China backed down. The U.S.
“quickly responded to the Chinese announcement of a cease-fire on October 6, 1958” and
before long the crisis ended.567

THE SINO-INDIA BORDER WAR OF 1962
The Sino-India Border Conflict was the short war between China and India in 1962,
around the disputed territory along their border. The border dispute can be traced back to
1959. In early 1959, a Tibetan revolt broke out. As a result, the Dalai Lama and tens of
thousands of refugees, who were all potential future guerrillas, fled to India for safety. This
“forced the issue of control over high Himalayan passes through which guerrillas could
flee and also return.”568 It also set the stage for the long-standing Sino-India Border dispute.
A series of violent border incidents already took place before the war, together with the
establishment of outposts in the disputed areas.
In June 1962, India established a new outpost in the disputed areas of the Himalayan
frontier. “The resulting confrontations, protests, and incidents gradually raised the level of
public acrimony and quickened the pace of private diplomacy in the late summer and early
fall.” 569 Despite repeated diplomatic protests by the Chinese, which resulted in an
ultimatum, India refused to give in. “It appears Nehru was hoping for ‘victory without war’
and planned to establish the permanent frontier on India’s terms with China’s eventual
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acquiescence.”570 Under this circumstance, on October 20, 1962, “China took advantage
of the then ongoing Cuban missile crisis, when the American attention was diverted, to
teach India a lesson by launching a long-prepared surprise attack.”571 As Neville Maxwell
puts it, China’s war decision was imposed and reactive:
India created a border dispute, refused to negotiate it, and then attempted to
make good its claims by armed force. A military response was imposed upon
Beijing, and when it came it was measured and appropriate. China’s reactive
use of force was justified, strategically and politically, indeed Indian policy had
left Beijing no realistic alternative.572

The war ended in India’s catastrophic defeat and China’s unilateral cease fire a
month later. At the conclusion of the war, China pulled back to the line of actual control
“to create a demilitarize minimize tension and conflict along the border.”573 Due to the
public neutrality of Moscow in the war, the rift between China and the Soviet Union
continue to deepen, since for Mao, a neutral stance of the ally was seen as supporting the
enemy.574 In terms of the causes of the war, it is widely accepted that the border war was
simply a logical outcome of long-existing border disputes, rather than a result of domestic
concerns.575 Thus, it is of little controversy that the root of the conflict was not domestic in
nature.
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THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER CLASH OF 1969
The Sino-Soviet Border Clash, also known as the Zhenbao Island Incident, refers
to the border conflict between China and the Soviet Union around the Zhenbao Island in
1969. The border clash marked the final split of China and the Soviet which could traced
back to the late 1950s. It is contested in academia about who was the initiator of the conflict.
More recent research, with the help of newly released documents, suggests that although it
was the Soviet Union who opened fire first in March 1969, the incident was indeed a
defensive counterattack intentionally designed by China.576 The major question now is how
to explain China’s decision.
According to Thomas Robinson, explanatory possibility could fall into three
clusters: “rationales flowing from the local and regional situation in China, rationales
concerning politics in the Chinese capital, and foreign policy-related motivations.”577 The
first category focuses on local commander’s personal consideration and the development
of the local firefight. Robinson elucidates one of the possibilities in the first category: “the
local Chinese border commander may have possessed enough latitude to initiate military
action if growing border tensions seemed to warrant it.”578 Robinson is somewhat skeptical
about the first category, and thinks the most convincing explanation should be a
combination of foreign policy rationales and national political motivations.579
At the foreign policy level, various possibilities stand out in the existing literature.
First, the incident was actually a reaction to Soviet aggression. By early 1969, Mao and his
colleagues could no longer endure the long-lasting Sino-Soviet border disputes, and
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thought it necessary to “strike back in a well-planned military attack” to teach the Soviet
Union a bitter lesson.580 The opportunity finally came when Soviet provocation intensified
at Zhenbao Island. As a result, China launched the first counterattack on March 2. The
second possibility is about preemption. As Robinson specifies, it is
the idea that whenever the Chinese Communists perceived a superior force
about to attack, the proper strategy (learned through bitter experience during
the Shanghai- Kiangsi-Yenan days) was to preempt the situation at a place and
time of one's own choosing, thus throwing the enemy off balance and perhaps
even preventing his coming ahead at all.581

Third, Mao tried to use the border conflict to estrange the Chinese mass from the
Soviet Union and the “bourgeois revisionist line.” In addition to the three possibilities listed
by Robinson, the existing literature provide a fourth one, that is, Mao’s desire to adjust the
relationship with the United States.582 At that point, Mao needed a compelling argument to
persuade the U.S. that the Sino-Soviet split was authentic and serious. Thus, an open
confrontation with the Soviet Union was a viable demonstration of its legitimacy. However,
the validity of this explanation was challenged by some scholars. For instance, Kuisong
Yang argued against this by indicating that the unprecedented war scared the top leadership
of CCP in 1969, which made it impossible for Mao and his colleagues to initiate a conflict,
purely to woo the United States.583
At the national political level, Robinson illustrates two possibilities. The first
possibility fits the logic of “gamble for survival.” Specifically, “factional strife in Peking
was so fierce that some groups, realizing they were literally fighting for their lives, took
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extreme measures.”584 According to Robinson, among those factions, only Mao and Lin
Biao had the possible motives and the power to initiate a conflict. The most likely option
would be Lin who “may have felt that a foreign threat would provide additional
argumentation for continued military administration and thus enhance his own chances of
long-term survival.” 585 However, little evidence shows that it was Lin who ordered
counterattack at the Zhenbao Island. Even though Lin was proved to be the initiator, it is
still not that convincing. The incident took place one month before Lin was designated as
the heir of Mao in the Ninth National Congress of the CCP, which means Lin was not faced
with Mao’s mistrust as he was years later. In other words, there was no severe threat or
problem that pushed Lin to gamble for survival.
The second national-level explanation follows the logic of diversion. For the
leadership, “a foreign incident was necessary to divert popular attention from domestic
tensions. The ensuing war scare and its concomitant outpouring of nationalism would
enable the leadership to carry through an ideologically based permanent restructuring of
Chinese society previously planned but sabotaged by the bureaucrats.”586 Scholars, like
Dmitri Ryabushkin and Yang, have made similar arguments to explain how Mao could
scapegoat the Soviet Union, having organized battles at the border, for “[t]he crash of the
economy, the degradation of education and culture, catastrophe in the social sphere, full
disorder and lawlessness in the country.”587 According to Yang, “the military clashes were
primarily the result of Mao Zedong’s domestic mobilization strategies, connected to his
worries about the development of the ‘Cultural Revolution’.”588 To support this argument,
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Yang quoted Mao’s words after the incident: “we should let them [the Soviet] come in,
which will help us in our mobilization.”589 This possibility may be true, but it does not
challenge my argument that revolutionary leaders are less likely to use force abroad when
they are faced with severe domestic problems. As discussed above, although China was
full of problems, the domestic situation in 1969 was not as pernicious as the initial years
of the Revolution. Order was restored and turmoil was contained. Therefore, this
aggressive attempt was a response to deal with less intense problems.
Mao’s initial plan was to fight “a controllable military conflict that would serve his
larger political purpose.”590 However, soon after the onset of the incident, the situation was
out of control and created “a perceived danger of war that Mao had never intended.”591
Before long, Beijing and Moscow took steps to de-escalate the conflict and ended the
border clashes.

SUMMARY
As one of the prominent revolutionary leaders, Mao’s policy decision-making has
caught scholars’ eyes. They provide various accounts for his aggressive foreign policies
and repressive domestic campaigns. However, they fail to bridge the two and explain why
in most cases, if not all, Mao refrained from using international conflict as a policy response
to severe domestic problems, but preferred measures like repressive campaigns.
In this chapter, after scrutinizing the history under Mao’s long rule, we find his
reluctance or even neglect to use foreign aggression when coping with intense domestic
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problems a result of his revolutionary experience and the current intense context. First,
Mao’s revolutionary experience and ascent to power during the revolution fostered his
confidence in eliminating opposition through repressive campaigns and mobilizing the
mass. He had considerable expertise when setting an agenda and eliminating enemies by
given then various stigmatic labels.
Second, the revolutionary experience endowed him with low tolerance for
opposition and enemies and predisposed him to repressive measures. One of the major
lessons he learned from the previous revolutions was that “struggle is the means to unity
and unity is the aim of struggle. If unity is sought through struggle, it will live; if unity is
sought through yielding, it will perish.”592 Specifically, he believed that ruthless repression
was the right way to deal with “the die-hard forces.”
Third, starting from the communist revolution, “Mao’s strategic doctrine had long
called for concentrating forces in only one direction.” 593 This made him less likely to
provoke conflict during severe domestic strife, because provocative behaviors may force
him into a situation in which he had to deal with both internal and external problems at the
same time.
Lastly, the serious domestic situation requires direct and immediate measures to
deal with the problems. With a prominent dominance and strong popular support in China,
Mao had no reason to rely on foreign aggression rather than a more direct solution. It
remains questionable whether international tension will ever solve the problem and even if
it does, it still takes more time for international disputes to take effect than other measures
do.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The field of psychohistory has explored the peculiar fit between the personalities
of great individuals and the requirements of history in their particular time and place.
—John W. Garver, Little Chance: Revolutions and Ideologies, 1997, p.87

How do rebel leaders respond to domestic unrest? Are they more likely to provoke
an international conflict and, if so, under what conditions? These questions can be
disaggregated into two major sub-questions answered in this dissertation project: (1) “are
rebel leaders more likely to provoke an international conflict than their non-rebel
counterparts in the face of internal unrest?” and (2) “are rebel leaders more likely to
provoke an international conflict rather than to utilize other policies (e.g. repression) to
deal with domestic troubles?” This concluding chapter recapitulates the theoretical
arguments and empirical findings in this dissertation. The following section will highlight
the importance of the aforementioned aspects to both the study of rebel leaders’ policy
preferences and international conflicts. The final section discusses the practical
implications of my findings.

DO REBEL LEADERS FAVOR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE DURING
DOMESTIC UNREST?
This dissertation project introduces a new framework to understand rebel leaders’
policy response to domestic unrest and investigates whether rebel leaders have a policy
preference of initiating international dispute in response to domestic unrest. I argue that
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leaders’ policy response to domestic unrest is a function of their pre-existing preferences
and contextual factors. Pre-existing policy preferences suggest the policies that leaders’
predispositions (shaped by their rebellion experience) would induce them to adopt in an
ideal situation, whereas contextual factors refer to the external situations that would
reshape their preferences and constrain their ability to adopt certain policies. Thus, if a
rebel leader has a pre-existing preference of using foreign aggression to cope with internal
troubles, and the current context neither changes his or her preference nor constrains his or
her ability to implement it, then the country may provoke an international conflict. If,
however, contextual factors either reshape the leader’s preference in favor of an alternative
policy or make initiating international dispute impractical, the leader may pursue another
policy path.
This dissertation project proposes that the severity level of domestic unrest is a
contextual factor that significantly affects how rebel leaders respond to such domestic
turmoil. In other words, rebel leaders’ willingness to use force abroad is contingent on the
level of severity of domestic unrest. When rebel leaders face a risk of severe internal unrest,
they are less willing to engage in international conflicts, because severe domestic strife will
reshape leaders’ perception and neutralize their policy preference toward international
conflicts via deliberative cost-benefit calculation and intuitive behaviors modifications.
This is because first, high intensity domestic strife changes the cost-benefit
calculation about available policy options. Specifically, serious domestic problems call for
a direct, speedy, and “to-the-point” policy response, which enables domestic measures (i.e.
co-optation and repression) to be more efficacious because domestic measures aim to
directly and effectively address the problem that gives rise to the strife.
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Second, severe domestic unrest affects rebel leaders’ intuitive behaviors by
activating some certain predispositions of leaders endowed by rebellion experience, which
induce them to use other policy response than initiating international dispute. To begin
with, the extremely unstable environment compels leaders to choose the policy they feel
most confident in. The rebellion experience makes rebel leaders more confident in utilizing
repression to deal with oppositions, given that they come into power after they survive a
severe domestic crisis (i.e. rebellion). This confidence will be translated into a preference
of repression during severe domestic unrest. In addition, severe domestic unrest is often
accompanied with the risk of international intervention. Compared to foreign aggression,
domestic measures better conform to rebel leaders’ appreciation of national authority and
sovereignty (a predisposition they obtained from rebellion experience). Furthermore,
rebellion experience predisposes rebel leaders to be ruthless to enemies, which will be
translated into a policy preference of repression during severe domestic unrest.
Both quantitative and qualitative analyses discussed in the preceding chapters
provide support for these claims. In the statistical studies of Chapter 3, the monadic and
dyadic cross-national tests indicate that when the severity level of domestic unrest
increases, rebel leaders are not more likely to provoke a MID than their non-rebel
counterparts. In the extreme instable situation, rebel leaders are more willing to use
violence at home, not abroad.
Two historical case studies discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 provide further support.
Through his long rule over Indonesia from 1967 to 1998, Suharto never responded to severe
domestic unrest by using force abroad, since the severe domestic environment reshaped his
preference in favor of domestic repression. In particular, imminent and severe problems
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called for direct and time-saving solutions and in this regard, domestic measures were more
effective for Suharto. In addition, his rebellion experience made Suharto more experienced
in using domestic measures, especially repression, which gave him greater confidence in
utilizing them. The confidence of leaders in policies is very important, especially when
they are dealing with emergencies. Moreover, his prior rebellion participation predisposed
Suharto to be ruthless toward opposition, which was later translated into a preference for
repression against opposition. All of these reasons resulted in the absence of international
dispute during severe domestic troubles.
Similarly, although China under Mao Zedong initiated a couple of international
militarized disputes, none of them took place as a response to serious domestic problems.
When Mao was faced with serious internal troubles, he turned to domestic repression, not
only because his long-term revolutionary experiences gave him more confidence in
repressive measures but also because in a severe situation, repression was a more efficient
and thus the preferable response. Specifically, like Suharto, prior revolutionary experiences
caused Mao to have less empathy toward opposition and more confidence in repression,
ultimately predisposing him to repression in the face of opposition. Furthermore, repression
is a prompter, direct, and thus more efficient way to cope with high intense troubles,
compared to launching an international dispute. All of these factors led to Mao’s preference
for repression rather than foreign aggression in the face of serious internal problems.
When considered together, these findings indicate strongly that rebel leaders rarely
choose to provoke international conflicts in response to severe domestic unrest. Instead,
they are more likely to repress domestically. This is because the high levels of domestic
unrest reshape their preference in favor of domestic repression.
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
The primary goal of this dissertation has been to develop a better understanding of
rebel leaders’ behaviors. The dissertation project, I hope, helps to advance the existing
studies in several ways. First, the theoretical approach introduced in Chapter 2 tries to bring
the context back to the forefront of the research into rebel leaders and international conflict.
The existing studies of rebel leaders and war focus primarily on leaders’ personal
preferences rather than on the larger context in which foreign policy is made. They have
tended to emphasize consistencies with the rebel leaders to explain their foreign policy
preferences. This tendency is problematic, because it overlooks the variations of rebel
leaders’ behaviors. The more systematic approach that incorporates contextual factors with
leaders’ personal preferences could fill the theoretical gap.
Secondly, this approach offers more accurate understandings of leaders’ policy
preferences. When making claims that leaders with certain traits may have a predisposition
or preference of some type of policy, most existing scholarly explanations of leader
preferences assume these predispositions or preferences as given, pre-existing and fixed.
This assumption, however, is misleading and overestimates the complication of individual
preference. In fact, predispositions and preferences are situational and subject to the change
of the context. In other words, preferences obtained from previous life experiences could
be reshaped by the current situation. In this case, rebellion participation may endow rebel
leaders with an inclination toward using force abroad, but contextual factors could also
shape leaders’ pre-existing preferences and make them favor alternative policies in a
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particular situation. Therefore, the theory introduced in this dissertation provides a more
thorough analysis of leaders’ decision-making process.
Third, the approach incorporates the role of leaders into the internal-external
conflict nexus and fills an important gap left by conventional wisdom. The conventional
wisdom on one hand assumes that initiating international dispute in response to domestic
unrest is driven by the principal-agent problem emphasizing how leaders behave when their
private interests deviate from national interests,594 and on the other hand classifies this
approach into the state and societal level of analyses neglecting the active role of leaders.595
Put differently, the existing studies assume away the variation of individual leaders and
their cross-situational inconsistency and believe that domestic unrest will produce a
consistence among leaders’ choice. This has left an important gap—the field simply cannot
explain whether leaders will go to war unless we treat leaders as the real actors and allow
them to play an active role. The dissertation project thus tries to bring the role of leaders
back into the internal-external conflict nexus and discusses whether rebel leaders prefer
foreign aggression as the response to domestic unrest, given their motivation of securing
their political survival.
To summarize, one of the major problems of existing relevant research is that it
focuses on the influence of one image and neglects the impact of other images. Kenneth
Waltz in his book Man, the State, and War classified theories of causes of war into three
“images”—individuals, the nation-state, and the international system.596 Later, J. David
Singer renamed them as three levels-of-analysis. 597 Most recent quantitative studies of
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rebel leaders and war unfold in one level of analysis and rarely discuss the interaction
between different levels. This results in a failure to provide a complete picture of rebel
leaders’ foreign policy-making. My theory, in this dissertation, aims to investigate the
interaction between the individual level and the state level of analysis to explain why rebel
leaders provoke an international dispute in the face of domestic unrest at some time, but do
not at other times.

PRATICAL IMPLICATIONS
With the end of large-scale decolonization movements and world-wide communist
revolutions, the substantial reduction of most dramatic rebellion movements (e.g.
revolutions) makes many people believe that rebel leaders are rapidly becoming obsolete.
It is certainly true that we may be less likely to encounter a large number of revolutionary
leaders like Mao and Suharto who participated either in communist revolutions or
revolutions for independence from the colonizers. Rebellions against current regimes,
however, could take other forms than those two kinds of revolutions. Given the risky and
violent features shared by all kinds of rebellion movements, we can expect contemporary
rebel leaders to behave similarly to how past (communist or postcolonial) rebel leaders
behaved.
From the civil war in Columbia, Nepal and Syria, the revolution in Ukraine and
Kyrgyz to a series of uprisings in the Arab Spring, the recent decade has shown that
rebellion is fresh in the air. That said, having someone with prior rebellion experience come
to power will be more than just thinkable in the future.
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Even at present, it could be of great significance if we can better know how
rebellion participation experiences would affect participants’ behaviors after they assume
power later. In 2000, 26.29% countries of the world were under the leadership of a former
rebel. Now, rebel leaders are still in control of many countries that may affect international
politics greatly. For example, Ali Khamenei, the Incumbent Supreme Leader of Iran, was
a key figure in the Iranian Revolution. Cuba is still under the rule of Raúl Castro, who was
a commander in the Cuban Revolution. Paul Kagame in Rwanda and Abdel Fatah el-Sisi
in Egypt serve as the examples of leaders who participated in the rebellions that occurred
after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, understanding how rebel leaders behave will
enable states to control the risk when interacting with those rebel-led countries.
As Rouhi and Snow (2019) notes, “Despite the critical importance of revolutionary
regimes to international security, most scholarship attempts to generalize about these
diverse and complex cases.”598 In other words, existing scholarship assumes that previous
rebellion participation endows leaders with some special characteristics, such as a
predisposition toward foreign aggression, thus making their foreign policies easy to predict.
This generalization is dangerous in practice, because it could stereotype rebel leaders as
warmongers and drive policy-makers without such an experience to make inappropriate
policies when dealing with a rebel leader. For instance, when explaining the tension
between revolutionary states and status quo states, Walt introduces a “spiral model,” which
suggests that revolution, for a variety of reasons, leads to mutual suspicion.599 In this case,
the stereotype of rebel leaders would definitely deepen the mutual suspicion between
revolutionary states and status quo powers and thus is more likely to cause conflict.
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Therefore, a useful foreign policy toward countries led by rebel leaders needs to
unravel the complexities of rebel leaders’ decision-making. By introducing a new
framework to understand rebel leaders’ policy making, this dissertation project hopes to
delineate a detailed process through which the decisions are made. The implications of this
study’s findings for the foreign policy of rebel leaders should be a source for optimism,
since they are not more likely to provoke an international conflict in response to severe
domestic unrest. More accurately, rebel leaders prefer repression to foreign aggression in
the face of serious internal troubles. That said, states may feel less concerned about a rebelled desperate country, since rebel leaders would devote most resources to directly solving
problems rather than initiating an international conflict. However, states should be
relatively careful when a rebel-led country is experiencing low-level domestic strife, since
rebel leaders are more likely to use foreign aggression in this situation.
Yet, when it comes to domestic politics, the results of this study provide reason for
caution. Given the inclination of rebel leaders to repress as a response to severe domestic
unrest, the possibilities of the infringement of human rights is high. In an extreme case, if
the infringement of human rights becomes a state-sponsored atrocity, it may incur
humanitarian intervention from the international community and thus lead to international
conflict.

204

APPENDIX A: COUNTRIES WITH DOMESTIC UNREST IN
THE PREVIOUS YEAR
Initiation of Militarized Disputes
Rebel Experience

0.509***
(0.137)

Severity Level of Domestic Unrest Lag

0.004*
(0.002)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.227
(0.152)
0.126
(0.131)
6.603***
(1.282)
0.268*
(0.117)
0.987***
(0.106)
-0.164***
(0.030)
-2.354***
(0.121)
3,961

Rebel Experience* Severity Level of
Domestic Unrest Lag
Military Service without Combat
Experience
Combat Experience
Material Capabilities
Autocracy
Five-Year Challenge Lag
Peace Years
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared (%)

9.78

Log pseudo-likelihood

-1734.1266

SE adjusted for
1,280
Note: All variables about domestic strife are one-year lagged.
Time for analyses is 1875-2000.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001

TABLE A.1. Coefficients from logistic regression model of the monadic impact of rebel experience
and severity level of domestic unrest on the initiation of militarized disputes, 1875-2000
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APPENDIX B: CATEGORICAL MEASURES OF UNREST
Model 2
(Rebel*High-level
Strife)
1.059***
(0.010)

Model 3
(Rebel*Low-level Strife)

Material Capabilities,
Initiator

Model 1
(Rebel*Domestic
Strife)
1.054***
(0.010)

Material Capabilities,
Target

1.070***
(0.011)

1.072***
(0.247)

1.070***
(0.011)

1.306
(0.230)

1.405
(0.247)

1.337
(0.237)

Logged Distance between
Capitals

0.737***
(0.011)

0.737***
(0.011)

0.737***
(0.011)

Democracy, Initiator

1.203
(0.150)
1.580***
(0.190)
0.357***
(0.065)
0.971***
(0.003)
1.082
(0.098)
1.330*
(0.150)

1.240
(0.154)
1.602***
(0.193)
0.352***
(0.064)
0.971***
(0.003)
1.114
(0.101)
1.337**
(0.151)

1.193
(0.149)
1.573***
(0.189)
0.356***
(0.064)
0.971***
(0.003)
1.081
(0.099)
1.339*
(0.152)

Initiator’s Proportion of
Dyadic Capabilities

Democracy, Target
Joint Democracy
Peace Years
Combat Experience
Military Service without
Combat Experience

1.052***
(0.010)

Rebel Experience
High-level Strife
1.225
(0.138)
Low-level Strife
1.408**
(0.180)
No Strife
1.572***
(0.217)
Constant
Observations

High-level Strife
1.247
(0.141)

0.020***
(0.003)
121,790

No High-level Strife
1.432***
(0.142)

Low-level Strife
1.264*
(0.125)
No Low-level Strife
1.570***
(0.157)

0.022***
(0.003)
121,778

0.022***
(0.003)
121,763

Pseudo R-squared (%)
15.45
15.24
Note: All variables about domestic strife are one-year lagged.
Time for analyses is 1875-2000. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001

15.36

TABLE B.1. Odds ratio from logistic regression model of MID initiation with interaction
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Model 4
(High-level Strife)

Model5
(Low-level Strife)

1.062***
(0.008)
1.044***
(0.009)
1.063
(0.185)

1.056***
(0.008)
1.049***
(0.009)
1.050
(0.180)

0.785***
(0.010)

0.780***
(0.010)

Democracy, Initiator

1.101
(0.145)

1.125
(0.138)

Democracy, Target

1.276
(0.178)

1.282
(0.170)

0.462***
(0.089)
0.978***
(0.002)
1.218*
(0.110)
1.280*
(0.155)
1.166
(0.112)
0.035***
(0.005)
83,736

0.430***
(0.077)
0.977***
(0.002)
1.137
(0.090)
1.218
(0.141)
1.195*
(0.103)
0.037***
(0.005)
97,470

10.82

11.76

Material Capabilities, Initiator
Material Capabilities, Target
Initiator’s Proportion of Dyadic
Capabilities
Logged Distance between Capitals

Joint Democracy
Peace Years
Combat Experience
Military Service without Combat
Experience
Rebel Experience
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared (%)

Note: All variables about domestic strife are one-year lagged.
Time for analyses is 1875-2000.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001

TABLE B.2. Odds ratio from logistic regression model of MID initiation without interaction
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